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Management tools and solutions are largely conceptualised through well-defined 
and well-understood problems. However, management often encounter problems 
that are neither well defined nor straightforward. These problems are labelled 
wicked problems and require a different management approach to solve. Many of 
these wicked problems fall within the public service delivery sector, of which the 
criminal justice system is part. The current study argues that crime in South Africa 
is a wicked problem because it portrays characteristics such as persistence and 
pervasiveness and does not have obvious causal relationships. Despite 
collaboration across several organisations and substantial resource investment, 
crime remains ‘untamed’ in South Africa.  
This study responded to calls in the literature for further research into 
collaborations that are mandated and directed. Given that wicked problems are 
unique and require unique solutions, this research proposed a framework that 
applies to South Africa and its historical context and is applicable in the governance 
context under which crime is addressed. This presented a compelling reason to 
undertake the current research and use the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security 
Cluster as a case to study intragovernmental collaboration.  
The objective of the research is threefold: first, to gain an in-depth explanation of 
intragovernmental collaboration within the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security 
Cluster from people who take part in the collaboration; second, to identify the 
dimensions of the collaboration and the interrelationships between them; and third, 
to develop a strategic framework for intragovernmental collaborations.  
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Interactive Qualitative Analysis was used as a research method with ten Senior 
Managers participating in a focus group and semi-structured interviews and five 
Top Managers participating in semi-structured interviews. In-depth descriptions of 
the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security collaboration were captured through 
Interactive Qualitative Analysis in line with the qualitative research approach and 
eight key dimensions of the collaboration were identified. 
The research proposed a Strategic Framework for Intragovernmental 
Collaboration that takes into account the findings of the research and a literature-
based conceptual framework underpinned by the Resource Dependency Theory, 
the Resource-Based View and the Complexity Theory.  
Findings from the study demonstrate that eight dimensions are key in the Justice, 
Crime Prevention and Security collaboration, and these dimensions are ranked in 
order of importance. The presented framework also highlights several differences 
from reported studies in this field. The contribution of this study not only extends 
the literature on intragovernmental collaborations but also sets clear guidelines for 
managers and policy makers to establish and direct intragovernmental 
collaborations. The chosen methodology and insider access to senior 
management ultimately produced rich descriptions not previously available.  
Two key recommendations are identified for the Justice, Crime Prevention and 
Security Cluster. Firstly, addressing the wicked problem of crime requires active 
participation of stakeholders beyond the Cluster and secondly, it must include 
active citizenship that is instrumental in contributing knowledge and learning as 
part of a feedback loop into the criminal justice system. Within the Justice, Crime 
vii 
Prevention and Security Cluster, the study identified three drivers of the 
collaboration that need to be addressed to enable the Cluster to work towards a 
goal consensus of addressing crime. These are leadership, culture and 
governance arrangements. Models of leadership and governance are included to 
guide the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster in this regard.  
Keywords: interorganisational collaboration, interorganizational collaboration, 
intragovernmental collaboration, interorganisational networks, interorganizational 
networks, Interactive Qualitative Analysis, IQA, collaborative governance, wicked 
problem, criminal justice system, Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster, 
JCPS Cluster  
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Chief Director: A Senior Management rank that is higher than a Director. 
Collaboration: Two or more independent organisations sharing their resources 
(knowledge, people, finances) towards identifying and achieving a substantial 
common goal. Refer to Section 3.5. 
Conceptual framework: A depiction or structure that a researcher compiles 
using literature to explain a phenomenon.  
Department:  Administrative components that constitute the government in South 
Africa. Examples are the Department of Health, the Department of Education and 
the South African Police Service. Within this document, the word “Department” 
refers specifically to the national government department unless otherwise 
specified. 
Director: The first-level senior Management rank in the South African public 
service responsible for implementation of government programmes. 
Director-General: An administrative head of a governmental department and 
highest-ranking civil servant. (A Director-General reports to a Minister).  
Framework: A depiction or representation of ideas that explain a phenomenon. 
Intragovernmental collaboration: Collaboration undertaken within national 
government departments and entities associated with national departments. Refer 
to Section 3.5. 
xvii 
Minister: A member of the Executive (one of the three arms of state) who serves 
as a Member of Parliament. Ministers are elected by the State President and are 
usually members of the ruling party.  
Strategic management: A discipline within organisations that includes analysing 
the environment, identifying priorities, planning, monitoring and reporting.  
Senior Managers: Directors (Level 13) and Chief Directors (Level 14) or the 
equivalent in public service in South Africa. These managers are responsible for 
the implementation of government programmes. 
Top Managers: Deputy Directors-General (Level 15) and Directors-General (Level 
16) or the equivalent within the public service. These managers provide strategic 




1 CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Management tools and solutions are largely conceptualised through well-defined 
and well-understood problems. However, management often encounters problems 
that are neither well defined nor straightforward to solve. These are labelled wicked 
problems and require a different management approach (Beinecke, 2009; 
McMillan and Overall, 2016; Van Bueren et al., 2003). Many of these wicked 
problems fall within the public service delivery sector, of which the criminal justice 
system is a part. 
The New Public Management approach that was adopted by governments in the 
1980s enforced strategic management and other administrative approaches to 
improve the effectiveness of government (Hood and Dixon, 2013).  
Within South Africa, regulations of the Public Finance Management Act (South 
Africa, 1999), include clauses on strategic management. Furthermore, in 2010, an 
outcomes approach was introduced through the Department of Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) for interdepartmental coordination of 
programmes and government-wide outcomes (South Africa, 2010). In total, 12 
government outcomes were identified, and the Justice, Crime Prevention and 
Security (JCPS) Cluster was tasked with achievement of Outcome 3: All People in 
South Africa Are and Feel Safe. The focus of this research study is on the JCPS 
Cluster’s coordination and implementation of Outcome 3 and its approach in 
addressing crime. 
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Despite clear policy guidelines and the allocation of resources, the effectiveness 
of this outcome’s approach within the JCPS Cluster is in question. For example, 
the murder rate has been increasing annually for more than seven years and was 
reported by the South African Police Service (SAPS) in 2019 to be 36.4 people per 
100 000, which is more than six times the rate recorded in the USA (Vecchiatto 
and Cohen, 2019). Other serious crimes such as gender-based violence, 
housebreaking, hijacking and business crimes also showed an increase in the 
2019 annual crime statistics (Vecchiatto and Cohen, 2019). This is despite an 
annual expenditure of over R73 billion by the SAPS and a further R14 billion by 
the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJCD) (South Africa, 
2018a) to reduce crime levels. On a separate but related matter, the SAPS led an 
intradepartmental implementation of an integrated IT system, which after 10 years 
and an investment of R7 billion resulted in little progress against agreed milestones 
(Mawson, 2015). Intragovernmental issues were identified as some of the key 
reasons for the lack of progress in the early days of the programme (Mawson, 
2015). 
The current study argues that crime in South Africa is a wicked problem because 
it portrays characteristics such as persistence and pervasiveness and does not 
have obvious causal relationships (Van Bueren et al., 2003; Head, 2019). An 
alternative approach with appropriate collaborative effort is, therefore, needed at 
both the planning and the implementation phases of key strategies and 
programmes in order to achieve objectives. 
Crime cuts across a number of organisations and requires collaboration at all 
levels. For example, at a strategic level, planning regarding resource allocation to 
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courts, police stations and correctional centres in addition to the human resources 
thereof is critical. These organisations are led by different Members of Cabinet and 
require effective interorganisational partnerships. 
Interorganisational networks are not only difficult to implement but are also time 
consuming and require combined human and other resources (Ansell and Gash, 
2008). A large number of factors such as leadership and trust affect the 
functionality and outcomes of these collaborative efforts, and some of these factors 
could be more significant than others (Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-Malyjurek, 2016). 
The aim of this research was to uncover the key dimensions of collaboration 
through the experiences of managers who are participating in intragovernmental 
collaborations within the JCPS Cluster. This effort produced a framework of 
intragovernmental collaboration that considers theories of interorganisational 
networks and complexity.  
Interorganisational networks exhibit a wide variety of forms and levels of 
complexities, some of which are mandated by a sponsor or public policy and some 
of which are formed by voluntary participants. Of particular interest to the current 
study are the mandated networks that are compiled through legislation or by a 
public authority. These efforts of partnership formation, although challenging, are 
often unavoidable (Keast and Mandell, 2012). The current study responded to a 
call by scholars to make contributions towards a better understanding of 
context-specific networks (Emerson, Nabatchi & Balogh, 2011; Putansu, 2015; Gil-
Garcia, Guler, Pardo and Burke, 2019; Gazley and Guo, 2020) and public sector 




1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem investigated by this study is the ineffective intragovernmental 
collaborations that address wicked problems. Following an extensive literature 
review, the researcher was unable to find a comprehensive framework that is 
relevant to the South African crime situation and that guides parties in 
intragovernmental collaborations to address wicked problems within the context of 
a developing country. 
Generally, governments tend to be structured for coordination rather than 
collaboration. In this regard, problems that require government departments to 
work together in a much tighter formation tend to falter. For example, the JCPS 
Cluster has been relatively successful in coordination projects such the 
implementation of the Child Justice Act, the hosting of the FIFA World Cup and 
many others. However, for implementations such as the Integrated Criminal 
Justice System (systems, processes and ICT implementation for the end-to-end 
criminal justice system), these have been a major challenge. These become even 
more difficult where the problems being addressed are wicked and require more 
intensive collaborative efforts.  
This thesis acknowledges the widely accepted challenge of inconsistent use of 
constructs and definitions within interorganisational networks (Provan, Fish and 
Sydow, 2007; McNamara, 2016; Castañer and Oliveira, 2020; Stout and Keast, 
2021). It is not the objective of the current research to make a contribution 
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regarding this matter; however, definitions adopted for the research are discussed 
under Section 3.5. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH PURPOSE  
The purpose of this research is threefold:  
1. To uncover the key dimensions affecting efforts in addressing crime as a 
wicked problem through the experiences of managers involved in 
intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level  
2. To develop a better understanding of how dimensions linked to 
intragovernmental collaborations interrelate 
3. To produce a framework that will guide intragovernmental collaborations in 
addressing crime 
Senior Managers (responsible for implementing government programmes in South 
Africa) and Top Managers (responsible for strategic direction and government 
programmes) were identified as key participants due to their influence on the 
outcome of the JCPS Cluster collaboration. The framework created in the current 
research will assist both sets of managers in addressing the shortcomings 




1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The following are the research questions for the study. 
Key question: 
How can intragovernmental collaborations at a strategic level be improved to help 
address crime as a wicked problem?  
Sub-questions: 
1. Which dimensions do managers identify as important in intragovernmental 
collaborations for addressing crime? 
2. What are the interrelationships between the dimensions identified under 
(1)?  
3. How can identified dimensions and interrelationships be used to produce an 
intragovernmental framework that will help address wicked problems? 
 
1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
This research contributes knowledge through a deeper understanding of 
interorganisational networks in general and of mandated and directed 
collaborations in particular. Furthermore, a key contribution to the field is expected 
to be made in the intragovernmental collaborations that are called upon to address 
wicked societal problems.  
A framework for intragovernmental collaborations requires an understanding of the 
dimensions affecting collaborations and the interrelationships between these 
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dimensions. To date, this has not been established for collaborations that are 
mandated and directed.  
The JCPS Cluster is an ideal case due to the following:  
• The collaboration focuses on crime, which is understood to be a particularly 
difficult and pervasive social and complex problem that is experienced in 
South Africa and many parts of the world. 
• The case is based in South Africa, a developing country with limited 
resources but with a functioning infrastructure. In addition, as a multilingual 
and multicultural country, South Africa presents an opportunity to contribute 
an even broader view. 
• The JCPS Cluster is a mandated and directed collaboration and falls within 
areas of scholarly development. 
• The Cluster has been in place for over two decades and, therefore, 
represents an ideal opportunity to gather experiences and insights. 
This research was undertaken in a developing country within a well-established 
intragovernmental network and addressed a key societal problem. It thus presents 
an ideal case for the development of theory. 
 
1.6 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
In line with the research objective of an in-depth understanding of the JCPS 
Cluster, a constructivist paradigm was adopted. This paradigm recognises an 
ontological stance of multiple realities presented by people who experience a 
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phenomenon (Bogna, Raineri & Dell, 2020). Because of its exploratory nature, 
qualitative research was deemed the most appropriate. 
From the epistemological point of view, knowledge and a deeper understanding 
was created through the descriptions from managers who participate in the JCPS 
collaboration. 
The constructivist approach appreciates the close connection between a 
researcher and the research being undertaken. This means that researchers’ 
values and the lens from which they view the world (axiology) need to be 
understood and acknowledged. For most of the current research, the researcher 
was a practitioner and participated in the JCPS Cluster. It is this participation that 
inspired the research study.  
 
1.7 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
Qualitative research methods focus on studying the complexity of phenomena in 
their natural environment (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The current research sought 
to uncover experiences and explanations through detailed narratives of both 
Senior Managers and Top Managers. The in-depth exploration of the phenomenon 
of intragovernmental collaboration experienced by these managers represented a 
constructivist approach.  
Interactive Qualitative Analysis (IQA) was selected as a research method because 
it aligns with the constructivist philosophy of seeking multiple realities in 
understanding a problem. Interactive Qualitative Analysis involves working 
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interactively with participants in identifying key dimensions and how these 
dimensions interrelate. This is in line with the current research questions. 
The research followed both an inductive and a deductive approach. The 
dimensions and interrelationships identified by the participants in the research 
followed an inductive approach. Using a deductive approach, the results from the 
research were compared with the conceptual framework identified in the literature 
in order to arrive at a framework for the JCPS Cluster. 
Top Managers were identified as a constituency deemed to have power over the 
JCPS collaboration and Senior Managers were identified as a constituency that 
best lives the collaborative experience. Senior Managers participated in a focus 
group to identify affinities (precursors of dimensions of collaboration), and this list 
was used by both Senior Managers and Top Managers to identify 
interrelationships. 
The dimensions and their interrelations identified through this research and in 




Intragovernmental collaborations refer to collaborations that take place within one 
sphere of government. The current research was undertaken for the JCPS Cluster, 
which is a collaboration consisting of National Departments and their related 
entities. 
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The current research was not undertaken in provincial or local governments and 
the findings can, therefore, not be extended to these spheres.  
 
1.9 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Chapter 1 introduces to the research. 
Chapter 2 forms part of the literature review and discusses theories that are 
relevant in explaining intragovernmental collaborations, namely the Resource 
Dependency Theory (RDT), Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the 
Complexity Theory. 
Chapter 3 explains key concepts of interorganisational networks. Explanations 
regarding types of partnerships and the relevance of different models of 
interorganisational collaboration in the current research are included. Models of 
interorganisational networks that have been identified by different scholars and the 
researcher’s conceptual framework for intragovernmental collaborations are 
discussed. 
Chapter 4 provides background on the South African criminal justice system using 
concepts that have been explained through literature. This includes explanations 
for crime as a wicked problem and the current structure and governance 
arrangements within the JCPS collaboration. 
Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion on IQA and how the process was 
undertaken in the current study. 
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Chapter 6 details the research results from Senior Managers and Top Managers. 
Chapter 7 provides an interpretation of the research results. 
Chapter 8 presents the conclusion and the contribution of the research. In addition, 
recommendations for further research are offered. 
12 




There is a substantial body of knowledge on a broad scope of interorganisational 
networks and much of it focuses on dimensions of networks. It was deemed 
appropriate to approach the literature survey for this research through a theoretical 
lens and identify dimensions of intragovernmental collaborations that are anchored 
in theory. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the theories that underpinned 
the current research. 
The three theories discussed in this chapter are the RDT, which explains the need 
of an organisation to rely on other organisations in order to reach some of its 
organisational goals; TCE, which explains cost considerations for 
interorganisational networks; and the Complexity Theory, which provides guidance 
in addressing wicked problems.  
 
2.2 RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY 
An organisation, as defined by Selznick (1948), is the arrangement of people and 
other resources towards the achievement of an agreed purpose. This definition 
stays true for all organisations, be they business corporations, governments or 
political parties. Furthermore, there is recognition that organisations are economic 
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arrangements that allocate resources for efficiency and effectiveness in achieving 
goals (Selznick, 1948). 
As organisations grow, institutionalisation occurs. Institutional Theory describes 
the process that an organisation undertakes as it grows. This includes the 
formation of structures, rules, norms, routines and processes through which 
organisations are created (Scott, 2005). Selznick (1996) describes this process as 
the emergence of a well-organised and stable social system and explains the need 
to maintain this social structure through formal institutional rules. 
As organisations flourish, deviations from formal rules and procedures result in a 
parallel existence of unwritten rules that are exercised by and for a clique of 
members within the organisation (Selznick, 1948). This social structure consisting 
of individual human beings is unique in every organisation. Any attempt to disturb 
this informal social structure is met with resistance (Selznick, 1948). Equally, any 
threats or perceived threats levelled at the organisations are met with resistance 
from individuals within the organisation (Selznick, 1948). 
In any type of interorganisational network, it is important to acknowledge that each 
participating entity consists of individuals and groups who are part of the formal 
and informal structures within their organisation and are, therefore, part of the 
dynamics that are associated with these organisations. An interorganisational 
network, although important, is thus overshadowed by the individual and the 
organisation from which he/she originates.  
The RDT provides a basis for understanding interorganisational relations and 
collaborations in the broad sense. Organisations operate in an external 
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environment that is uncertain and unpredictable (Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). 
Resources that are needed by an organisation to achieve its goals are often 
sourced outside the confines of the organisation (Nienhüser, 2008; Tehseen and 
Sajilan, 2016). These resources could include people, raw material, technologies, 
goods and services. 
In response to uncertainty, organisations form interorganisational relationships 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; Hillman et al., 2009; Reddy and Park, 2019). A meta-
analytical study by Drees and Heugens (2013) confirmed that the key factor in 
seeking interorganisational relationships is resource dependence (i.e. either 
seeking stability of resource availability or seeking access to scarce resources). 
For the current research, access to resources is one of the key drivers of 
intragovernmental collaborations within the criminal justice system. Several key 
concepts associated with the RDT are described below. 
2.2.1 Social Exchange 
Central to the RDT is the concept of exchange. Social Exchange is itself not a 
theory but a framework that supports other theories (Emerson, 1976; Cropanzano 
and Mitchell, 2005). Within the current research, Social Exchange is, therefore, a 
framework that is linked to the RDT to explain concepts of exchange within the 
theory. 
Although exchange takes place between individuals, groups and institutions, in the 
current research, discussions are limited to the interorganisational perspective. 
Existing definitions of ‘an exchange’ have been found to be inadequate in 
addressing a wide range of interorganisational relationships. For example, Cook's 
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(1977) definition is oversimplified because it refers to dyadic relationships and 
Levine and White's (1961) definition excludes mandated relationships. Mandated 
interorganisational relationships are not as widely studied as voluntary 
relationships due to the complications that are brought about by a mandate (Keast 
and Mandell, 2012); however, exchange as a concept includes mandated 
relationships. 
2.2.2 Goal clarity 
Every exchange relationship exists to meet an objective or is established with an 
objective in mind. Before arriving at this objective, the domain of each organisation 
should be well defined. The domain of an organisation is a statement of their 
objectives and the functions that they will undertake to attain those objectives 
(Levine and White, 1961). For an exchange to be negotiated, participants must 
arrive at a domain consensus (i.e. clarity regarding the goals and objectives of 
each organisation and how the collaboration will assist in achieving these goals). 
Domain consensus is a main prerequisite for exchange and may be subject to a 
lengthy negotiation (Levine and White, 1961; Biermann, 2017). It is argued that the 
domain consensus is itself an interorganisational exchange due to the intensity 
and often prolonged interactions required (Levine and White, 1961). 
Levine and White (1961) further described an exchange in terms of four 
dimensions: (i) the parties to the exchange; (ii) the elements being exchanged; 
(iii) the agreement underlying the exchange, which can range from a legal 
agreement to an informal agreement; and (iv) the direction of the exchange (either 
unilateral, reciprocal or joint). This framework is useful in assisting parties to arrive 
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at a common understanding regarding the nature of the exchange relationship and 
can be used in facilitating deeper discussions within the interorganisational 
arrangement. In addition, this framework provides perspective for existing 
exchange arrangements. 
Within the current research, the extent of the understanding of domains by the 
managers of the different entities within the JCPS Cluster and their understanding 
of the nature of the exchange is part of the investigation. 
2.2.3 Power  
The second concept associated with the RDT and Social Exchange is Power. 
Organisations that have resources that are regarded to be in short supply are 
deemed more powerful than those who do not (Drees and Heugens, 2013; 
Malatesta and Smith, 2014; McCarthy and Rhodes, 2018). Hence, gaining power 
over resources means that an organisation has more control over their objectives 
(Hillman et al., 2009; Reddy and Park, 2019). It should, however, be borne in mind 
that organisations do not seek power for the sake of power but seek it to reduce 
the dependence and risks associated with the external environment. 
At an individual level, power as a social relationship is characterised by one person 
having an influence over the aspirations of another (Emerson, 1962; McCarthy and 
Rhodes, 2018). Power is a relationship that is not characterised by elements such 
as a person’s wealth or profession. For example, persons who have power over 
others may be overpowered themselves by different individuals in a different 
context. This introduces the concept of dependence. In other words, in a particular 
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context where X has power over Y, then Y is reliant on X to realise the objectives 
over which X has the power. 
In an exchange, the relationship is said to be balanced if actors have equal power 
within the context and, therefore, equal levels of dependence. There is a tendency 
for actors to prefer exchange with equally powerful actors. Where power is 
balanced, both parties tend to have equal negotiating strength (Emerson, 1976). 
Where Player A has power over Player B, the more powerful Player A will continue 
to use the power to his/her advantage and accrue benefits (Mizruchi and Yoo, 
2017). However, over time, the more powerful player develops dependence on the 
less powerful player and the relationship tends to balance the exchange ratio (R. 
M. Emerson, 1976). 
Studies of power dependence have been primarily conceptualised within dyadic 
relationships (i.e. only two organisations are involved). However, resource 
dependence and power dependence can take place in arrangements of more than 
two parties; this is termed an exchange network. Studies such as those by Cook 
and Whitmeyer (1992) and Low and Li (2019) extended the RDT and power 
dependence to interorganisational exchange networks. By definition, an exchange 
network is three or more parties who provide opportunities for exchange between 
one or more parties within the group (Cook, 1977; Chang, 2018). 
A key concept of power that emanates from the network environment is centrality. 
Centrality refers to a more powerful exchange position that one participant has 
compared with other participants within the network (Cook, 1977; Cook, Emerson 
and Gillmore, 1983; Baek and Bae, 2019). This elevated power position could be 
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due to the control of resources that the network requires or to decision-making 
privileges. Participants with positional power are expected to use this power to their 
advantage. For example, they can use their power to exclude other participants 
within the field from the network. 
In addressing power deficiencies in general and centrality within an 
interorganisational network in particular, participants tend to adopt one or more of 
the mechanisms described by Emerson (1962) and Huo, Tiang, Tiang and Zhan 
(2019). The first involves withdrawal from the network by a dissatisfied participant. 
This approach depends on whether the environment has shifted sufficiently to 
render withdrawal a viable option (i.e. the participant is confident of survival outside 
the exchange relationship). 
The second approach is an extension of the network. A level of dissatisfaction in 
one member of the network may lead this individual to consider a relationship with 
a different member, thereby extending the network. The third approach is status 
elevation, which occurs when one of the participants introduces new resources 
that are of value to the network. This brings about a shift in the power balance. 
Lastly, the mechanism of coalition formation involves two or more participants 
joining forces against the powerful participant of the network. 
The above mechanisms are possibilities that are available for reformulation of a 
wide range of exchange relationships. However, in mandated exchange networks, 
withdrawal or extension may not be straightforward. Coalition formation and status 
elevations are more viable strategies to address power imbalance within such 
exchange relationships. 
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In addition to the influence of power, the sources of power have been studied. 
Within an interorganisational network environment, three sources of power have 
been identified, namely formal authority (widely accepted decision-making 
influence), control over critical resources, and discursive legitimacy (ability of an 
organisation to speak as an authority on an issue) (Hardy and Phillips, 1998; 
Rodriguez, Langley, Béland & Denis, 2007). 
The main source of power within the criminal justice system and the South African 
public service in general, is political. Administrative departments such as the 
DOJCD, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS) and the SAPS are headed 
by Ministers who are members of the Cabinet and are appointed by the State 
President of the country. The National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP) is 
appointed by the President even though his/her prosecutorial decisions are not 
directed by the Executive. The Head of the Judiciary (Chief Justice) and other 
Superior Court judges are appointed by the State President following 
recommendations of the Judicial Service Commission consisting of members of 
the Executive, the Judiciary and the Legislature. 
Cabinet Ministers are the most powerful politically; however, the strength of their 
powers is not equal. The source of power for Ministers who are politicians lies in 
the strength of their constituencies or the complex social relationships within their 
political organisations. The agenda of the organisations within the criminal justice 
system is thus affected by the power play within the political environment. 
The second source of power within the criminal justice system lies in the relative 
size and control of resources. Throughout the years, different organisations have 
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acquired control of resources and used this control as a tool for negotiation within 
the collaboration. For example, because of its large size, the SAPS tends to set 
the pace for modernisation and implementation of technological initiatives. 
The Judiciary has a high discursive authority due to its status as an independent 
arm of state and its authority on the law of the country. Members of the Executive 
are subject to the authority of the Judiciary as are all other citizens of the country. 
Although several scholars have made contributions regarding power in 
interorganisational networks, limited contributions have been made in relation to 
collaborations within the political-administrative landscape. For example, Moe 
(1991) offered a descriptive narrative of the landscape without offering any 
solutions; Keller (1984) proposed a solution to a political-administrative problem 
without a theoretical basis; and the focus of Benson's (1975) article on the political 
economy is far removed from the political-administrative interface discussed. 
Therefore, a generic framework of power is discussed. 
A framework developed by Purdy (2012) offers a basis for assessing power within 
interorganisational networks and how power is used or abused within governance 
processes. This framework determines the effect of participants, processes and 
content on the three themes associated with power, namely official authority, 
resources and discursive legitimacy. This framework (shown in Table 2.1) assisted 






Table 2.1 Framework for assessing power in collaborative processes 
 
































Formal Authority Resources Discursive 
Legitimacy 
 
Participants • Selection of 
participants 
• Limits placed on 
participants 
• Number of 
representatives 
• Expertise of 
representatives 
• Status of 
representatives  




• Ownership of the 
process 
• Interaction 
expectations for the 
process 
• Number, length and 
location of meetings 
• How the 
process is paid 
for 
• Frequency of voice 
• Methods of voice 
• Communication 
about the process 
 
Content • Setting the agenda 
• Outcomes and 
expectations for the 
process 
• Use of indirect 
authority such as 
legal rights 





• Production of 
meeting records 
• Prioritisation of 
issues 
• Framing of issues 
to be addressed 
 
 
     
Source: Purdy, 2012 
 
2.2.4 Trust 
The RDT stipulates that organisations undertake interorganisational relationships 
to address the uncertainty associated with availability of resources. To address 
this uncertainty, organisations identify parties that can help stabilise the supply of 
their resource needs (Williamson, 1981).  
Exchange relationships have elements of risk and trust (Molm, Takahashi & 
Peterson, 2000; Latusek and Vlaar, 2018). On the one hand, there is a risk that 
the exchange relationship may not yield the expected results and on the other 
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hand, participants must trust the intentions of other parties to deliver according to 
promises. 
Trust is a complex concept that has been defined by many scholars in different 
fields of study. Within the context of this research, the simplified definition of trust 
by Henderson and Smith-King (2015) as one party’s expectation that another can 
be depended upon to carry out obligations, to behave in a predictable manner and 
to act fairly was adopted. This definition is in line with the widely accepted definition 
of interorganisational trust that is presented in the literature by authors such as 
Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone (1998), Gulati and Nickerson (2008), Klijn, 
Edelenbos and Steijn (2010) and Oomsels, Callens, Vanschoenwinkel and 
Bouckaert (2019). 
Edelenbos and Klijn (2007) identified three characteristics of trust, namely 
vulnerability to opportunistic behaviour from others, risk due to unpredictable 
behaviour, and expectations that the motives of others are good. Oomsels and 
Bouckaert (2014) developed a framework on sources of interorganisational trust 
and distrust based on the three characteristics of trust identified by Edelenbos and 
Klijn (2007) (See Table 2.2). This framework measures the extent to which rules, 
roles, routines and relations assist or impede the building of trust.  
Within the context of this research, this framework was used to determine the 
extent to which trust is a factor within the JCPS cluster under study and how 
managers deal with issues of trust. Of interest is the issue of trust within the JCPS 





Table 2.2 Simplified framework for sources of interorganisational trust  
 
Rule Role Routine Normative 
Framework 











































































































































































Source: Oomsels and Bouckaert, 2014 
 
2.3 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS  
Transaction Cost Economics is concerned with economic decisions on sourcing 
goods and services outside the organisation (Williamson, 2008). A transaction 
takes place when goods or services are transferred through a separable interface 
or entity (e.g. from buyer to seller) (Williamson, 1981). Transaction Cost 
Economics is used as the basis of a wide range of interorganisational networks 
such as strategic alliances, consortiums and joint ventures (Dyer, 1997; Parkhe, 
1993; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994; Roberts and Greenwood, 1997). 
Transaction costs are the sum of the production costs and the governance costs 
(Williamson, 1981, 2005; De Waard, De Bock & Beeres, 2019). Transaction costs 
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are said to be economical if the sum of the production costs and the governance 
costs are less than the costs incurred by the organisation in producing the 
goods/services (Williamson, 1998). This theory finds resonance with the current 
research since the challenge of intragovernmental collaborations is not only a 
sociological problem of coordination but also an economic problem of efficiency. 
Intragovernmental collaborations, therefore, need to address coordination in 
delivering public services and ensure that the collaboration lowers the transaction 
costs in order to achieve efficiencies from working collaboratively. 
A key application of TCE is the Resource-Based View (RBV) of a firm. This 
emphasises the thorough analysis of internal resources and capabilities of a firm 
(competitive advantage) before collaborating with others on the resources and 
capabilities that it does not possess. An organisation’s resources are both tangible 
and intangible assets that are tied to the organisation on a short- to long-term basis 
(Wernerfelt, 1984, 2015; Klier, Schwens, Zapkau and Dikova, 2017).  
Examples of resources are brand names, information, knowledge, technologies, 
skilled personnel, trade contacts, machinery, efficient procedures and capital, 
among others (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Alexy , West, Klapper & Reitzig, 
2018). These assets can be broadly classified as physical capital, human capital 
and organisational capital resources (Barney, 1991). Physical capital assets 
include technology, access to raw material, and equipment. Human capital 
includes the expertise of employees, relationships, intelligence and insights. 
Organisational capital includes systems for planning and coordination, 
organisational structure and informal relationships within and outside the 
organisation. 
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The essence of the RBV is identifying and developing capabilities in resource types 
that other organisations are not able to replicate (Sullivan, Barnes & Matka, 2006; 
Barney and Mackey, 2016). A sustained competitive advantage of an organisation 
thus entails implementing a value-creating capability that other competing 
organisations are not simultaneously implementing and which is difficult for 
competitors to emulate (Mitra, O’Regan & Sarpong, 2018). In essence, the RBV 
emphasises the importance of the internal resources of an organisation. 
Extension of the RBV led to two additional areas of emphasis: the relational view 
and the knowledge-based view of the organisation (Acedo, Barroso & Galan, 
2006). 
2.3.1 Relational view of a firm  
The relational view of the firm identifies the ability to build interorganisational 
relationships as the source of a sustained competitive advantage for the 
organisation. In other words, organisations that initiate and successfully sustain 
strategic alliances are more successful than those that do not (Dyer and Singh, 
1998). 
In their seminal article on the relational view, Dyer and Singh (1998) identified four 
sources of sustained competitive advantage in building interorganisational 
relationships. These are (i) relation-specific assets such as specific and exclusive 
supplier relationships, colocation, and co-development of hi-tech software and 
other technologies; (ii) knowledge-sharing practices between participants, 
(iii) complementary capabilities; and (iv) effective governance arrangements. 
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Authors such as Arya and Lin (2007), Bryson, Ackermann and Eden (2007) and 
Hansen and Ferlie (2016) investigated and confirmed the applicability of the RBV 
of the firm to non-profit organisations. In their study, Arya and Lyn (2007) posit that 
such organisations compete against each other for the resources within their 
environment (funding, human resources, etc.) and at the same time, collaborate in 
meeting their common objectives, which are usually for the public good. For 
example, groups of non-profit organisations that protect the rights of children 
compete for resources while collaborating with others within their immediate 
environment. For the JCPS Cluster, collaborative advantage means winning the 
war against crime. 
A comparison between the application of RBV by profit and not-for-profit 











Table 2.3 Resource-Based View for profit vs. not-for-profit organisations 
Profit-making entities Non-profit-making entities 
Identify resources of the firm Identify resources of the firm 
Determine capabilities of the firm Determine capabilities of the firm 
Identify competitive advantage  
 
Identify traits that lead to a collaborative 
advantage 
(Value-creation; addressing public good /  
 addressing public problem)  
 
Possible capabilities for use in 
interorganisational networks:  
• Specific assets (human resources, 
patents, distribution networks, etc.) 
• Relationship-building 
• Collaborative capability 
• Knowledge 
• Governance arrangements (to lower 
transaction costs)  
 
Possible capabilities for use in 
interorganisational networks:  
• Specific assets (human resources, 
distribution networks, etc.) 
• Relationship-building 
• Collaborative capability 
• Knowledge 
• Governance arrangements (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) 
Source: Author 
2.3.2 Collaborative advantage  
Collaborative advantage applies to the success that an interorganisational network 
achieves regarding the situation or problem that is being addressed (Huxham and 
Macdonald, 1992). 
In order to sustain a collaborative advantage at an interorganisational level, 
organisations need to have collaborative capability. This is defined as the 
readiness of an organisation to participate in a successful interorganisational 
network (Huxham, 1993a). It is expected that a well-functioning organisation with 
an enabling culture should be able to begin to collaborate with others. Conversely, 
an organisation with low levels of maturity in terms of internal organisational 
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capabilities has a lower probability of successfully engaging in an 
interorganisational network. 
Huxham (1993a) proposes six elements of collaborative capability: (i) extent of 
organisational independence; (ii) extent of the autonomy of individuals; 
(iii) cohesiveness in the structure of the organisation; (iv) level of maturity in 
organisation’s strategic processes; (v) level of sophistication of the organisation’s 
strategy statement; and (vi) degree to which collaboration remains a challenge.  
This collaborative capability model is helpful in assessing the readiness of 
organisations to collaborate. However, where long-standing collaborations are not 
yielding expected results, this model can be useful in assessing the health of the 
collaboration. In the context of this research, collaborative capability can be used 
to uncover attitudes of managers towards the collaborative effort and the levels of 
maturity at which the collaboration is being approached by stakeholders. 
2.3.3 Collaborative strategic management 
The RBV provides a framework for firms to identify the capabilities and resource 
types that other organisations are not able to replicate (Klier et al., 2017; 
Wernerfelt, 2015). This framework forms the basis of strategic management, which 
involves a conscious process that organisations undertake to identify their internal 
capabilities in order to sustain a competitive advantage in the market. As already 
discussed, for public services, the collaborative advantage involves the 
organisation of resources within a collaborative effort in order to address public 
problems (Huxham, 1993b). A collaborative strategy, therefore, is the joint 
formulation of the vision and the long-term goals for addressing a given social 
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problem, and this includes both organisational and joint courses of action for 
implementation (Clarke and Fuller, 2011).  
A meta-strategy is defined by Huxham (1993b) as a high-level statement of the 
meta-mission and the meta-objectives of a collaborative effort. An improved 
formulation of a collaborative strategy by Clarke and Fuller (2011) includes a joint 
course of action and implementation. A collaborative strategy or meta-strategy 
should include an implementation plan.  
Three factors need to be taken into consideration in the conceptualisation of a 
meta-strategy:  
1. Level of interdependence 
The level of interdependence or interconnectedness determines the level at which 
planning should be undertaken. A meta-strategy is recommended for organisations 
with high levels of interconnectedness since organisations with low levels of 
interconnectedness participate at a level of coordination or cooperation (Huxham 
and Macdonald, 1992). 
2. Level of planning 
For high levels of interdependence, the strategic plans of participating 
organisations should include strategic plans of the collaboration. Conversely, 
organisations with low levels of interconnectedness will maintain their independent 
strategic plans but put measures in place to perform the actions expected from 
their participation (McGuire, 2006). 
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3. Resource allocation 
Joint resource allocation is important due to the level of interconnectedness of the 
organisations and the impact that they each have on the joint problem (McGuire, 
2006). This resource allocation should take place at a strategic rather than an 
implementation or operational level. Synchronisation of strategic management 
processes becomes important to ensure proper alignment between the different 
organisations that are working within the interorganisational network.  
Considering the level of interconnectedness of intragovernmental collaborations, 
a meta-strategy for such a collaborative effort should, therefore, consist of a 
meta-mission (joint mission statement), meta-goals, meta-objectives and joint 
action plans that include joint resource plans.  
2.3.4 Governance  
Governance costs comprise one of the two key drivers of transactional costs 
incurred by organisations in interorganisational relationships (Oliver E. Williamson, 
2008). Therefore, lowering these costs can be a source of sustained 
interorganisational competitiveness if managed effectively (Dyer and Singh, 1998). 
Dyer and Singh (1998) identified two broad classes of governance mechanisms: 
(i) third-party enforcement of agreements (e.g. legal contracts and statutory 
structures); and (ii) self-enforcing agreements. In practice, interorganisational 
networks may employ a number of governance mechanisms simultaneously in line 
with practical considerations (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and in some instances, 
employ informal governance structures developed over time as the level of trust 
increases. 
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The model by Provan and Kenis (2008) identified three methods of governance 
within networks: (i) the Self-Governed Network in which participating organisations 
jointly coordinate the activities without a hierarchy between them; (ii) the Lead 
Organisation Model in which one identified organisation governs the network; and 
(iii) the Network Administration Model in which a separate organisation is 
established to coordinate the activities of the network. Provan and Kenis (2008) 
propose that a decision on a governance structure should be based on four 
contingencies, namely level of trust, number of participants, degree of consensus 
on goals, and nature of the task. However, in line with TCE, the cost of the 
governance arrangement is significant and should be included. Table 2.4 illustrates 
the relative importance of these factors in each type of governance structure. 
 
Table 2.4 Key predictors of effectiveness of forms of network governance 
Forms of 
Governance 


























Moderately high High High 
Source: Adapted from Provan and Kenis (2008) 
Although a number of network structures were found to be possible within 
mandated relationships, Alexander (1998) and McGuire (2006) found a lead 
organisation or a lead agency to be more common and appropriate. A possible 
concern with lead organisations, particularly in intragovernmental collaborations, 
32 
is that these organisations may be seen as being in a more powerful position than 
their peers (Huxham, 1993b). 
In the public sector, managers within these interorganisational networks oversee 
relationships that cut across levels of government (Mandell, 1988; Koffijberg, De 
Bruijn and Priemus, 2012). Multiple governance structures are, therefore, expected 
to be identified for each collaborative effort in which the organisation is involved.  
This research examined governance structures and the extent to which these 
structures assist or impede the JCPS collaboration. In addition, the research 
identified suitable governance arrangements for the JCPS Cluster where 
necessary. 
2.3.5 Knowledge-Based View 
Advocates of the Knowledge-Based View such as Grant (1996), Schütz, Kässer, 
Blome and Foerstl (2019) and Caputo, Garcia-Perez, Cillo and Giacosa (2019) 
assert that knowledge is the most important resource of an organisation if 
managed appropriately. More importantly, it is the combination of different areas 
of knowledge and the manner in which an organisation expands its knowledge that 
provides a sustained competitive advantage (Grant, 1996). Grant and 
Baden-Fuller (1995) present the following regarding knowledge: 
• Knowledge is a key productive resource of an organisation and has the 
potential to make a significant contribution. 
• Knowledge comprises information, skills, technology and expertise. 
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• Explicit knowledge can be verbalised and, therefore, communicated, 
whereas tacit knowledge stays within individuals and cannot be easily 
communicated. 
• Both tacit and explicit knowledge are acquired by individuals; however, tacit 
knowledge is acquired and then stored by individuals. 
Knowledge management involves the effective dissemination, receipt and 
integration of knowledge across organisations and participants (Weber and 
Khademian, 2008), which is required for the effective integration of different 
perspectives from different organisations. 
It, therefore, follows that an effective interorganisational network needs effective 
management of knowledge. Within the context of the current research, knowledge 
management and its related practices among participating organisations were 
investigated. Knowledge management is reviewed in Chapter 3.  
 
2.4 GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND COMPLEXITY 
While the theories of organisations and interorganisational networks discussed in 
Chapter 2 provided a foundation to understand collaborations, the theoretical basis 
of wicked problems needs to be explored because of the context of the current 
research. The Complexity Theory and the GST was identified as appropriate for 
the research. This means that in addition to crime being addressed in an 
intragovernmental collaboration, it is important to recognise the pervasive and 
aggressive nature of crime as a wicked problem. 
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The criminal justice system in South Africa consists of several governmental 
departments and agencies that operate through different mandates, objectives and 
political leadership. These organisations form part of a criminal justice value chain 
from reporting of the crime to incarceration and are part of the larger 
socio-economic environment of the country. It is for this reason that systems and 
the Complexity Theory are deemed applicable in this context. 
This chapter reviews the GST and the key principles that underpin the theory. This 
is followed by the application of this theory within the management field through 
the Complexity Theory and thereafter, by application of this theory as it related to 
the topic under study. 
2.4.1 General Systems Theory 
The GST was developed in the 1950s through the work of Von Bertalanffy (1954, 
1972) with a background in biological sciences and Boulding (1956) with an 
economics background. The theory comfortably cuts across a wide range of fields 
(e.g. biological, mechanical and social).  
A system, in its simplest definition, is a number of interdependent parts that 
function together as a unit and work towards a common goal (Von Bertalanffy, 
1972; Caws, 2015; McMahon and Patton, 2018; Hofkirchner, 2019). The unit 
consists of inputs, a transformation process, outputs, feedback, and the 
environment (Von Bertalanffy, 1972). The key principles of the GST are as follows: 
• Interconnectedness and Holism: Every system has at least two subsystems 
that are interconnected. The system cannot be simplified as a sum of the 
individual subsystems and should instead be analysed holistically. 
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• Hierarchy: Systems-thinking recognises a hierarchical relationship between 
itself and its subsystems. In addition, higher-order systems (suprasystem) 
exist of which the system is a component. 
• Open/Closed Systems View: Open systems exchange information, energy 
or any other material within the environment in which they operate whereas 
closed systems do not. For example, a biological cell and a machine are 
classified as closed systems because they function without interaction with 
their environment. Conversely, social systems are classified as open 
because they interact with the environment. It is important to note that 
systems usually have varying degrees of openness and closeness (Kast 
and Rosenzweig, 1972) rather than being strictly open or closed. 
• System Boundaries: A boundary is used first, to establish a separation 
between a system and its environment, and second, to establish whether a 
system is closed or open. For example, a human cell is a closed system 
because of the microscopic environment under which the cell operates, 
whereas a human body is an open system because it interacts with the 
environment in which it functions (atmosphere). Within social systems, 
boundaries are difficult to establish because they extend beyond the 
immediate obvious environments. 
• Negative vs. Positive Entropy: Entropy refers to the tendency of systems to 
move towards disorder and destruction (highest level of entropy). For 
example, a machine, which is a closed system, will run until resources are 
depleted or until it fails. This is in line with the second law of 
thermodynamics in physics (Von Bertalanffy, 1950). On the contrary, open 
systems possess negative entropy because they can draw resources and 
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other input from the environment and have the ability to progress towards 
improved levels of performance. 
• Steady State, Dynamic Equilibrium: A closed system eventually must attain 
an equilibrium state with maximum entropy – death or disorganisation. For 
example, a machine, which represents a closed system, will continue to run 
until it breaks down. However, a machine in an open system can continue 
to run through infusion of energy sources and revitalisation. 
• Goals: Within social systems, the subsystems pursue their own goals in line 
with the broad values and objectives of the individual entities whereas 
mechanical systems are designed to address a single issue or challenge. 
• Equifinality of Open Systems: Equifinality suggests that certain results may 
be achieved with different initial conditions and in different ways. This view 
suggests that social organisations can realise their objectives with an 
assortment of inputs and with varying internal activities or processes. 
Based on the principles above, systems are generally classified as simple or 
complex. A simple system consists of hierarchical relationships between 
subsystems. It is governed by simple rules and does not evolve but tends to 
destruct over time. In addition, its subsystems do not pursue their own individual 
goals and none are influenced by the environment (e.g. as in the case of 
mechanical systems). An example of a simple system is a traffic light system that 
is operated in a small town using simple timer-based rules. Systems classified as 
complicated are merely more sophisticated simple systems. Using the same 
example, a traffic light system in a large city with built-in rules to assist traffic flow 
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may be classified as a complicated system. Similarly, a large airport is complicated 
but not complex. 
Complex systems are on the opposite end of the systems spectrum relative to 
simple systems. They are not governed by straightforward rules, they evolve over 
time through interaction with other subsystems and they interact with the 
environment. Their subsystems often work towards achieving their own goals. For 
example, social systems such as the criminal justice system fall within this 
classification. 
2.4.2 Complexity Theory 
The Complexity Theory builds on the GST through the development of additional 
concepts within the social sciences field. Buckley (2008) describes society as a 
complex adaptive system and recommends further development of models for 
sociocultural systems. Social structures such as organisations and 
interorganisational arrangements are classified as complex adaptive systems 
because they possess the following basic characteristics of complexity: 
• They are open systems that interact with their immediate environment. 
• They consist of a suprasystem (whole) and subsystems that operate 
interactively. 
• The sum of the outputs of subsystems is larger than the whole (Gestalt 
Principle). 
• They are dynamic systems that draw from their immediate environment 
(material, feedback, etc.). 
• There are multiple routes towards the achievement of goals. 
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Following the understanding of complexity within social and organisational fields, 
several characteristics have been identified. These include non-linearity, 
co-evolution, emergence and self-organisation. 
Non-linearity refers to the disproportionate results that can be attained following 
the introduced intervention (Cilliers, 2000; De Coning, 2016; Williams, 2020). This 
implies that in some instances, major efforts made on the system might not yield 
any results, and in other instances, a minor input might result in a disproportionate 
effect on the system. For example, in one instance, an elaborately planned 
intervention or project may yield unsatisfactory results whereas in another 
instance, a minor initiative may result in major unintended consequences.  
Co-evolution refers to the changes that take place within the elements of a complex 
adaptive system due to continuous interaction between the elements and its 
environment. In other words, co-evolution involves interactions between two or 
more interdependent systems that result in changes in the course of their 
development (Rammel, Stagl & Wilfing, 2007). 
Emergence refers to the processes whereby the actions and interactions of 
elements of a system result in changes in the entire behaviour of the system 
(Stacey, 1995; Williams, 2020). Emergent phenomena are not possible to 
anticipate fully or predict and simply run their course (Goldstein, 1999, 2016). In 
addition, it is important to emphasise that the emergent phenomena of the system 
are not predictable even if the phenomenon within the individual elements is well 
understood (Goldstein, 1999). 
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Self-organisation is a process in which overall direction arises from interactions 
between elements of a system towards order (Dekkers, 2017; Wheatley and 
Kellner‐Rogers, 1996). The process is spontaneous without the need for control 
by an external agent. An alternative definition by Bovaird (2008) describes 
self-organisation as a process in which elements of a system instinctively 
communicate with each other and cooperate towards a common behaviour. 
Organisations themselves are complex adaptive systems because of their ability 
to organise without external leadership. Similarly, teams within organisations can 
self-organise towards the achievement of agreed goals. 
The GST and the Complexity Theory, therefore, provide a good theoretical 
background on complexity and offer good descriptions of the complexity 
phenomena. 
2.4.3 Application of Complexity Theory (Systems Thinking) 
As described earlier, organisations are complex adaptive systems because they 
demonstrate characteristics such as self-organisation, co-evolution, emergence 
and non-linearity. Based on ‘Hierarchy’ as one of the key principles of systems 
theory, intragovernmental collaborations are on a higher level of complexity, with 
organisations within the collaboration described as subsystems. From a systems 
boundary point of view, intragovernmental collaborations that extend to a broader 
range of stakeholders such as political and social are, therefore, on a higher level 
of hierarchy than other interorganisational networks in general.  
Criminal justice systems consist mainly of three key functions: police services, 
courts and correctional services (Bernard and Engel, 2001; Bernard, Paoline & 
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Pare, 2005). Identification as a system dates back to the 1950s in studies 
conducted by the American Bar Association at the time when the GST was an 
emerging concept (Walker, 1992; Bernard et al., 2005). The emphasis of the 
systems approach was on crime control in addition to the coordination of 
government agencies. 
The application of the GST was questioned by a number of scholars who indicated 
discomfort with the extent to which the criminal justice system mirrored the GST. 
Two schools of thought identified by Kraska (2006) showed diverging views 
regarding the application of the GST. The ‘closed-system’ approach places 
emphasis on the effectiveness of the criminal justice system through better 
coordination and minor adjustments in the rules and regulations within the system. 
Conversely, the ‘open-system’ approach emphasises socio-economic and other 
environmental factors associated with criminal justice. Other areas of emphasis 
within the open-system approach include effective rehabilitation and reintegration 
of offenders back into society. 
The South African criminal justice system can be described as an open-system. 
The criminal justice system consists of police services, court services and 
correctional services as core functions. Court services in terms of facilities, court 
staff, infrastructure and systems are provided by the DOJCD, while Legal Aid 
South Africa provides legal assistance to indigent members of the public. 
Subsystems are interrelated and interconnected.  
In line with descriptions of systems, the criminal justice system has inputs (criminal 
cases recorded), transformation (investigation, prosecution, adjudication), outputs 
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(case outcomes) and feedback (crime statistics, case analysis, etc.) and operates 
within a wider economic, social and political environment, which in turn, provides 




Figure 2.1 Overview of the criminal justice system  
Source: Author 
 
The criminal justice system can also be described as a complex adaptive system. 
There is a hierarchical arrangement of system and subsystems. The criminal 
justice system has subsystems (as described), and these subsystems are 
themselves complex systems. For example, the police service is a single 
organisation; however, it is in itself complex. This is because first, it consists of 
core policing and support functions that should work towards a common goal; it 
interacts and is affected by external factors; and it has characteristics of complex 
systems such as co-evolution and emergence that have been described.  
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Second, the subsystems of the criminal justice system pursue their own goals and 
objectives. All these subsystems are governed by different sets of legislation and 
mandates, which may often be conflicting. For example, the high conviction rates 
and the long prison sentences pursued by prosecutors tend to overstress the 
correctional facilities. However, the early release of inmates tends to upset crime 
victims and other stakeholders within communities. In addition, the system is 
complicated further by the level of independence that is accorded to different 
subsystems. For example, prosecutorial and judicial independence enshrined in 
the South African Constitution can present practical challenges of coordination. 
Third, the system and its subsystems interact and receive feedback from the 
environment. The environment consists of a broad range of stakeholders that 
includes members of the community, non-governmental institutions and other 
governmental institutions. 
Principles of complexity, namely self-organisation, emergence and co-evolution 
apply to the South African criminal justice system. Self-organisation refers to a 
process in which some form of course arises from interactions between elements 
of the system towards more complexity or order depending on the need (Wheatley 
and Kellner‐Rogers, 1996). Over 400 Magistrates’ Courts operate daily in South 
Africa. Within each courtroom, cases are heard in the presence of prosecutors, 
magistrates, the accused, witnesses and legal representatives. Other support 
functions involve transportation of awaiting trial detainees from correctional centres 
by the police, interpreting services during the trial, recording of proceedings and 
safe storage of records, among many others.  
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At a local level, the criminal justice system functions without major intervention 
from top government leadership. Magistrates, and in some cases prosecutors, 
tend to assume the informal leadership role and use their influence to support their 
local court administration machinery. This shows the self-organisational nature of 
the system.  
Co-evolution involves dynamic interactions between two or more elements of a 
system that account mutually for each other's development (Rammel, Stagl & 
Wilfing, 2007; Foster and Pyka, 2014). The criminal justice system as a whole 
co-evolves with the evolution of criminals. The level of sophistication of criminals 
forces the system to respond appropriately, although in most cases, the response 
is slower than expected. For example, the long-standing issue of jurisdiction needs 
to be reconceptualised following the growing scourge of cybercrime that involves 
criminals from different jurisdictions and different countries than the crime victim. 
In addition, the level of technological sophistication of such crimes requires 
non-traditional approaches.  
Emergence refers to the processes whereby changes within the entire system are 
the result of actions and interactions of agents (Goldstein, 2016; Werder and 
Maedche, 2018). The changes are emergent because they are not predictable and 
can be pervasive. For example, tightening of bail procedures because of public 
pressure to act tough on crime may seem sensible from a political point of view. 
However, an increase in the number of awaiting-trial detainees has a major impact 
on correctional centres and the criminal justice system as a whole. First, the state 
needs to safeguard suspects in custody, and this places strain on public funds; 
second, overcrowding results in health hazards and difficult working conditions for 
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staff; third, the escape rate tends to increase; and finally, litigation cases against 
the state for loss of income may increase. The snowball effect of these issues and 
the impact of the decision on the system may not be understood even when the 
individual impact on each subsystem is well understood. 
The most critical implication of the criminal justice system as a complex adaptive 
system is the Gestalt Principle (system as a whole) (Von Bertalanffy and Rapoport, 
1956). The principle stipulates that a system is not merely the sum of all the 
subsystems within it but includes the interactions and interconnections within these 
subsystems. This implies that the system is larger than the sum of its subsystems. 
For this reason, analysis should be primarily undertaken at the level of the system 
rather than the subsystems. Any tampering with one subsystem might influence 
the entire system, often in unpredictable ways (non-linearity principle). 
Although the concepts are well understood and applicable to the criminal justice 
system, some scholars have raised concerns regarding the relevance of the 
approach. In their article on the GST, Bernard et al. (2005) mention a number of 
reasons for the despondency that some authors have regarding the GST.  
First, the three key systems of the criminal justice system (policing, courts and 
corrections) seem to have different and often conflicting objectives, which is in 
contrast with the idea of a system working towards a common goal. Bernard et al. 
(2005) argue that the common goal of the criminal justice system is in the main, 
the processing of offenders into non-offenders. However, the tactics employed 
may be found to be in conflict. For example, in processing offenders, police officers 
might feel aggrieved that the time and effort invested in tracking a suspect is 
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wasted when the suspect is released on bail and possibly, may not be found again. 
In other instances, correctional supervision could be frequently recommended by 
correctional officials in situations where the police would prefer incarceration as a 
deterrent. However, some may argue that a clearer goal articulation is needed 
because the criminal justice system is indeed a system of interdependencies and 
agencies that should work together (Bernard et al., 2005).  
Second, there is an unusually high level of inefficiency associated with the criminal 
justice system. Although the police arrest criminals, the rate of processing these 
cases by prosecutors, followed by a trial and judgement is decreasing (Bernard et 
al., 2005). This significant portion of overlooked cases could lead to reoffending. 
The very nature of the criminal justice system in which many investigations do not 
lead to an arrest raises suspicion regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
system.  
Third, professionals within the criminal justice system exercise a high level of 
discretion within their daily activities. For example, a police officer’s discretion to 
arrest and his/her attitude and capability to investigate and finalise an investigation 
are a series of educated guesses and discretion (Walker, 1992). The study by the 
American Bar Foundation in the 1970s uncovered pervasive “lawlessness, racism 
and casual unprofessionalism” in the United States in the previous decade 
(Walker, 1992:57), particularly when dealing with offenders from particular classes 
and backgrounds. Cases of police brutality, particularly linked to racism, continue 
to be reported, and these sparked the formation of the Black Lives Matter 
movement in 2013 (Hartfield, Griffith & Bruce, 2018; Williamson, Trump and 
Einstein, 2018; Pierson et al., 2020). In May 2020, this grew to a worldwide 
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phenomenon after the brutal killing of George Floyd by police in Minneapolis, 
Minnesota.  
Similarly, interactions between prosecutors and legal practitioners result in a series 
of negotiations, delays and tactics that are accepted as ‘due process’. These 
interactions give rise to a level of discomfort for some scholars (Ciocchini, 2014; 
Dandurand, 2014; Karpin, 1990). This discretion presents a chaotic arrangement 
rather than a proper processing system.  
The approach of treating the subsystems of the criminal justice system 
independently does not solve the problems mentioned and may possibly 
exacerbate them. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge the 
interdependencies and interrelations that point to the need to treat the criminal 
justice system as a single system. Furthermore, it should be noted that theory is 
not considered a perfect fit within all applications but rather guides the 
understanding of the application. It is for this reason that the GST remains 
applicable within the criminal justice system despite these imperfections. These 
identified challenges emphasise the need to adopt a systems approach in order to 
address the challenges rather than highlight the reasons not to adopt the 
approach. 
Having described the criminal justice system in terms of the Complexity Theory, it 
is important to determine how to apply this theory practically in order to make 
improvements within the system. 
The first and most important proposal is to gain an overall performance view of the 
criminal justice system. For example, we need to ask, how do we know that the 
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criminal justice system is working? What are the key measurements? How do we 
know that it is working better than five years ago? Measurements such as case 
throughput and end-to-end conviction rates can assist. Once system-view data are 
understood, it would be easy to see how the different parts of the criminal justice 
system contribute towards these numbers and how different subsystems can 
contribute towards addressing the identified weaknesses. The crime statistics 
shared by the South African Police system do not reflect a system approach and 
do not assist in addressing the silo mentality.  
The next step is to assign the overall performance of the criminal justice system. 
Until 2020, different ministers and administrative heads were accountable for their 
own departments (subsystems). The result has been a silo approach that makes 
participants implement their own plans and use their resources to address their 
issues on their own.  
Merely setting up a cluster such as the JCPS Cluster does not yield results if the 
systems approach and the systems thinking do not take root. A major 
transformation is required to prepare the criminal justice system for information 
sharing, joint accountability, etc. The objective of this research is to propose an 
enabling framework that will assist the JCPS Cluster in progressing towards 
collaborating better in addressing crime. 
Further contributions connected to the Complexity Theory have been made by 
scholars through the identification of leadership dimensions that assist in 
addressing wicked problems. These are described under Section 3.5. 
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2.4.3 Complexity Theory and taming of Wicked Problems 
The Complexity Theory in general and the systems approach in particular are 
considered essential in understanding and addressing wicked problems (Head and 
Alford, 2015; Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller, 2015; McMillan and Overall, 
2016). Wicked problems are problems that are pervasive and multidimensional; 
they involve diverse stakeholders and require considerable interorganisational 
effort to tame. These problems have been described by authors as 
incomprehensible and resistant to solution (Alford and Head, 2017; Head, 2019; 
Rittel and Webber, 1973). 
Rittel and Webber (1973) present ten characteristics of wicked problems: 
1. There is no clear definition of the problem. 
2. There is no obvious solution or solutions to the problem. 
3. Proposed solutions are not absolute and can be assessed as good enough, 
better or worse, etc.  
4. There is no definitive test for a solution. 
5. Attempted solutions cannot be readily undone, and there is not enough time 
to learn by trial and error. 
6. There is no measurable set of potential solutions or an exact set of actions 
that may be incorporated into the plan. Some actions could be contradictory. 
7. Every wicked problem is fundamentally unique. A proposed solution to a 
wicked problem does not necessarily apply to a class of similar wicked 
problems. 
8. Every wicked problem can be a symptom of another problem. 
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9. The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in several ways. 
10. There is no tolerance by members of the public for experiments that fail. 
Although not all problems are wicked, those that are wicked are not always on the 
same spectrum of wickedness. The degree of wickedness ranges from Type 1 to 
Type 3 (Head and Alford, 2015). Type 1 problems are simple because there is 
consensus on both the definition of the problem and the solution to the problem. 
Classic strategic management approaches of cause and effect would therefore 
apply. 
Type 2 problems are complex because there is agreement on the problem 
definition but disagreement on the solution to the problem. Type 3 problems are 
wicked because there is no agreement on the definition of either the problem or 
the solution to the problem. In addition, it is possible for a problem that is initially a 
Type 1 problem to become a Type 3 problem due to pervasive policy failures (Head 
and Alford, 2015). 
In their article titled “Wicked problems: Turning Strategic Management Upside 
Down”, McMillan and Overall (2016) assert that traditional strategic planning 
processes and tools will not work for wicked problems. They argue that wicked 
problems require a different mindset and different performance systems than 
standard problems. The Complexity Theory, a systems theory-based approach, 
has been identified as appropriate for addressing or taming wicked problems 
(Head and Alford, 2015; Zivkovic, 2015; Fischbacher-Smith, 2016). 
50 
Although crime in a different context would not be classified as wicked, in South 
Africa, the persistence and pervasiveness of the problem renders it as such. First, 
socio-economic factors that either exacerbate or cause the problem lie outside the 
criminal justice system itself, and this further complicates the problem. For 
example, South Africa has one of the highest Gini Coefficients in the world, which 
means the income gap between the richest and poorest portions of the population 
is one of the largest (OECD, 2017). Second, solutions are multidimensional and 
cannot be prioritised easily. More than 20 years after the formation of a JCPS 
Cluster, issues pertaining to high crime rates persist. This could point to pervasive 
policy challenges.  
By way of example, such problems cut across authority between governmental 
departments and across policy domains, political and administrative jurisdictions, 
and social interest groups (Weber and Khademian, 2008; Piatak, Romzek, LeRoux 
& Johnston et al., 2018). Although each wicked problem is unique, several scholars 
have proposed frameworks and approaches to tame wicked problems.  
Scholars such as Bovaird (2008) and Eshuis and Gerrits (2019) describe the new 
concept of strategic management for wicked problems as a set of reactions that 
are expected to have a positive impact on the problem and simultaneously change 
the principles that shape the changing environment. Strategic management as a 
function needs a major transformation in order to fulfil the rigorous requirements of 
interorganisational networks in general and to solve wicked problems in particular 
(McMillan and Overall, 2016). Head and Alford (2015) called on public-sector 
management to contribute solutions to the wicked problems that are prevalent in 
public service. 
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The following are approaches that have been identified in literature to address 
wicked problems. 
Knowledge management 
The first key insight regarding a complex problem is the approach towards the 
understanding of the problem. Complex systems must be approached from a 
pluralist point of view by synthesising perspectives from many angles through a 
number of stakeholders in order to understand the problem better (Eppel, 2017; 
Richardson, 2008). 
In line with resource-based theory, knowledge is one of the key resources for 
exchange within an interorganisational network (Weber and Khademian, 2008; 
Eppel, 2017). The ability to synthesise perspectives from a wide range of 
stakeholders requires effective knowledge management and this entails effective 
transfer, receipt, and integration of knowledge across participants (Weber and 
Khademian, 2008). In this regard, Weber and Khademian (2008) identified three 
dimensions of knowledge sharing, transfer and dissemination. In the first instance, 
where the problem being addressed in an interorganisational setting is simple or 
where there is consensus regarding the problem, the straightforward ‘syntactic’ 
knowledge transfer usually works. This approach requires common computer 
programmes, compatible systems and common guidelines and procedures.  
Where the first approach emphasises transfer of information (syntactic), the 
second approach emphasises receipt of information (semantic) (Weber and 
Khademian, 2008). In situations where there is no consensus on the problem, such 
information could be open to misinterpretation and misunderstandings due to the 
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wide and often diverse worldviews and cultures of the participants. It is, therefore, 
as important to focus on the interpretation as it is to transmit.  
The third approach, a ‘pragmatic view of knowledge’ (Weber and Khademian, 
2008) emphasises the integration of knowledge. This is applicable to wicked 
problems and entails a process of synthesising divergent views and producing new 
knowledge that is applicable to the context of the wicked problem being tamed. In 
these instances, participants must be willing to relinquish their long-standing views 
and alter their thinking. Building a contextual new knowledge set for a wicked 
problem is, therefore, one of key steps towards taming the identified problem. 
As part of the current research, the practices and attitudes of managers towards 
knowledge sharing in the context of wicked problems were investigated. 
Organisational learning and mental models 
Challenging long-standing knowledge generated by teams and professionals 
within organisations is admittedly difficult, particularly in dynamic complex 
environments where cause and effect do not neatly follow each other (Kim and 
Senge, 1994; Rangone and Mella, 2019). In their work on organisational learning, 
Kim and Senge (1994) described a concept of ‘shared mental models’ that can 
assist in the process towards challenging prevailing thoughts. A mental model is 
internalised images, beliefs, assumptions and stories that influence perception and 
action. Individuals are often not aware of deeply held mental models that affect 
their thinking and impede their problem-solving capacities. Mental models are held 
by individuals; however, in a social set-up, they are often shared. Shared mental 
models influence individual mental models and vice versa.  
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Learning takes place when individuals adjust their actions based on feedback from 
the environment, which in turn, adjusts their individual mental models. Individual 
learning leads to organisational action, which in turn, results in adjustment of 
shared mental models. Within the context of a wicked problem, it is very important 
to create an environment in which mental models are identified and challenged in 
order to allow new thinking and a deeper understanding of the wicked problem. 
The criminal justice system is made up of vastly different people with different 
backgrounds and outlooks. For example, leaders in the SAPS are long-serving civil 
servants who have trained and served within a hierarchical and military-style 
environment. On the contrary, prosecutors are legally qualified civil servants and 
magistrates and judges are independent members of the Judiciary. Within this 
diverse group of people are administrators whose functions are to offer support 
within the different subsystems. It is, therefore, important to facilitate the 
exploration of the different mental models and where necessary, to facilitate the 
shifting of mental models in order to assist in the taming of the wicked problem.  
Active citizenship 
Public-service challenges in general and wicked problems in particular mainly 
affect citizens or members of the public. Managers are, therefore, caught between 
addressing wicked problems within a challenging bureaucratic environment and 
citizenry who often perceive such problems differently (Meek and Newell, 2005; 
Rangone and Mella, 2019). It is, therefore, important to ensure that any attempt at 
taming a wicked problem that affects citizens includes the citizens. 
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Where active citizenship is not well established, ground rules need to be laid. The 
five focus areas that build the adaptive capacity of communities are create a 
disequilibrium state, amplify action, encourage self-organisation, stabilise 
feedback, and enable information flows (Zivkovic, 2015). 
Interactions between a system and its surroundings result in states of equilibrium 
and disequilibrium. A disequilibrium state is brought about by a disruption in 
existing patterns of engagement. In South Africa, #FeesMustFall in tertiary 
institutions or service-delivery protests could serve as examples. It is through this 
disequilibrium and crises that organisations innovate and adapt towards a new 
state of equilibrium (Boyatzis, 2008; Garud, Gehman & Giuliani, 2014; Zivkovic, 
2015) Feedback and the interactions between external players (active citizens) 
enable the criminal justice system to innovate and move towards a new state of 
equilibria. This state is one of constant renewal through feedback from the external 
environment. 
Leadership capabilities  
Addressing wicked problems requires leadership that appreciates complexity in 
addition to leadership that can tackle such challenges. Leadership can be 
considered from different angles. For the current research, two key attributes are 
important. First, a leader is expected to steer conversations and to coordinate 
stakeholders towards taming a wicked problem and second, a leader needs to 
possess skills to lead and implement systems to enable achievement of goals 
(Beinecke, 2009, 2016).  
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In addition to these attributes, it is essential that leaders possess an appropriate 
attitude for taming wicked problems (Termeer et al., 2015; Craps, Vermeesch, 
Dewulf, Sips, Termeer & Bouwen, 2019). Termeer et al. (2015) identified four 
attitudes that leaders needed to adopt to deal with wicked problems – reflexivity, 
resilience, responsiveness, and revitalisation.  
Reflexivity refers to the ability to deal with problems within an unstructured and 
constantly changing environment. Wicked problems require a curious attitude, an 
open mind and the ability to connect and integrate conflicting ideas. Resilience is 
the attitude to adapt to a changing environment while following the intended course 
and staying focused on the challenges at hand. Responsiveness is the ability to 
respond to the changing demands of the wicked problem in addition to responding 
appropriately to a broad range of stakeholders (Termeer et al., 2015). 
Revitalisation refers to the ability of maintaining momentum through courses of 
action to address the wicked problem. 
The leader should be able to identify blockages and stagnation and put measures 
in place to address these (Termeer et al., 2015). This capability is necessary to 
unblock unproductive patterns in the governance process. Table 3.1 summarises 
the described leadership attitudes. 
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Table 2.5 Leadership attitudes to address wicked problems 
Leadership 
Capability 
Definition Aspect of the Wicked 




Reflexivity The ability to recognise 
and handle unstructured 
problems and numerous 
realities 
Unstructured problems; 






Resilience The ability to adapt in 
response to uncertain and 




Unpredictable results;  
Uncertainties 
Risk of failure in 
accomplishing 
basic functions 
Responsiveness The ability to respond 
reasonably to unlimited 
demands and challenges 
‘No stopping rule’; 








Revitalising The ability to unblock 
and rekindle processes in 






Source: Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller, 2015 
Each of the four dimensions requires a leader to act, observe and enable in every 
situation when dealing with wicked problems (Termeer et al., 2015). By way of 
illustration, a leader should demonstrate the ability to act reflexively, observe 
reflexively and enable reflexivity within the context of the problem being addressed. 
It is important to note that the profile of the leader described contravenes some of 
the leadership roles that are needed in traditional organisations. For example, 
transformational leadership that requires a leader who can envision, excite and 
organise a team towards the achievement of a vision will not succeed (Head and 
Alford, 2015). Similarly, transactional leadership that stresses efficiency, structure 
and performance is inappropriate (Beinecke, 2009). Instead, to tame wicked 
problems, a collaborative leadership approach is needed for complex systems. 
This involves leadership across organisations, the building of trust, persuasion and 
strong communication skills (Head, 2019; Head and Alford, 2015). 
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In addition to attitude, leaders need technical skills to implement and manage the 
task at hand. Vangen and Huxham (2000) identified three pillars of leadership in 
public interorganisational networks, namely structures, processes and 
participants. They noted that none of these is within the control of members of the 
collaboration and identified activities that leadership needs to undertake to 
counteract the effect of these constraints. These include managing power and 
controlling the agenda, representing and mobilising member organisations, and 
enthusing and empowering those who can deliver collaboration objectives ( 
Vangen and Huxham, 2000) . 
It, therefore, follows that there are three focal areas when dealing with leadership 
for interorganisational networks that solve wicked problems, namely the attitude of 
the leader, the behaviours of the leader that will help push the collaboration 
forward, and leadership skills. Figure 3.2 presents a summary of the leadership 
model.  
At an analytical level, the three leadership models are used to observe and assess 
leadership personalities in the context of strategic management within 
intragovernmental collaborations.  
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Table 2.6 Leadership for taming wicked problems  
Source: Termeer, Dewulf, Breeman and Stiller, 2015; Vangen and Huxham (2000) 
 
Consensus building 
Wicked problems are described as Type 3 problems by Head and Alford (2015) 
because of the lack of agreement regarding the definition of the problem and the 
solutions to the problem. However, to begin to tame a wicked problem, a 
consensus on the way forward needs to be established. Consensus does not 
necessarily mean agreement with either the problem or the solution thereof but 
agreement on the approaches that will be taken to move forward. 
Consensus building can be described as a range of practices in which stakeholders 
representing different interest groups come together in dialogue to address a policy 
issue or a common challenge through a mediated process (Innes and Booher, 
1999, 2016; Diaz, Webb, Warner & Monaghan, 2018). 
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The consensus-building exercise is a continuous reiterative process that is 
cumbersome and may take significant time to complete. This process cannot be 
rushed (Ansell and Gash, 2008; Lahat and Sher-Hadar, 2020). In addition, 
consensus building does not necessarily take place during a formal facilitated 
process. Mandell (1988) recognised the importance of the informal networks that 
managers within interorganisational networks use to shape conversations. 
It is not enough to engage with a broad range of stakeholders, including citizens, 
without a concerted effort to integrate all the insights and establish consensus 
towards addressing these problems. Three key insights from the Integrative 
Theory are useful in this regard.  
The first is creating common ground between participants. Next is drawing insights 
from different disciplines and exposing the commonalties and the contradictions 
between the different disciplinary insights into the problem being addressed (Meek 
and Newell, 2005). It is important to note that common ground in many complex 
problems needs to be created because it is not inevitably there (Meek and Newell, 
2005; Edelenbos and van Meerkerk, 2017; Klijn, van Meerkerk & Edelenbos, 
2020).  
The second insight involves embracing differences. This approach emphasises the 
importance of not only celebrating the different points of view and approaches but 
also facilitating new thinking due to different input. The third is the importance of 
assessing the extent of the differences (‘assess the distance’) between the various 
fields that are providing insights. For example, in problems such as air pollution or 
climate change, the problem could require insights from the natural sciences with 
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a scientific approach to problem-solving and at the same time, the problem might 
include human and morality issues from the humanities discipline (Meek and 
Newell, 2005). It is this contradiction that needs to be anticipated and dealt with. It 
is these three conditions that promote continuous interaction and harmonisation 
between vastly different worldviews.  
Innes and Booher (1999, 2016) developed tools to assess the outcomes of 
consensus building grounded on the Complexity Theory. The approach assesses 
both the process and outcome issues. The two most critical inputs for consensus 
building based on the Complexity Theory are inclusion of all stakeholders and the 
ability for all participants to deal with a broad range of inputs. From an outcomes 
point of view, it is important to note that consensus-building outcomes are not 
limited to high quality agreements. Table 2.7 shows the criteria used to assess the 
quality of the process and outcome criteria. Although not all criteria need to be met, 
the fewer that are met, the lower the quality of the outcome (Innes and Booher, 
1999). These approaches have been used in studies such as those of Calderon 





Table 2.7 Process and outcome criteria for consensus building 
Process Criteria Outcome Criteria 
1. Includes representatives of all 
appropriate and diverse interest 
groups  
2. Is motivated by a purpose shared by 
the collective  
3. Is self-organising, enabling 
participants to agree on ground 
rules, tasks, task teams, objectives 
and topics of discussion 
4. Engages participants, keeping them 
interested, and learning through in-
depth engagements and informal 
interactions  
5. Encourages challenges to the 
prevailing ideas and enables 
creative thinking  
6. Incorporates a wide range of good 
quality information and builds 
consensus on its meaning around 
its meaning  
7. Seeks consensus only after 
discussions have fully considered 
the interests and issues and after 
significant effort has been made in 
responding creatively to differences 
1. Generates a high-quality 
agreement  
2. Ends deadlocks  
3. Compares well with other 
planning approaches in terms of 
benefits and costs  
4. Harvests creative ideas  
5. Results in learning and change 
that is not confined to the group  
6. Builds political and social capital  
7. Produces information that is 
acceptable and understood by 
stakeholders  
8. Initiates a wave of change in 
attitudes, actions and 
behaviours, partnerships and 
new institutional practices  
9. Gives rise to institutions and 
practices that are networked, in 
touch with communities, 
responsive to change and 
manage conflict  
 
Source: Innes and Booher, 1999 
Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005) developed a comprehensive framework for the 
role of conversations in interorganisational networks. They argue that the first 
critical step is the establishment of a common identity where participants consider 
the common good of the collaboration. This enables the participants to begin to 
consider the interests of the collaborative before those of their individual 
organisations.  
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Hardy, Lawrence and Grant (2005:66) further propose that members’ 
conversations regarding “Common Construction of Key Issues” include agreement 
on the definition of the problem, the depth and complexity thereof and possible 
solutions. Within this conversation, common constructions in addition to private 
constructions (views of one organisation that differ from the other organisations) 
should be entertained. Both these constructions need to be understood in order to 
begin a process towards innovative solutions. 
Finally, Hardy et al. (2005) emphasise the appreciation of two styles of talk 
throughout the collaboration, namely collaborative talk, which ensures that the 
voices of the weakest organisations are heard, and assertive talk, which ensures 
that the interests of all participant organisations are considered. This approach 




Interorganisational networks can be explained through several theories, two of 
which are the RDT and TCE. In addition, the Social Exchange framework explains 
the nature of the relationships within resource dependency and identifies three key 
dimensions. These are goal clarity, which is critical to the definition and boundaries 
of the interorganisational relationship; power; and trust within the relationship. 
Regarding TCE, two frameworks explain the cost of establishing 
interorganisational networks. The first is the relational view of the firm, which 
entails readiness and the capability to work collaboratively with other firms. The 
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second is the knowledge view of a firm, which entails the effective management of 
the knowledge-based resources of the firm. 
It should be noted that a shortcoming associated with the two theories lies in the 
fact that they address objectives at organisational level. That is, the decision to 
form partnerships lies in the benefits for the organisation and not on the benefits 
that accrue at the level of the partnership. The dimensions are nonetheless useful 
in understanding the decision to form and remain in a partnership. 
The seven dimensions affecting interorganisational networks that were identified 
through the RDT and the TCE were (i) goal clarity, (ii) power, (iii) trust, (iv) 
collaborative advantage, (v) collaborative strategic management, (vi) governance, 
and (vii) knowledge management. These dimensions provide a basis for further 
research into interorganisational networks and its emphasis in the South African 
context. 
Figure 2.1 presents the theoretical considerations adopted to investigate 
interorganisational collaborations. This framework illustrates a holistic and 
integrated view of interorganisational networks not found elsewhere in the existing 




Figure 2.2 Theoretical framework for interorganisational networks using Resource 
Dependency Theory and Transaction Cost Economics  
Source: Author 
 
The GST and the Complexity Theory provide another dimension in the 
understanding of the criminal justice system and the wickedness of crime in South 
Africa. The practical application of the GST to management studies was illustrated 
through principles of complex adaptive systems. 
Working through the Complexity Theory and its application in complex adaptive 
systems, several dimensions relevant to addressing crime as a wicked problem 
were identified. These are as follows: 
• Implementing appropriate knowledge management systems for the 
collaboration  
• Adopting appropriate organisational learning principles to shape mental 
models  
• Building active citizenship and encouraging interaction  
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• Identifying appropriate leadership  
Therefore, the key dimensions identified through literature that are appropriate in 
addressing wicked problems are (i) knowledge management, (ii) organisational 
learning, (iii) active citizenship, and (iv) leadership capabilities. Figure 2.2 
demonstrates the dimensions of collaborations as derived from the GST. 
 
  




3 CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND ON INTRAGOVERNMENTAL 
COLLABORATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The theoretical background on resource dependence and TCE provided 
explanations for the basis of interorganisational relationships, while the GST 
provided explanations for criminal justice in South Africa as a system.  
The current chapter provides a deeper understanding of interorganisational 
networks in general and intragovernmental collaborations in particular to provide 
specific insights for the research context. The chapter presents details on the 
classification of collaborations and a discussion on intragovernmental 
collaborations. Relevant models of interorganisational networks that are useful as 
points of departure for intragovernmental collaborations are reviewed and a 
conceptual framework for the research is prepared. 
 
3.2 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS USING 
THE 3Cs FRAMEWORK 
Resource dependence provides reasons for organisations to enter into 
interorganisational relationships. However, it is TCE that clarifies the economic 
reasons for choosing either the ‘market’ (outside the organisation) or the ‘hierarchy’ 
(within the organisation) to provide the resources that the organisation needs 
(Lacoste, 2016; Pahl-Wostl, 2019; Thorelli, 1986). However, between the two 
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extremes, other relationships have been identified as neither purely market nor 
purely hierarchy. 
The first approach in the classification of these relationships is based on horizontal 
integration using the 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007). With this 
model, relationships are classified as cooperation, coordination and collaboration 
based on the objectives and intensity of interactions between organisations as 
indicated in Table 3.2. Cooperation represents the lowest level within the 
continuum where organisations maintain full autonomy and interactions are not 
formalised. Collaboration is on the highest level of the continuum where 
organisations work jointly to implement systematic changes with a high level of 
interdependence.  
Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) identified four attributes, namely goal alignment, 
level of autonomy, structural linkages and levels of formality to illustrate the 
strength of the 3Cs model. For example, in collaborations, goals are deeper and 
include interventions within the entire system/industry whereas cooperation, may 
be limited to information sharing. In regard to structural linkages, collaborations 
may result in changes within structures of organisations, whereas no changes are 
expected in cooperations. Lastly, cooperation takes place on an informal basis 
whereas collaboration requires a formal approach that may include appointing a 
lead organisation or establishing an agency (Provan and Kenis, 2008).  
McNamara (2012) extended the four attributes of Provan and Kenis (2008) to 
include information-sharing, decision-making, resolution of turf issues, resource 
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allocation, systems thinking and trust. The 3Cs framework based on extended 
attributes of integration is detailed in Table 3.1.  
 
 Table 3.1 The 3Cs framework and attributes of integration 
Integration Cooperation Coordination Collaboration 
Time taken to 
establish 
Short term Medium term Longer term 
Goals 
Information-sharing; 
base of support 
Align organisational 
resources to meet a 
predetermined goal 
Synergise to create 
something new or 




Retains autonomy but gives 
some element to joint effort; 
joint programme planning  
Highly interdependent 





Some level of stability of 
membership; 
medium links 
Members move outside 
traditional functional 
areas; dense links 






Information is exchanged 
through more formal 
channels 
Open and frequent 
communications 














A neutral facilitator may 
help resolve conflicts 
Participants work together 





Physical and non-physical 
resources are exchanged 
to achieve individual goals 
Physical and non-physical 
resources are pooled in 




does not occur 
System integration may 
occur for better 
achievement of individual 
goals 
System integration occurs 
for better achievement of 
collective goals 
Trust 
Trust relationships are 
not required but may 
develop 
Leaders work closely to 
create relationships based 
on trust 
Trust between 
participants is needed to 
sustain relationships 
 Adapted from Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) and McNamara (2012) 
 
It is important to acknowledge that the complexity of wicked problems, which to a 
large extent require system-level engagement, cannot be approached by way of 
cooperation and coordination (Keast, Brown & Mandell, 2007; Mandell, Keast & 
69 
Chamberlain, 2017). In addition, key insights developed from this framework are 
the intensity of participation in collaborations; the pooling of physical and 
non-physical resources (McNamara, 2012, 2016); interdependence and the level 
of trust needed to meet collective goals.  
A similar framework by Huxham and Macdonald (1992) was developed within the 
context of local government and the public sector. Similar to other authors, 
Huxham and Macdonald (1992) adopted definitions that recognise the level of 
participation in the achievement of common goals. 
Within the ambit of collaboration, the authors defined a meta-strategy as a 
statement of the joint goals that participating organisations are pursuing. 
Participating organisations would thus be expected to align the strategies of their 
individual organisations with those of the collaboration. Furthermore, these 
organisations would pool resources to ensure that the meta-strategy is achieved 
(Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). Trist (1983) explained that for this meta-strategy 
and meta-objectives to be achieved, a referent (regulatory) organisation would 
need to lead, particularly for wicked problems or multidisciplinary public services. 
However, within the context of the current research, the referent organisation does 
not necessarily extend to regulation of industries. In other words, the referent 
organisation can be a simple structure based on the governance needs and cost 
implications. It is, nevertheless, accepted that a referent organisation is best suited 
in collaborations with high levels of interdependence and a need to pool resources. 
It is important for managers, particularly those involved in wicked problems, to 
avoid the pitfall of employing cooperative or coordinative approaches to instances 
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where collaborative efforts are needed. Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) and 
Mandell, Keast and Chamberlain (2017) found that managers often use the words 
interchangeably and apply them loosely. It is important to ensure that where 
collaboration is identified as an appropriate mode of interaction, that it is 
implemented appropriately. It is also important to note that in long-term 
collaborations, particularly in the public sector, all three modes can be undertaken 
to a different extent by the same public sector organisation (Mandell, Keast & 
Chamberlain, 2017). 
Within the concept of this research, the 3Cs framework is accepted as the initial 
basis of classification for interorganisational relationships. Reasons for the 
formation of these interorganisational relationships can be attributed to either 
resource dependency or TCE. In practical terms, reasons for the formation of such 
relationships can be summarised into five generic needs: cash injection, scale 
(growth), skill acquisition, access to resources, or a combination of these (Todeva 
and Knoke, 2005; Stuart, 2013). These relationships, identified by Todeva and 
Knoke (2005), Bastida, Marimon and Tanganelli (2017) and Shijaku, Larraza-
Kintana and Urtasun-Alonso (2018), can be broadly classified as strategic 
alliances and as organisations that share benefits and managerial control and 
contribute to strategic business areas such as technology, product and distribution 
while remaining independent. This definition excludes relationships such as 
mergers and acquisitions that result in the formation of a singular organisation (a 
hierarchy).  
Public sector organisations, particularly government, do not consistently ‘fit the 
mould’ of strategic alliances, particularly where the relationships are formed within 
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a government (local, provincial or national). This is because from a governance 
point of view, two government departments cannot strictly maintain the same level 
and type of independence as two private sector organisations. Strategic alliances 
can, however, be formed by a combination of private and public sector 
organisations. Table 3.2 shows types of private and public sector networks 
mapped within the 3Cs framework. The 3Cs model can, therefore, be applied to 
public sector organisations based on the same principles that are applied in the 
private sector. 
 
Table 3.2 Mapping of private and public sector interorganisational relationships 
within the 3Cs framework 




• Subcontractors (short-term) 
• Licensing (fee-based) 
• Action sets (lobby groups) 
• Affiliate marketing 
• Industry Standard Groups (adoption 
of technical standards) 
• Suppliers 
• Subcontractors (short-term) 
• Joint project implementation 
 
Coordination • Cooperatives 
• Cartels (e.g. Organisation of 
Petroleum Producing Countries) 
• Inter-ministerial committees 
• Joint programmes 
• Policy coordination 
Collaboration • R&D Consortia 
• Franchising 
• Subcontractors (long-term) 
• Joint ventures 
• Public-private partnerships 
• Intragovernmental collaborations 
• Intergovernmental collaborations 
• Government outcomes 
Adapted from Todeva and Knoke (2005) 
The inconsistent use of the 3C terminologies throughout literature initiated the call 
for scholars to develop widely acceptable definitions that could be understood and 
used consistently. Castañer and Oliveira (2020) responded to the call and 
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undertook a meta-analytical study of definitions of the 3Cs. Three dimensions, 
namely actions, behaviours and outcomes, were used as a basis to define the 3Cs.  
Castañer and Oliveira (2020) define coordination as a joint determination of 
common goals, while cooperation refers to the implementation of these goals. 
Regarding collaboration, the authors defined it as the act of voluntarily helping 
other partners to achieve common goals (Castañer and Oliveira, 2020). These 
definitions were deemed too generic and not useful for the broad spectrum of 
interorganisational relationships. In particular, the close association of 
collaboration and cooperation overly simplifies the spectrum of relationships.  
In contrast, Stout and Keast (2021) recognise the differences between 
coordination and cooperation as they relate to the public service. The authors 
clarify the role of coordination in the implementation of a large portion of 
government programmes and identify cooperation simply as an exchange 
relationship. For example, financial institutions sharing financial transaction data 
with law enforcement agencies represents a cooperation effort in which the 
exchange relationship is mutually beneficial. In a situation where law enforcement 
agencies work with the Department of Home Affairs in addressing human 
trafficking, this would be deemed a coordination effort because this partnership 
involves working together on a narrow, clearly defined goal while maintaining 
separate organisations, resources and activities.  
The approach of Stout and Keast (2021) emphasises the importance of power, 
human interactions and interrelatedness in interorganisational relationships. 
Regarding collaboration, the authors argue that an important factor in the network 
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is that participants hold equal status without perceived power over one another 
(Stout and Keast, 2021). This approach places the emphasis on power as a 
differentiator between cooperation/coordination and collaboration. However, this 
does not align with the current research. The key determinants of collaboration are 
deemed to be interconnectedness and goal complexity, and these largely align 
with the definitions of Huxham and MacDonald (1992b) and Keast et al. (2007).  
It is apparent that definitions will continue to emerge with further research. For the 
purposes of the current research, definitions are adopted in line with these merging 
understandings.  
 
3.3 CLASSIFICATION OF INTERORGANISATIONAL NETWORKS – 
SCHOPLER’S MODEL 
Whereas the 3Cs framework classified interorganisational relationships in terms of 
the intensity of interactions and level of autonomy, Schopler's (1987) contribution 
lies in the classification of groups in terms of the origin of the group and the task 
structure.  
Schopler (1987) classified origins as either mandated or voluntary. Group origin 
refers to the way a group or interorganisational relationship was originally 
conceived. A group is mandated when an external body, agent or legislation 
creates such a group to carry out a legislative mandate, to enforce a regulation or 
to implement a political mandate, whereas a voluntary group is initiated by 
participants in response to a challenge or market forces. 
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Task structure refers to the extent to which such groups determine their task. A 
high external task structure means the groups have authority to determine their 
purpose, structures and tasks, whereas a low external task structure refers to a 
situation where the purpose, tasks and structures are determined outside the 
group.  
Using a 2 x 2 matrix, four types of groups based on group origin and task structure 
were identified through Schopler’s Model and are detailed in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Classification of interorganisational networks using Schopler’s Model 
 Directed Self-Directed 
Mandated 
Type I: Reliable Compliance 
 
• Brief formative phase 
• Low level of overt problems in 
group 
• Decision-making: Efficient 
participation 
• Low member satisfaction 
• Minimal quality of output 
• High compliance with external 
demands 
 
Type II: Frustrated vs. Responsive 
 
• Brief/moderate formative phase 
• Low/moderate level of problems in 
group decision-making: Confusion, 
covert conflict 
• Minimal/moderate quality of output 
• Low/moderate member satisfaction 
• High/moderate compliance with 
external demands 




Type III: Directed vs. Inner Conflict 
 
• Moderate/longer formative phase 
• Moderate/high level of problems in 
group decision-making: 
Manipulation, open conflict 
• Moderate/high member satisfaction 
• Moderate/high quality of output 
• Moderate/low compliance with 
external demands 
Type IV: Creative Commitment 
 
• Longer formative phase 
• High level of problems in group 
decision-making 
• Open conflict over specific ends and 
most appropriate means 
• High member satisfaction 
• High quality of output 
• Low compliance with external 
demands 
Source: Schopler (1987, 1994) 
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Type I relates to groups that are both mandated and directed. It is not difficult to 
form such a group because the mandating authority identifies participants and 
tasks for the team. However, compared with other groups, the quality of output is 
expected to be the lowest due to enforced compliance of directives, which could 
lead to low morale. The functionality of Type I groups is not expected to be high 
due to differing opinions, differing interests and the process of establishing trusting 
relationships. Mandates from legislation or political directives are often difficult to 
bypass, and participants tend to comply with the directive. It is for this reason that 
conflict is avoided, while the level of satisfaction is low. Schopler (1987:704) 
labelled this group “Reliable Compliance”. Intragovernmental collaborations fall 
within this category in which groups and their tasks are fully mandated and closely 
directed by such a mandate. It should be noted that one of the reasons for 
dysfunction is the absence of a profit motive, which is usually a strong driving force 
of voluntary private-sector-based networks. 
Type II groups are also formed through a mandate. However, these teams are 
self-directed (i.e. their tasks and functions are directed in line with the received 
broad mandate). The group takes longer to form and function due to the discretion 
afforded to the members during the initiation phase. This discretion makes their 
output better than the output expected for mandated and directed groups. 
Examples of Type II networks are interagency agreements mandated by 
government and partnerships between government and NGOs. 
Participation in Type III groups is voluntary; however, the tasks are directed. For 
example, individuals may voluntarily become part of a lobby group with a specific 
means to achieve objectives. The voluntary nature of such groups requires a broad 
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consensus to stay intact. Conflict, accompanied by power play, is more likely in 
such groups, and output is expected to be superior to both mandated groups. 
Type IV groups are voluntary and have internal determination of tasks and 
structures. The groups take the most time to form due to efforts in building 
consensus on both the objectives and the tasks. However, once formed, the group 
is expected to provide the most satisfaction for members and the outputs are 
expected to be of high quality. 
It is evident from Schopler (1987) and Schopler (1994) that a mandate for any 
interorganisational group or network affects the formation and interactions that 
take place within the network. It is noted that although a Type 1 network is the 
easiest and quickest to form, it is the most challenging regarding achievement of 
results. This peculiarity is identified by scholars such as Levine and White (1961), 
Aldrich (1976) and Gray (1985).  
In addition to acknowledging the disparity, Rodriguez et al. (2007), O’Leary and Vij 
(2012), McNamara (2012, 2016) and others admit that insufficient studies of 
mandated networks have been undertaken. There are, however, authors who have 
responded to the call for more research and to date, selected studies specifically 
focusing on mandated networks have been undertaken. The current research also 
responds to this call and provides an understanding of intragovernmental 




3.4 MANDATED INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATIONS 
Intragovernmental collaborations have been described by different scholars using 
different terminology, and this has resulted in fragmentation in an environment with 
inadequate research content. Furthermore, public-sector-type networks take 
different forms such as mandated or voluntary, and these networks are often 
discussed without a clear distinction between the two. The findings of such 
research efforts are, therefore, too general and too simplistic to apply to the 
complexities and challenges of the mandate. For example, the model of Ansell and 
Gash (2008) does not differentiate between findings drawn from mandated and 
voluntary networks. Some networks such as those studied by Lee (2015) and 
Gerber, Henry and Lubell (2013) are not mandated and others, such as, mandated 
networks studies by Rodriguez et al. (2007) and Muir and Mullins (2015) are self-
directed. 
Another area of conceptual confusion lies in the definitions of intragovernmental 
and intergovernmental networks. Within the fields of intergovernmental relations 
and political studies, intergovernmental relations refer to coordination between 
three spheres of government, namely local, state/provincial and national. 
Intergovernmental relations are classified as horizontal when they involve 
participation by players from one sphere of government and as vertical when 
referring to participation by players from two or three spheres (Smith, 2002). 
Relations within one sphere of government are denoted intergovernmental if the 
participation entities originate from different municipalities or counties (in terms of 
local government) or different provinces or states (in cases of provincial or state). 
This is based on the principle that these separate municipalities and states are 
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legislatures within their own right (Smith, 2002). Where relationships involve 
governmental entities from Members of Cabinet within the same legislature, these 
relationships are intragovernmental (Smith, 2002). It should be further noted that 
intragovernmental relations could exist within one local or one provincial 
government (Fischbacher-Smith, 2016). 
In South Africa, the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (South Africa, 
2005) stipulates the governance arrangements between local, provincial and 
national governments and sets out appropriate structures to deal with the interface. 
The objective of the Act was to enable the three spheres of government to integrate 
and work together in delivering services and addressing the major challenges 
facing the country. An example of a governance structure is the MinMEC in which 
a Cabinet Minister from National Government interacts with provincial Members of 
the Executive Committee within a functional area. Another example defined in the 
Act is the Premier’s Intergovernmental Forum where the Premier (political head of 
a province) interacts with mayors of municipalities and a relevant member of the 
Provincial Executive Council. Hence, this Act provides structures and guidance on 
how different spheres of government relate to each other (South Africa, 2005). 
While interorganisational relations identify actors and interactions between these 
actors, there are managerial and other implementation practicalities that managers 
must address. Mandell (1988) recognised intergovernmental management as a 
means of understanding how the layers of government interact and how to cope 
with management challenges stemming from these interrelationships. From this 
perspective, intergovernmental collaboration is an entire field rather than a layered 
organisation (Mandell, 1988).  
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From the two perspectives, there appears to be a spectrum of intergovernmental 
partnerships that is dependent on the nature of the interorganisational relationship. 
For example, at a level of cooperation, inter-ministerial committees can be clearly 
classified as intragovernmental (i.e. several government departments under the 
leadership of a Cabinet Minister cooperating on a specific plan of action). However, 
in the context of collaborations, particularly those addressing wicked problems, 
intragovernmental collaborations require deeper levels of interaction, resource 
sharing, knowledge management and interaction. 
Similarly, intergovernmental interactions can take the form of cooperation, 
coordination and collaboration with provincial, local and national government 
organisations. For example, within the criminal justice system, the Child Justice 
Act (South Africa, 2008), which guides the criminal justice process for children 
allegedly in conflict with the law, requires the involvement of social workers from 
the Department of Social Development at national level and implementation by 
provincial legislature. Although the coordination’s epicentre is at National 
Government level in this instance, the interactions spread much wider.  
Within the context of this research, an intragovernmental network is, therefore, 
defined as a mandated partnership of one sphere of government (local, provincial 
or national) to identify and address a pervasive public policy problem through the 
participation of government departments and entities and the sharing of resources 
(e.g. financial, human and knowledge-based resources). Other types of mandated 
government-led partnerships include interagency collaborations (Hudson, Hardy, 
Henwood & Wistow, 2006; Conteh, 2013), which involve entities mandated and 
directed by government to assist in the delivery of services.  
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Collaborative governance was defined by Ansell and Gash (2008) as collaboration 
that involves joint decision-making between government agencies and 
non-governmental stakeholders working on public policy or public management. 
The definition emphasises the presence of both governmental and 
non-governmental stakeholders as key in effective public policy and management.  
The meta-analytical study of 137 articles by Ansell and Gash (2008) revealed a 
large number of single-case studies and single-issue investigations. Based on 
these articles, a framework for collaborative governance was developed, as shown 
in Figure 3.1. Although primarily based on voluntary networks, this framework 
provides a foundation on which to build a framework for mandated collaborations. 
 
Figure 3.1 Generic framework for collaborative governance  
(Source: Ansell and Gash (2008) 
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The study of Ansell and Gash (2008) identified three starting conditions that either 
encourage or frustrate the onset of the collaborative effort. First, participation of 
players perceived to be powerful and highly influential might discourage the 
participation of players who are less influential. The second is the strength of the 
incentive to participate. In cases where there is not much to gain, participation is 
less enthusiastic. Finally, pre-existing conflict and trust issues could discourage 
new efforts to collaborate (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Although these starting 
conditions are applicable to voluntary networks, the issues have not been ruled out 
for mandated networks. 
Institutional design identifies not only the members of a collaboration but also the 
institutional arrangements that are most appropriate to facilitate the collaboration. 
It is important that these structures consider efficiency from an economic point of 
view together with effectiveness and quality of outcomes. In line with studies by 
Provan and Kenis (2008), these approaches include the formation of a 
coordinating organisation (network administration organisation) or designation of 
a lead organisation among participating entities.  
The collaborative process by its nature is a strategic management process. The 
model of Ansell and Gash (2008) consists of themes that were identified from the 
research, and these encompass shared understanding, which includes a clear 
mission and common understanding of the problem that leads to a joint strategic 
plan and the implementation thereof. Scholars that have undertaken substantial 
work in this area include Huxham and Macdonald (1992) in their article regarding 
the development of a meta-strategy, Gray (1985), Hood, Logsdon and Thompson 
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(1993) on their work on collaborative process, and Clarke and Fuller (2011) on 
collaborative strategic management.  
A meta-strategy was defined by Huxham (1993b) as a high-level statement of the 
meta-mission and meta-objectives of a collaborative effort. With this background, 
a meta-mission represents the reason for an existence (or purpose) of an 
interorganisational network and provides a joint sense of meaning for 
stakeholders. Huxham (1993a) refers to meta-objectives as the highest level at 
which objectives of a network are expressed. In contrast to voluntary networks, the 
interconnectedness of intragovernmental collaborations requires a joint 
understanding of what needs to be achieved in the short term (meta-objectives) 
and the long term (meta-goals). In addition to the statements of meta-goals and 
meta-objectives, a Joint Action Plan should be included. This plan should include 
resource sharing, which is prevalent and typical in the highly interdependent and 
interconnected collaborations within government (McGuire, 2006).  
The collaborative strategic management framework proposed by Clarke and Fuller 
(2011) is based on a model for interorganisational networks proposed by Hood, 
Logsdon and Thompson (1993). This model includes critical steps of problem-
setting (common understanding of the problem being solved), direction-setting and 
implementation. An additional contribution of Clarke and Fuller (2011) includes 
implementation steps within the network and within individual organisations. In 
addition, they identified a broad range of outcomes of the network, which is beyond 
the achievement of planned outcomes. These include process-centric outcomes 
that lead to changes in how network processes are undertaken, 
environmental-centric outcomes that lead to unexpected outcomes of the network, 
83 
and partner-centric outcomes that lead to the impact made on individual partner 
organisations (Clarke and Fuller, 2011). Hence, this means that an outcome of a 
partnership is not merely addressing a problem but addressing how the solution 
can be achieved in the long term. This is particularly applicable to wicked problems. 
Although Clark and Fuller’s (2011) contribution is significant, it has its limitations. 
First, the networks that were studied were voluntary and the authors admitted that 
it could not be assumed that the framework would perform in other types of 
networks. Secondly, the research study was undertaken within the sustainable 
development sector, which typically has clear goals that participants 
enthusiastically aspire towards (Clarke and Fuller, 2011). For mandated and 
directed interorganisational networks, that is, Schopler’s (1987) Type I 
partnerships, the dynamics are different and thus may require a customised 
conceptualisation of collaborative strategic management.  
The model of Ansell and Gash (2008) identified three key contingencies that need 
to be carefully considered before collaborative governance can be pursued: “Time, 
Trust and Interdependence” (Ansell and Gash, 2008:561, 2018). First, there needs 
to be sufficient time to reach consensus because bringing parties together with 
limited time to achieve tangible results is disingenuous. Consensus is, therefore, a 
function of time. Second, trust is another obstruction for collaborative governance. 
Where levels of trust are low, it is imperative to undergo a trust-building process. 
A third contingency is the level of interdependence between participant 
organisations. If the interdependence is high, then the collaborative governance 
effort can be undertaken even when trust is low. However, if parties do not need 
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each other to achieve their goals (low interdependence), then the collaborative 
effort, which includes trust building and consensus building, is worthless. 
Although this model involved governmental agencies as collaborators, Ansell and 
Gash (2008) disclosed that the participation of non-governmental agencies was 
largely voluntary. Thus, this model does not fully address mandated collaboration. 
In addition to their disclosure, the 137 articles showed a bias towards American 
case studies. Similarly, other studies such as those of Clarke and Fuller (2011) 
and Hood, Logsdon and Thompson (1993) were not undertaken specifically for 
mandated collaborations. 
The collaborative governance model developed by Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh 
(2011) provides a more comprehensive approach, particularly for networks that 
include governmental institutions (Bryson, Crosby & Stone, 2015). This model is 
based on a broader definition of collaborative governance. The definition included 
government-government, government-private sector and a broad range of 
cooperation, collaboration and coordination efforts. The model of Emerson, 




Figure 3.2 Framework for collaborative governance 
Source: Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) 
 
Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011) challenged scholars to use the framework 
to extend theories of interorganisational networks by studying different relationship 
contexts. It is, therefore, the intention of the current research to contribute towards 
mandated and directed networks in response to this call. 
3.5 DEFINITION OF KEY CONSTRUCTS USED WITHIN THE CURRENT 
RESEARCH 
Following the in-depth discussion of the 3Cs and models of interorganisational 
network, definitions of key constructs used in the current research are discussed. 
i. Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration 
The current research recognises coordination and collaboration as separate 
constructs, which is in line with definitions presented by Huxham and MacDonald 
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(1992b), Keast et al. (2007) and Stout and Keast (2021). The definitions adopted 
for the three terms are, therefore, as follows: 
Cooperation: A partnership in which participating organisations are in an exchange 
relationship that is of mutual benefit but without substantial commitment and use 
of resources or participation in resourcing, planning and implementation, for 
example, the exchange of data. 
Coordination: A partnership in which participating organisations work jointly 
towards the achievement of a well-defined goal while using their own resources 
towards achievement of the goal, for example, the implementation of the 
Trafficking in Persons Act by different government departments. 
Collaboration: A partnership in which participating organisations work together 
towards the identification of substantial goals and jointly identify and share 
resources towards the achievement of goals. This partnership is characterised by 
interdependence between participating organisations and a long-term outlook 
towards the achievement of goals. Collaborations are needed to address pervasive 
service-delivery failures and wicked problems. Within the current research, the 
JCPS Cluster is referred to as an intragovernmental collaboration because it is 
addressing crime as a wicked problem and requires substantial effort in goal 
identification and problem implementation. Care has been taken within the current 
research to avoid the use of the word ‘collaboration’ to represent generic 
interorganisational partnerships that do not fit the strict definition of a collaboration. 
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ii. Interorganisational Networks:  
A generic partnership of two or more organisations that work towards achieving a 
common goal. These partnerships include private, public and non-governmental 
organisations and any combinations thereof. Within the current research, the term 
network is used for a generic interorganisational partnership and a synonym that 
is used for network is partnership. 
iii. Collaborative Governance:  
This refers to all public sector-based partnerships that broadly include 
collaboration, coordination and cooperation together with voluntary, mandated, 
directed and self-directed partnerships. In addition, participating organisations 
include all spheres of government, non-governmental organisations and 
private-sector organisations. Research in collaborative governance is helpful for 
intragovernmental collaborations but is often found to be generalised and focused 
on voluntary collaborations.  
iv. Intergovernmental Collaboration: 
This involves partnerships that span two or three spheres of government (local, 
provincial, national) to address major service-delivery challenges. 
v. Intragovernmental Collaborations:  
This is the subject of the current research and refers to partnerships that are 
mandated, led and directed within one sphere of government to address major 
government programmes and goals. Within the current research, participating 
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organisations are led primarily by one sphere of government, with limited or no 
participation from NGOs. 
vi. Mandated Networks:  
These are partnerships that are established by way of legislation, regulation or by 
any party such as parliament or individuals empowered to issue a directive. The 
same mandate often includes instructions on the governance of the network and 
identification of participating organisations/parties/individuals. 
vii. Voluntary Networks:  
These are partnerships in which organisations willingly participate for the time that 
the parties work towards a common goal and derive mutual benefit.  
viii. Directed Collaborations:  
These are partnerships in which participation and focus areas are indicated 
through a mandate. These are largely within the public service and are directed 
towards the implementation of major government programmes. 
ix. Self-Directed Collaborations  
These are partnerships in which membership, goals and efforts are directed by 
participants or participating organisations.  
As has already been indicted, research within interorganisational networks has 
largely been generic and has focused predominantly on voluntary networks. Most 
of the discussions on the topic are drawn from generic interorganisational network 
research. The intention of the current research is to contribute an understanding 
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of the networks through the analysis of a specific type of network that is 
understudied (mandated and directed). 
 
3.6 THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTRAGOVERNMENTAL 
COLLABORATIONS 
Developing a conceptual framework involves identifying concepts within a 
phenomenon, defining them and thereafter linking them to form a coherent 
structure or outline (Berman and Smyth, 2015). A framework is useful as a starting 
point for thinking about the research and the context under which it is undertaken 
(Smyth, 2004). 
A conceptual framework can be compiled in two ways. In the first instance, it can 
be constructed inductively following a literature survey (Leshem and Trafford, 
2007; Berman and Smyth, 2015; Wald and Daniel, 2019). Alternatively, it can be 
constructed following field work or a research process as a means of building 
theory (Wald and Daniel, 2020). The former approach was adopted for this 
research.  
Although a number of collaborative models such as those of Wood and Gray 
(1991) and Ansell and Gash (2008) take the form of input-process-output or 
antecedent-process-outcome, a different approach was proposed in line with the 
mandatory nature of the JCPS collaboration. Through literature, the following 
themes were identified: 
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• Antecedents of intragovernmental collaboration that represent dimensions 
that need to be in place prior to implementing a collaborative effort.  
• Governance arrangements for intragovernmental collaboration, that are 
critical for addressing wicked problems require an extensive range of 
stakeholders.  
• Intragovernmental collaborations as an on-going process. 
• Feedback loops that must enable stakeholders to appraise, regroup and 
interact with active citizenry. 
3.6.1 Antecedents of intragovernmental collaborations 
Interorganisational partnerships are time consuming (Ansell and Gash, 2008, 
2018). Before efforts to establish a network are undertaken, a few critical 
antecedents need to be in place. For intragovernmental collaborations, the 
proposed antecedents are goal clarity, trust and leadership.  
• Goal clarity 
The RDT stipulates that organisations identify interorganisational partnerships in 
order to access the resources needed to achieve their own goals (Hillman et al., 
2009; Gaffney, Kedia and Clampit, 2013; Escobar and Deshpande, 2018). Central 
to the interorganisational relationship is an exchange framework that should 
stipulate the goals and include role clarity. For example, the mandate should 
clearly articulate to participants the larger goal that is being addressed. Although it 
may not be clear at the start, a sense of direction needs to be created for 
stakeholders. Within the JCPS Cluster, it is important for each participating 
organisation to recognise that resources are being brought together to address 
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crime as a greater goal, not to create an environment where individual 
organisations lobby others to help address their own goals.  
Organisations themselves are abstract and do not participate in interorganisational 
networks. It is individuals who participate. Vangen and Huxham (2011) caution 
against the disjuncture between collaborative goals, organisational goals and 
individual goals. Intragovernmental goals, with the additional dimension of a 
political environment, need special attention to ensure that the network is not 
doomed to failure due to this issue. 
• Trust 
Another antecedent for interorganisational networks based on the exchange 
framework is trust. For voluntary relationships, trust is central to the formation of 
the network, and breakdown in trust will likely spell the demise of any voluntary 
network that is underway. For mandated networks, trust will severely affect the 
functionality of the network, even if the network remains intact due to the mandate. 
It is, therefore, important in mandated networks to ensure that appropriate rules, 
routines and roles within the collaboration build trust (Oomsels and Bouckaert, 
2014). Trust can be both an antecedent and a process issue. If trust cannot be 
established, then collaboration should not be attempted. However, where trust can 
be built over time, then this should form part of the collaborative process (Ansell 
and Gash, 2008). 
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• Leadership 
Leadership is critical to the success or failure of collaborative efforts. For 
addressing wicked problems, three leadership attributes are required. These are 
facilitation and skills management; ability to take appropriate actions (act, enable, 
observe); and attributes of reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness and revitalisation 
(Termeer et al., 2015). In the context of addressing wicked problems, it is critical 
that a leader has an appropriate balance between transformation leadership that 
can excite and inspire action and collaborative leadership that is persuasive, builds 
trust and communicates effectively (Beinecke, 2009; Alford and Head, 2017; 
Kramer, Day, Nguyen, Hoelscher & Cooper, 2019). 
Intragovernmental collaborations are generally mandated, and this often means 
that leaders who champion or participate in such collaborations are mandated. 
These leaders are often participants of collaborations due to the offices that they 
occupy. In some instances, participants and champions are rotated after a few 
years without careful consideration of the appropriate leadership needed to drive 
the collaboration forward. It is critical for high-ranking politicians, who often lead 
and mandate participants in intragovernmental collaborations, to identify 
leadership attributes and leadership styles that are appropriate for an 
intragovernmental collaboration.  
3.6.2 Governance arrangements  
Intragovernmental collaborations have a high level of interdependence and require 
the joint sharing of resources. It is, therefore, imperative to have formal and 
elaborate governance arrangements that will ensure appropriate management of 
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the collaboration (Rodriguez et al., 2007). It is recommended that these should 
include governance structures, appropriate identification of participants, and 
mechanisms for resource sharing. 
Institutional arrangements 
It is understood through TCE that the effort to collaborate in order to improve 
efficiencies towards addressing a goal is offset by the governance cost of the 
collaboration (Oliver E. Williamson, 2008). It is, therefore, important to ensure that 
the governance arrangement assists the collaboration in meeting its objectives at 
an appropriate cost.  
With reference to the Provan and Kenis (2008) model, wicked problems with large 
stakeholders and poor goal consensus point to the establishment of a Network 
Administration Office, which involves officials focusing almost exclusively on the 
management of the collaboration. Despite being costly, authors such as McGuire 
(2006) found this appropriate. Although it is tempting to use other approaches such 
as Lead Organisation, mandating authorities should carefully weigh the costs and 
benefits. 
Appropriate rules of engagement between participants should be included in 
governance arrangements. This engagement moves beyond governmental 
agencies and involves engagements with citizens and entities not linked to 
government. 
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Appropriate participating organisations 
A key feature of intragovernmental collaborations is that they have more than one 
organisation participating in a number of collaborations at different levels 
simultaneously. Managers within these networks manage relations that cut across 
levels of government (Edelenbos, Klijn and Steijn, 2011; Mandell, Keast and 
Chamberlain, 2017; Klijn, van Meerkerk and Edelenbos, 2020) The JCPS Cluster 
structures shown in Figure 6.2 illustrate this point and range from inter-ministerial 
committees at strategic levels to project teams and implementation committees at 
operational levels.  
Mandating authorities should not only ensure that governance structures are in 
place to manage such interactions but also, and more importantly, that appropriate 
individuals are recruited to participate.  
Mechanisms for resource sharing 
The RBV of a firm emphasises the importance of organisations evaluating their 
resources in anticipation of identifying partnerships with other organisations. 
Sharing of resources is, therefore, an important factor in the decision to form 
interorganisational relationships (Julkunen, 2016; Klier et al., 2017; Mischen, 
2015).  
It is critical for intragovernmental collaborations with high levels of 
interdependence to identify governance arrangements that will enable them to use 
the available resources efficiently. This means that intragovernmental 
collaborations should not only work towards a common goal but should also have 
the maturity to pool budget and human resources.  
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Knowledge is one of the key resources of exchange (Hardy et al., 2003; 
Witherspoon, Bergner, Cockrell & Stone, 2013; Klier et al., 2017; Caputo et al., 
2019). This means that the strength of the intragovernmental collaboration also 
lies in effective knowledge management, which entails effective transfer, receipt, 
and integration of knowledge across organisations and participants (Weber and 
Khademian, 2008; Mischen, 2015). Therefore, knowledge sharing as a strong 
consideration for mandatory collaborations needs to have proper governance 
arrangements.  
3.6.3 Process of Intragovernmental Collaborations 
The collaborative process is an iterative process of consensus building, planning, 
joint implementation and progress assessment. For intragovernmental 
collaborations, this is usually a long-term engagement through generations of 
participants. Key issues that need to be included in the on-going process of 
collaboration are presented. 
Trust building 
Mandated networks need to continue even in incidences where trust could be a 
problem. Leadership should, therefore, ensure that activities and decisions of the 
collaboration build trust rather than erode it by establishing appropriate rules, roles 
and routines (Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn, 2010; Willem and Lucidarme, 2013; Muir 
and Mullins, 2015).  
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Management of power relations 
The RDT stipulates that organisations with resources that are in short supply are 
deemed more powerful than those without resources (Drees and Heugens, 2013; 
Malatesta and Smith, 2014; Henderson and Smith-King, 2015). Issues of power in 
intragovernmental collaboration involve both unequal relationships based on 
resources and political power to influence decisions (Keller, 1984). Participants 
will, therefore, attempt to use their position of power to their advantage (Emerson, 
1962). Other tactics that could be used by participants include coalition formations 
and threats of withdrawals (Emerson, 1962). The possible use and misuse of 
power by mandated authorities and participants within intragovernmental 
collaborations is, therefore, an issue that needs to be carefully managed. 
Collaborative capability 
Participants in intragovernmental collaborations are members of organisations with 
their own cultures, processes, systems and social structures (Selznick, 1948). 
Some of these organisations may display tendencies of immaturity regarding 
collaboration, which include underdeveloped strategic management processes, 
incoherent organisational structures, high individual versus organisational 
autonomy and poor management (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992). 
Part of the collaborative processes should, therefore, include building collaborative 
capacity in the organisations that are critical to the success of the 
intragovernmental collaboration.  
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Collaborative strategic management 
Intragovernmental collaborations should possess a framework that involves 
appropriate planning, implementation and evaluation of progress towards 
addressing wicked problems. Due to the level of interconnectedness between 
participating organisations of intragovernmental collaborations, a meta-strategy 
(joint strategy) consisting of meta-objectives, meta-resourcing and joint action 
plans is appropriate.  
3.6.4 Feedback loops 
Although most frameworks of interorganisational networks refer to ‘outcomes’ as 
a key component (Wood and Gray, 1991; Ansell and Gash, 2008; Clarke and 
Fuller, 2011), this is not the case with wicked problems. Because of the complexity 
and pervasiveness of wicked problems, problems cannot be tamed in the short to 
medium term (Termeer et al., 2015). The success of taming wicked problems lies 
in the on-going process of engagement. In line with the Complexity Theory, 
feedback regarding the wicked problem being addressed is critical. This is 
necessary for both participants and the citizens at large. Because of the 
complexity, consensus regarding the feedback itself may be a challenge. 
Dimensions aligned with feedback that have been identified through the 
Complexity Theory are as follows: 
• Knowledge management 
• Organisational learning and mental models 
• Active citizenry 
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3.6.5 The Conceptual Framework Diagram 
The proposed conceptual Framework for Intragovernmental Collaboration for 
addressing wicked problems considers antecedents, governance, collaborative 
framework and feedback loops. Figure 3.3 indicates the proposed framework.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Conceptual Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Two approaches for the classification of interorganisational relationships were 
identified. The first was the 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) and 
the second was Schopler’s (1987) four-quadrant model. These two models 
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provided the basis for the classification and understanding of interorganisational 
networks in general and intragovernmental collaborations in particular. 
The 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell (2007) classifies relationships in 
terms of the nature of the network (i.e. cooperation, coordination and 
collaboration). It is important for leadership to apply the 3Cs appropriately. For 
example, where collaboration is the solution to a public problem, managers should 
not apply tactics fit for coordination or cooperation and vice versa. 
The second and most important classification of interorganisational networks was 
through Schopler’s (1987) model. Regarding groups, Type I refers to mandated 
and directed relationships typical of intragovernmental collaborations. Some of the 
characteristics include efficient participation (in line with the mandate) with a low 
level of member satisfaction and minimal quality of input. Intragovernmental 
collaborations form part of the study of collaborative governance.  
A comprehensive model by Ansell and Gash (2008) presents a starting point for a 
framework for intragovernmental collaborations taming wicked problems. Using 
the Ansell and Gash (2008) model as a starting point and noting its shortcomings, 
the current research attempted to propose a framework for the admittedly difficult 
intragovernmental collaborations that were classified as both mandated and 
directed. 
The conceptual Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations was built using 
the RDT, TCE and the Complexity Theory. The dimensions that play a role in 
intragovernmental collaborations that were identified through literature were 
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arranged in a logical framework and identified as antecedents, governance, 
process and feedback. The arrangement is shown in Figure 5.1. 
This research investigated the extent to which the JCPS collaboration and 
intragovernmental collaborations in general align with existing literature on 
interorganisational networks. A framework for intragovernmental collaborations in 
general, and the JCPS Cluster in particular was, therefore, the outcome of the 
current research.  
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This chapter provides a description of crime as a wicked problem in South Africa 
and discusses the involvement of the criminal justice system in dealing with the 
scourge. In line with the topic under research, intragovernmental collaborations 
within the criminal justice system form part of the description of the case.  
 
4.2 CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM  
Criminal justice is a collection of decisions that are made from the time crimes are 
committed to the time offenders have served their sentences (Walker, 1992; 
Feeley, 2018). Participants include the police, accused person, prosecutor, 
defence lawyer, magistrate or judge, other participants assisting the courts 
(witnesses, social workers, etc.) and administrative support (e.g. court clerks and 
prison officials) (Feeley, 2018; Swanepoel and Meiring, 2018).  
The criminal justice system refers to government agencies that are responsible for 
the administration of criminal justice; these agencies are expected to work jointly 
to ensure the effectiveness of the system (Swanepoel and Meiring, 2018). The 
three key subsystems identified are policing, courts and corrections.  
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4.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The three main components of the criminal justice system (police services, courts 
and correctional services) operate under different legislative mandates and receive 
separate budget allocations. The capacities and high-level output of these 
components are discussed herein. 
The SAPS is a national government department led by a Member of Parliament 
(Minister of Police) appointed to this portfolio by the State President. The State 
President also appoints the administrative head of the institution (The National 
Commissioner) who in turn, appoints his/her Provincial Commissioners for the nine 
provinces and the heads of units in the National Office. There are over 1 138 police 
stations distributed throughout the country (South Africa, 2017d). 
According to the SAPS Annual Report for 2018/19, there were 150 855 police 
officers employed, which represents a per capita headcount of 256 police officers 
per 100 000 population based on the 2019 population estimate of 58.8 million by 
Statistics South Africa (South Africa, 2019e). This figure is lower than the world 
average of 340 and higher than the average of 220 recommended by the United 
Nations (BusinessTech, 2015). Large cities such as Durban, Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Pretoria have their own metropolitan police services, but these have 
limited jurisdiction (law enforcement and by-laws) and refer criminal cases to the 
SAPS. The United Nations study excluded these law enforcement agencies from 
their statistics. The SAPS received a budget allocation of R90.4 billion 
(approximately USD5 billion) for the 2018/19 financial year from the National 
Treasury. 
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Although the combined number of police at all levels of government and private 
security is high, the system is overburdened with a high number of reported cases 
of serious crimes. For the 2018/19 financial year, the SAPS recorded 1.65 million 
serious crimes. These included murder, rape, sexual assault, car hijackings and 
business and house robberies. 
In 2017, the number of private security officers employed by security companies 
was 534 289 (South Africa, 2019d). This is more than twice the number of police 
officers and the military combined. South Africa has the fourth highest number of 
private security officers per capita in the world (Daily Maverick, 2017). Unlike the 
police service that performs both law enforcement and criminal investigations, 
private security companies provide guarding services, armed response and cash-
in-transit services but have no authority to arrest. Communities that can afford 
private security maintain that private companies provide a more reliable response 
than the police.  
The administration of justice is headed by the Minister of Justice and Correctional 
Services, who is a Member of Parliament and appointed to this portfolio by the 
State President. The Minister oversees the daily functioning of the courts, enabling 
the Judiciary and prosecution to deal with cases. In addition, the Minister oversees 
other legal administrative services that are rendered to members of the public and 
the State. According to the DOJCD Annual Performance Plan 2018/19, the Court 
Services Branch, which forms part of a larger responsibility of the Minister, was 
allocated a budget of R6.5 billion for the 2018/19 financial year (South Africa, 
2019b). This amount was spent on court operations, new infrastructure, 
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refurbishments, administrative staff and administrative processes such as court 
recordings. 
The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) of South Africa is headed by the NDPP 
who is appointed by the State President. Each of the nine provincial offices is 
headed by a Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) appointed by the State 
President. Although the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa affirms the 
independence of prosecutorial decisions, the institution reports to the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development who is a Member of Parliament.  
The NPA had 4 408 prosecutors and support staff at the end of the 2018/19 
financial year and spent a budgeted amount of R3.8 billion, which included witness 
protection services, asset forfeiture and support services. Their annual report 
shows that 276 309 cases were cases finalised with a verdict and 149 469 were 
finalised through alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms (e.g. mediation). Of 
the 966 474 new dockets received from the police service for prosecution in District 
and Magistrates’ Courts, 124 654 were accepted for prosecution and 508 5545 
were declined. A total of 310 980 dockets were referred for further investigation 
and a small percentage was dealt with through fines, diversion and informal 
mediation. These figures illustrate that half of the cases that the police deem 
investigated and trial ready have poor prospects of a successful prosecution. 
Within the same year, 103 760 cases that were enrolled were withdrawn from the 
Magistrates’ Courts. Although there are often valid reasons for the withdrawals, 
this large number of withdrawn cases is concerning. As already mentioned, issues 
are systematic and not attributable to a single organ of state. In addition, the 
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system depends on inputs from members of the public and witnesses for 
successful prosecutions of crime. 
The Chief Justice is the Head of the Judiciary for both lower courts (District and 
Magistrates’ Courts) in addition to the Superior Courts (High Courts, Supreme 
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court). The appointment of a Chief Justice 
is made by the Judicial Service Commission, which consists of legal professionals, 
members of the ruling party and members of the opposition parties in Parliament. 
This process gives effect to the Judiciary as an independent arm of State to 
discharge judicial functions without fear or favour. Processes are currently under 
way to establish a mechanism that offers administrative independence for the 
Judiciary. However, in 2018/19, the administrative processes of the Judiciary were 
still overseen by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development.  
At the end of the 2018/19 financial year, there were 1 895 magistrates for the lower 
courts. The magistracy had 2 324 posts approved, demonstrating a vacancy rate 
of 19%. The Chief Justice establishes norms and standards for the performance 
of the magistrates and has mechanisms in place to assess their performance. 
The DCS is headed by the Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, 
who is a Member of Parliament. The National Commissioner (Administrative Head) 
is appointed by the State President together with nine Provincial Commissioners. 
During the 2018/19 financial year, the department had an average prison 
population of 162 875 consisting of both awaiting trial inmates and sentenced 
offenders (South Africa, 2019a) . The approved bed space of 118 572 indicates an 
overcrowding rate of over 37% during that year. Although overcrowding has 
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decreased through the involvement of the JCPS Cluster’s interventions on bail and 
other initiatives, overcrowding remains a problem. During the same year, the 
department had 70 532 parolees under their care. The total budget spent during 
the financial year was R24 billion, with a staff complement of 38 344 responsible 
for incarcerations, rehabilitation, care, social integration and administration.  
The capacities of the three key components reveal a largely unbalanced picture. 
The police service appears to be large, but it is ineffective as illustrated by the high 
number of cases that have no prospect of successful prosecution. Regarding 
prosecutions, many enrolled cases are withdrawn while offenders who are 
incarcerated and cared for by taxpayers’ money tend to return due to the prevalent 
socio-economic conditions outside prison. 
 
4.4 THE JUSTICE CRIME PREVENTION AND SECURITY CLUSTER 
Recognising the complexity of the problem, the South African government put 
together an intragovernmental collaboration to fight crime. Cabinet approved the 
first National Crime Prevention Strategy for South Africa in 1996 (Raunch, 2001). 
This strategy was formulated through an inter-ministerial committee led by the 
Minister of Safety and Security with participants from the departments of 
Correctional Services, Defence, National Intelligence, Justice, Safety and Security 
and Welfare (Shaw, 1996). This was the first instance of intragovernmental 
collaboration on crime prevention in South Africa at a strategic level. 
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The strategy consisted of four pillars:  
1. Pillar 1: Criminal Justice Process was meant to address process issues 
such as prosecutorial policies, child justice processes, criminal statistics 
and performance.  
2. Pillar 2: Reducing crime through environmental design included the 
implementation of an effective national population identification system, a 
commercial crime strategy, and regulations for motor vehicles.  
3. Pillar 3: Public Values and Education emphasised the role of the community 
in preventing crime and educating school-going children in addition to public 
relations efforts.  
4. Pillar 4: Trans-national crime emphasised organised crime and border 
control in crime prevention.  
Business Against Crime (BAC) is an organisation that was founded in 1996 by 
large private sector institutions in support of the implementation of government’s 
crime prevention strategy. The collaboration was initially operated through the 
Network Administration Model (Provan and Kenis, 2008) where the BAC project 
office championed and coordinated government departments towards addressing 
crime. Direct participation by BAC was reduced as the formation of the JCPS 
Cluster took shape and developed into a Self-Governed Network. 
An Integrated Justice System (IJS)-Project Office and the IJS-User Board was 
established in 1997 to begin the work. The recommendations of the Mulweli 
Consortium to the IJS Board included identification of 96 quick-fix projects, 
26 fast-track projects, and six enterprise-level projects for the criminal justice 
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system. Key successes of the IJS Board were limited and included implementation 
of bail protocol to reduce the number of awaiting trial inmates in addition to 
implementation of alternative dispute-resolution mechanisms.  
In November 2007, Cabinet approved a seven-point plan of the criminal justice 
system to address the blockages that have been identified within the criminal 
system. The points included adoption of a single mission and vision for the criminal 
justice system and implementation of an integrated modern information system for 
sharing criminal data within the criminal justice system.  
The seven-point plan was an attempt to develop a meta-strategy as envisioned by 
Huxham and Macdonald (1992). Although several projects were identified and 
implemented, the meta-strategy that included a joint mission and vision and 
integrated planning and resourcing was never fully realised. This “collaborative 
inertia” (Huxham and Vangen, 2004:191) could be attributed to leadership issues 
together with difficulties in managing complexities and people and other dynamics 
within the system. 
By 2017, the IJS Board was operational and to date, continues to implement an 
IT platform that enables the seamless monitoring of the criminal justice system. A 
report given to the Parliament of South Africa in 2017 indicated that the 
case-management systems of the DOJCD, the NPA and the SAPS were integrated 
and case data were being exchanged through the IJS transversal system (South 
Africa, 2017c) 
In 2010, government, through the DPME, adopted the Outcomes Approach to 
service delivery and identified 13 outcomes of governments together with key 
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performance indicators for the monitoring thereof (South Africa, 2010). In regard 
to Outcome 3, ‘All People in South Africa Are and Feel Safe’ and in line with the 
outcomes guide, the JCPS Cluster needed to ensure the development of 
objectives and indicators that lead to achievement of the national outcome.  
Outcome 3 consisted of eight outputs, with indicators and targets for specific 
departments and government agencies:  
1. Output 1 focused on crime prevention through the reduction of serious 
crime, particularly contact and trio crimes.  
2. Output 2 focused on establishing an effective criminal justice system by 
reducing case backlogs and similar initiatives.  
3. Output 3 focused on addressing corruption within the JCPS Cluster to 
ensure its effectiveness and its ability to serve as a deterrent against crime.  
4. Output 4 focused on improving and managing perceptions of crime among 
the population.  
5. Output 5 focused on improving investor perceptions of South Africa.  
6. Output 6 focused on effective border control.  
7. Output 7 focused on the integrity of the national identity system. 
8. Output 8 focused on combating cybercrime (South Africa, 2010).  
Each cluster, through the leadership of a Minister, is responsible for quarterly or 
six-monthly reporting of progress to Cabinet and all are Self-Governed networks. 
For the JCPS Cluster, the Strategy and Performance Monitoring Committee was 
tasked with compiling progress reports for discussion by the Directors-General 
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(DGs) of the Cluster, Ministers and Cabinet. Figure 4.1 shows the cluster 
subcommittees active in 2018 together with the reporting lines to the Cabinet. 
 
Figure 4.1 JCPS Cluster structures and reporting lines, 2019 
 
In their evaluation of crime prevention, Pelser and Louw (2002) caution against the 
overemphasis of a multi-agency approach, which appears to be a means to an 
end. The JCPS Cluster with its extensive subcommittees and participants could 
fall into this trap. Nonetheless, some level of success has been achieved by the 
cluster through 20 years of collaboration. 
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The bail protocol that was introduced has made an impact on the number of 
awaiting trial prisoners within the system, which is evident in the drop in the 
reported awaiting-trial figures (South Africa, 2017a). Other JCPS initiatives such 
as the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms have enabled the system to 
reduce the number of cases on court rolls. 
The contribution of the JCPS Cluster to the successful hosting of the FIFA World 
Cup 2010 through coordination between the JCPS, the Metropolitan Police 
Services and private security towards policing is another case in point. The work 
included the implementation of special purpose courts where cases related to 
tourists were dealt with speedily through the courts.  
The case-management systems of the SAPS (Case Administration System [CAS]), 
the NPA (Enforcement Case Management System [ECMS]) and the Department 
of Justice (Integrated Case Management System [ICMS]), which were piloted in 
2013, were successfully integrated (South Africa, 2017b). This initiative reduced 
the amount of data capturing between departments and enabled sharing of basic 
case information such as details of suspects and charges. 
The finalisation of key legislation such as the Child Justice Act and the Trafficking 
in Persons Act, which involved the coordination of different Cluster departments, 
were successful. However, full implementation and effectiveness of such laws 
remain a challenge.  
Challenges still remain within the collaboration at a strategic level. For example, 
joint resource planning remains a challenge, that is, different departments still work 
with individual budgets and negotiate these as individual departments. As a result, 
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capacity planning and implementation issues remain. System-wide performance 
indicators for cluster-level monitoring are still not finalised. Experiences and issues 
regarding the challenges are a subject of the current research. 
 
4.5 CRIME AS A WICKED PROBLEM 
In simple terms, crime is the perpetration of an act that is known to be unlawful and 
punishable by identified organs of state (Collins, 2020). Although there is 
commonly understood crime such as murder and theft, different countries and 
different jurisdictions within countries identify crimes differently; this is largely 
affected by underlying values and norms. For example, crimes such as prostitution 
and drug possession are treated differently in different environments. Within the 
context of the current research, crime refers to crime against property and persons 
(e.g. theft, rape, murder, assault) and includes business-related crime. These 
crimes are widely reported, easily understood and can present reasonably 
acceptable comparisons between countries.  
From a sociological perspective, criminality is seen as deviation from socially 
accepted norms and behaviour (Savage and Kanazawa, 2002; Henry, 2018). The 
source of the deviant behaviour is complex and can be linked to a broad range of 
psychological, economic and political issues. Furthermore, this behaviour can be 
influenced by the response and effectiveness of the criminal justice system 
(Jacobs and Cherbonneau, 2018).  
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Crime in South Africa has been a persistent problem for decades. Although the 
profiles of crime have been changing over time, the picture shows a persistent and 
a pervasive complex problem. 
Although it is not accurate to classify South Africa as a murder capital of the world, 
the persistently high murder rate indicates the intensity of the problem. The highest 
murder rate of 64 per 100 000 population recorded in 1994 was largely fuelled by 
political violence. In the last ten years, the figure stabilised around 34 murders per 
100 000 people against the recorded world average of six (UNODC, 2013) . Within 
the continent, the average murder rate of 14 is still less than half the South African 
figure. 
The decrease in the number of sexual offences reported in South Africa from 
64 921 in 2010/11 to 53 293 in 2019/20 (South Africa, 2020) is comforting when 
population growth is taken into consideration. While the SAPS reports sexual 
offences in the magnitude of 50 000 a year, the National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) finalises approximately 6 000 cases per year, with a conviction rate of 70% 
(South Africa, 2019c).  
In many instances, these convictions are for lesser charges. For example, a study 
conducted by the Institute for Security Studies in South Africa found that on 
average, 4% of reported rape cases have rape convictions at the end of the court 
processes (Vetten, 2014). The study concludes that the criminal justice system is 
not an effective deterrent for sexual offences. 
In regard to other violent crimes, South Africa continues to fare badly. The number 
of trio crimes (car hijacking, business robbery, residential robbery) reported to the 
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police is approximately 60 000 per year, whereas the NPA finalises approximately 
1 700 of such crimes with an 85% conviction rate (South Africa, 2018b, 2019c). It 
should be emphasised that weaknesses are system-wide and cannot be solely 
attributed to the NPA. 
A survey entitled Victims of Crime is an annual survey of 33 000 households that 
provides a view of the changing perception of crime and the agencies responsible 
for addressing it. The results of this survey demonstrate a grim picture of crime 
and the criminal justice system. Households who perceive violent crime to have 
escalated or to have remained the same increased from 57% in 2011 to 70.6% in 
2017 (South Africa, 2018c). The findings further revealed that the percentage of 
households satisfied with the police service decreased from 64% in 2011 to 54% 
in 2017 (South Africa, 2018c). Similarly, satisfaction regarding courts decreased 
from 65% to 41%.  
This survey confirms that efforts that are currently being undertaken in the criminal 
justice system are not felt by members of the public. This is clear from the high 
levels of crime, low reporting figures, inadequate responses by the police, slow 
and discouraging court processes and other issues. 
Peculiar to South Africa is the high level of violent crime (Holtmann and Domingo-
Swarts, 2008). Crime is often not an economic or a social-misfit problem but a sign 
of deep-rooted social problems. For example, data from the police service indicate 
that a large majority of offences such as assault and assault with intent to do 
grievous bodily harm (89%), murder (82%) and rape (76%) are perpetrated by 
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persons known to the victim. This indicates the extent to which people tend to settle 
disputes violently. 
One of the studies undertaken by the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation (CSVR) involved a series of in-depth interviews with violent crime 
offenders to understand the root causes of crime (CSVR, 2008). This study was 
conducted in a Johannesburg and a Cape Town correctional facility and involved 
interviews with offenders who were in their twenties and early thirties. It was found 
that the offenders had prior history of offending while at school. Another key factor 
that was identified was unstable or dysfunctional family structures, which often 
involved neglect and abuse. These people were often raised in households and 
environments characterised by neglect, alcohol and drugs. In addition, the men 
revealed that they understood violence to be an acceptable means of settling 
disputes and affirming their masculinity. Many admitted to having been accused of 
sexual offences in their past (CSVR, 2008).  
The study drew the following conclusions regarding crime in South Africa:  
• Crime has become normalised (i.e. violence is a necessary and justified 
means of resolving conflict).  
• A substantial proportion of males believe that coercive sexual behaviour 
against women is legitimate. 
• A prevalent subculture of violence and criminality that includes gangsterism, 
theft and other delinquencies exists. 
• Unstable living arrangements for children who are brought up with 
inconsistent and inadequate parenting often lead to criminal behaviour. 
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• The high levels of inequality, poverty, unemployment, social exclusion and 
marginalisation often lead to criminality. 
• Abuse of alcohol and drugs fuel crime (CSVR, 2008). 
South Africa has one of the highest incidences of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome, 
particularly in the Western Cape of South Africa. This is due to the system of paying 
people working on wine farms with cheap, low-grade wine instead of cash. 
Although outlawed in the 1960s, the legacy of this practice remains (Bowers, 
Rendall-Mkosi, Davids, Nel, Jacobs & London, 2014; May, Marais, De Vries, 
Hasken, Stegall, Hedrick et al., 2019). 
Another detrimental practice that encourages alcohol consumption is the 
decades-old shebeen culture that took root in South African townships where 
people use their own houses as drinking spots or taverns to earn an income 
(CSVR, 2009). With very few recreational options available, people from 
neighbourhoods gather and consume alcohol, often in an environment with 
ineffective regulation and law enforcement. The police of a small town in the Karoo 
(less than 7 000 people) alleged that there were 64 known illegal outlets in that 
town (Holtmann, 2008). These illegal taverns are often found near inappropriate 
areas such as schools. With the high unemployment rates in townships, this is 
another environment dominated by poverty, alcohol and violence whose 
socio-economic issues are linked to crime.  
The connection between alcohol and crime has been confirmed by several studies. 
For example, a study by Holtmann (2008) confirms that crimes involving violence 
are prevalent on Saturdays, followed by Fridays and thereafter, Sundays. Many 
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South Africans do not work on Saturdays and Sundays and, therefore, social 
gatherings are arranged within these days. Holtmann (2008) revealed that of the 
violent crimes committed in 2006, 47% of the victims of murder, 66% of the trauma 
victims and 44% of the rape victims had a high alcohol content in their blood during 
their ordeal. South African’s use of alcohol for recreation coupled with poverty and 
a culture of violence exacerbates the crime situation. 
Once incarcerated, many inmates tend to reoffend and return to prison. Accurate 
statistics of recidivism (reoffending) in South Africa are not available, but it is known 
to be very high. For example, in a study for repeat offences, it was found that 
55−60% of people in the database of the Criminal Records Centre of the SAPS 
were repeat offenders (Murhula and Singh, 2019). This figure includes low-priority, 
non-custodial sentences for crimes. Statistics of recidivism from correctional 
centres are much higher. For example, anecdotal evidence from Pollsmoor 
Maximum Security Prison in Cape Town revealed that prisoners spend, on 
average, six weeks outside prison after their release before returning (Pelser and 
Rauch, 2001).  
Participants often alluded to ‘fear of life’ after incarceration (Ngabonziza and Singh, 
2012; Singh, 2016). Their fear was based on returning to a life of socio-economic 
issues and a hostile environment upon release. This shows that the underlying root 
causes of crime are not being addressed by incarceration or the attempted 
rehabilitation in the prisons. 
It follows from these points that the South African crime situation cannot be 
addressed in isolation. It needs the involvement of a far greater number of 
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government agencies and stakeholders. The depth to which crime is entrenched 
shows that the problem is beyond complex and is downright wicked. 
Holtmann (2008) proposed a model that would help South Africa break the cycle 
of poverty (Figure 4.2). From this figure, a key area of focus for breaking the cycle 
lies in dealing with at-risk families and communities. It starts with ensuring that no 
child is born under conditions of extreme poverty and/or domestic violence and 
focuses on the plight of the mothers. The aim is to ensure that a 15-year-old mother 
does not have a daughter who becomes a mother at 15 years old or a son who is 
in conflict with the law at the age of 15 years (CSVR, 2009). Law enforcement 
agencies must discourage criminal behaviour, adequately deal with those who 
inadvertently enter the system and ensure appropriate rehabilitation programmes.  
 
Figure 4.2 Framework for breaking the cycle of crime 
Source: Holtmann (2008) 
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In line with the model of Head and Alford (2015) and based on the description of 
crime in South Africa, its wickedness can be classified as Level 3. It has been 
shown that, firstly, crime is pervasive. Despite crime being a major area of strategic 
focus for government, a series of strategic and implementation plans over a 
20-year period have not delivered substantial improvement. 
Secondly, crime has a major socio-economic background that can be traced to 
challenges within family structures, which are fuelled by behaviours such as the 
distractive alcohol drinking culture and toxic masculinity issues. The problem is, 
therefore, multidisciplinary. 
Thirdly, attempts to solve crime have not indicated a clearly defined road map on 
what the key focus areas are and how crime should be approached. For example, 
the extent to which the country focuses on commercial crimes vs. social crimes vs. 
contact crimes does not indicate clear focus areas or approach. There is also no 
clearly understood and communicated strategy to the public and other 
stakeholders on the approach to addressing crime.  
 
4.6 CONCLUSION 
South Africa’s murder rate was shown to be much higher than the global and 
African rates. Peculiar to the country is the extent and persistence of violent crime. 
The pervasiveness and challenges of crime have received a fair amount of 
attention from different sectors. Extensive research has been presented by a wide 
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variety of non-governmental organisations such as. the Institute for Security 
Studies, the Centre for the Study of Crime and Violence and state entities such as 
the Centre for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Stats SA and various 
academic institutions. The crime statistics are extensively analysed by 
criminologists and journalists.  
Possible root causes of crime have been identified and modelled. The framework 
provided through the CSIR study of 2006 clarifies the source of violent crime and 
identifies risk factors such as dysfunctional families, alcohol abuse, culture of 
violence and toxic masculinity as risk factors and how to address them. 
Implementation of crime prevention strategies have been formulated and 
implemented at local level (e.g. the Karoo study by Holtmann, 2008).  
Furthermore, it has been shown that the criminal justice system itself is not 
severely under-resourced by world standards, but the system has inefficiencies 
and blockages that have been identified through criminal statistics. Crime was 
shown to go largely unpunished, with poor throughput between different 
subsystems of the criminal justice system. Despite additional private sector funding 
from organisations such as BAC, the crime rates have not significantly decreased. 
Government recognised the need to bring all key governmental role players 
together and coordinated the JCPS Cluster. This intragovernmental collaboration 
has been in operation for almost 20 years and through the years, a number of 
subcommittees and task teams have been formed to address crime and related 
issues. The JCPS Cluster and its network of committees and reporting structures 
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illustrates the importance that government places on the criminal justice system 
and the willingness to commit people, time and effort to it. 
Attempts have been made since 1996 to put together a meta-strategy for the JCPS 
Cluster. Formulation of the joint mission and vision for the cluster in addition to 
arriving at system-level performance standards that are acceptable to all cluster 
parties were not realised. Similar to other wicked problems experienced by 
government, this section illustrates the need for an effective strategic management 
framework that will enable proper planning and implementation of programmes. 
The JCPS Cluster is an ideal case to study intragovernmental collaboration 
because of the following: 
• It is a long-standing collaboration whose history can be traced to 1996. 
• It consists of an extensive number of subcommittees, some operating at a 
collaborative level and others focusing on coordinating and cooperative 
efforts. 
• The collaboration addresses crime, which is a major challenge facing South 
Africa and which has an impact on sustainability of the country in terms of 
loss of investments, skills flight and other consequences. 
• It is a wicked problem; it is difficult to arrive at a consensus regarding 
solutions and it is pervasive.  
• Being in South Africa, the collaboration will enable a detailed study of 
intragovernmental collaboration in a developing country. 
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The current research created a crucial opportunity to use intragovernmental 




5 CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Qualitative research methods focus on studying the complexity of phenomena in 
their natural environment (Leedy and Ormrod, 2013). The current research sought 
to uncover experiences and explanations through detailed narratives of Senior and 
Top Managers. The in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of intragovernmental 
collaboration experienced by these managers represented a constructivist 
approach.  
Interactive Qualitative Analysis was adopted as the research method due to the 
exploratory nature of the approach and its relevance in addressing research 
questions. Interactive Qualitative Analysis is a qualitative method by which a 
systematic process of data collection, analysis and interpretation are merged as a 
whole through a process of interaction between the researcher and the participants 
(Du Preez and Du Preez, 2012). 
Interactive Qualitative Analysis emphasises the development of theory through the 
interactions between participants who share their experiences with the researcher 
(Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). It is for this reason that the data collection 
instruments used in the current research were not based on the detailed literature 
research that had already been conducted. In-depth comparisons between the 
findings of the current research and those in literature were, therefore, made after 
data collection and analysis. 
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A key feature of the IQA lies in its emphasis on the systems approach to research. 
According to Northcutt and McCoy (2004), a system is a representation of any 
phenomenon through a specific reality or angle. For example, intragovernmental 
collaboration itself is a system, while the criminal justice is also a system. In line 
with well-established system theory, Northcutt and McCoy (2004) further describe 
a system as consisting of different components and having interrelationships 
between these components. It is, therefore, important to understand that any 
wicked problem cannot be addressed without understanding the individual 
components and the interactions between them. Interactive Qualitative Analysis 
as a research method is alive to the systemic nature of phenomena and was, 
therefore, an appropriate research design.  
 
5.2 BACKGROUND ON INTERACTIVE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
A paradigm is a set of beliefs that define how an individual views and makes sense 
of the world (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Guba and Lincoln, 1994; Khaldi, 2017). These 
basic beliefs are sometimes referred to as philosophical worldviews (Creswell, 
2013). Paradigms in research explain how researchers view the world and explain 
the angle from which researchers understand and explain their research. 
Paradigms are explained through four dimensions.  
Ontology explains the nature of the reality (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Creswell, 2013). 
This refers to whether reality exists independently of individuals or whether 
individuals have their own reality based on their background and experience. 
Within intragovernmental collaboration of the JCPS Cluster, it is understood that 
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individual experiences are influenced by each individual’s outlook and values. 
From an ontological point of view, there is, therefore, no universal or singular reality 
but a multitude, which are shared and acknowledged through the research. 
Interactive Qualitative Analysis as a research design is constructivist and 
recognises reality as socially constructed (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Wahyuni, 2012). 
In identifying people who live the experience, IQA acknowledges that people who 
possess intimate knowledge of a phenomenon and people with power over the 
phenomenon are the most relevant to produce the knowledge (Northcutt and 
McCoy, 2004). For the current research, the researcher identified appropriate 
constituents and the manner in which these constituents were to be involved in the 
research. 
Epistemology refers to the manner in which knowledge is generated and 
understood (Wahyuni, 2012). In other words, epistemology refers to the extent in 
which a researcher finds comfort in the level of objectivity and subjectivity of the 
knowledge being generated. The current research focused on understanding 
experiences and explanations from different managers. Knowledge was, therefore, 
generated through the interpretation of their realities.  
Within IQA, the understanding of a phenomenon is developed through both 
deductive and inductive processes (Davis, 2019; Marx and de Swardt, 2019; 
Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). The process of identification of dimensions affecting 
intragovernmental collaboration (affinities) by participants represented a process 
of induction, while establishment of interrelationships between these dimensions 
followed a deductive process. The objective of the research was, therefore, to 
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produce theory of intragovernmental collaborations built through the experiences 
of managers using the IQA process. 
Axiology refers to the set of values that a researcher subscribes to and was brought 
into the research enquiry (Abdullah Kamal, 2019; Wahyuni, 2012). These values 
could explain the perceived biased views held by the researcher (Creswell, 2013). 
This means that interactions between the researcher, his/her research and the 
participants are expected, to some extent, to reflect the values of the researcher. 
The researcher is a Senior Manager in the DOJCD and is, therefore, part of the 
Senior Managers within the JCPS Cluster. The researcher acknowledges that her 
experiences may differ substantially from other Senior Managers due to her 
background, values and attitudes that differ from other individuals.  
The role of the researcher and participants within the IQA is described as 
interdependent, which means that the researcher and the participants participate 
in data collection and analysis (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004; Cook and 
Geldenhuys, 2018; Du Preez and Stiglingh, 2018). This is contrary to some 
qualitative methods in which participants are mainly involved with data collection 
and the researcher performs the analysis. For the current research, managers 
were involved in the identification of dimensions affecting their intragovernmental 
collaboration and worked with the researcher to identify relationships between 
these dimensions. 
Constructivism as a paradigm and IQA as a research design recognised the 
ontological stance of multiple realities, the epistemological stance of knowledge 
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generation though multiple realities, and the axiological angle of the 
interconnectedness between the values of the researcher and her research.  
The four key steps that make up an IQA enquiry are research design, focus groups, 
interviews and reporting (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004) and are described 
hereunder. 
 
5.3 INTERACTIVE QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.3.1 Problem statement 
The first step in research design for IQA is the identification of the problem or 
phenomenon that requires further investigation. For the current research, the 
problem that was investigated was the ‘ineffective intragovernmental 
collaborations to address crime’.  
5.3.2 Constituencies and participants 
To understand the phenomenon, it is necessary to analyse it as a system by 
identifying and analysing its subsystems. Within this analysis, it is crucial to identify 
different constituencies (groups of people) who provide different perspectives. Two 
key groups were identified: (i) those who have knowledge and experience 
regarding a phenomenon, and (ii) those with power over it (Davis, 2019; Northcutt 
and McCoy, 2004). 
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The Distance Power Analysis (Table 5.1) was used to identify the constituencies 
who have knowledge and experience regarding intragovernmental collaboration 
within the JCPS Cluster and the constituencies with power over it. 
Table 5.1 Distance Power Analysis for constituencies 
Constituency Distance Power 
(Administrative) 
Decision 
Senior Managers Immediate Adequate Convene 
Top Managers Immediate Adequate Convene 
Government Ministers Immediate Inadequate Leave out 
Legislators Removed Inadequate Leave out 
 
Senior Managers 
Purposive sampling was used to identify the participants of the research. A 
purposive sample relies on the judgement of the researcher to select participants 
who will provide the insights needed to address the research questions (Sharma, 
2017). The researcher identified Senior Managers participating in the JCPS 
Cluster who have in-depth knowledge of intragovernmental collaboration within the 
JCPS Cluster and who fit the following criteria: 
1. Levels 13–14 for government departments or the equivalent for public 
entities 
2. At least two years of participation in one of the JCPS Cluster structures 
A total of 22 Senior Managers were identified as meeting both the criteria and were 
invited to take part in the research. Of these, 16 Senior Managers agreed to 
participate and received email invitations. On the day of the focus group, ten 
participants managed to attend but six had to cancel at short notice due to pressing 
issues. 
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For the semi-structured interviews, ten participants were interviewed, three of 
whom did not participate in the focus group. A list of the 13 Senior Management 
participants who were involved in the focus group and the semi-structured 
interviews is presented in Annexure B.  
Top Managers 
The JCPS Cluster has a limited number of Top Managers who participate within 
the cluster. For example, the number of DGs of the core JCPS Cluster (Chief 
Executive equivalent) that is required for a quorum of the JCPS DGs meeting is 
eight, according to terms of reference. These include the SAPS, the DOJC, the 
DCS and the Department of Home Affairs. The remaining ten DGs include those 
from departments such as Communications, South African Revenue Services and 
International Relations; these DGs are not heavily immersed in the JCPS Cluster 
experience and only attend meetings when required. 
Although eight Top Managers were targeted for participation in the semi-structured 
interviews, only five participated. It should be noted that two of the participants 
were in Top Management acting positions and had been for an extended time. 
Both these participants were experienced in their areas of leadership. 
A list of the Top Managers who took part in the semi-structured interviews is 
presented in Annexure B. 
5.3.3 Focus group (Senior Managers) 
A focus group is a data collection method that is based on collecting information 
from a group rather than from one individual at a time. Focus groups are useful for 
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determining views and the meanings behind those views (Gill, Stewart, Treasure 
& Chadwick, 2008; Gill and Baillie, 2018) and provide richer and more spontaneous 
reactions than individual participation (Onwuegbuzie, Dickinson, Leech & Zoran, 
2009; Plummer, 2017; Nyumba, Wilson, Derrick & Mukherjee, 2018). Despite little 
contact with the researcher, focus groups yield a relatively large amount of data 
(Nyumba et al., 2018; Parker and Tritter, 2006). The role of focus groups in IQA is 
to gather key information from a group of people through a highly interactive and 
a consensus-driven approach.  
For Senior Managers, a single focus group session was undertaken and deemed 
appropriate given the limited number of potential participants. First, the IQA 
provided in-built rigour that encouraged broad and intensive participation during 
data collection and analysis. Second, the researcher took special care to ensure 
that the invited participants could raise diverse opinions without fear (Smithson, 
2000).  
Although the ideal number of participants recommended for focus groups generally 
ranges from 6 to 12 (Nyumba et al., 2018; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009), Northcutt 
and McCoy (2004) identify the ideal number of participants for IQA focus groups 
to be 12. However, they admit that this number is not prescriptive and 
circumstances and research questions should be considered (Northcutt and 
McCoy, 2004).  
The focus group, therefore, proceeded with ten participants, and this was deemed 
sufficient for the current research for three reasons. First, further inputs were 
planned through semi-structured interviews and missing key participants were to 
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be included in the interview phase. Second, it was noted that further postponement 
of the focus group could discourage existing participants from committing to a later 
date since participation was purely voluntary. Third, there were indications that the 
IQA could proceed successfully with less than 12 participants, as indicated in 
theses by Tabane (2010), Bonthuys (2016) and Burgers (2018). 
Although focus groups are recommended for identification of affinities for each 
constituency (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004), it was deemed that for Top Managers, 
a focus group was not viable and only semi-structured interviews were undertaken. 
This was due to the limited number of potential participants available and the 
difficulties in accessing them on the same day for a focus group. A focus group 
was, therefore, only convened for Senior Managers and the affinities identified 
were thereafter used in the Top Manager interviews.  
A facilitator with experience in IQA was recruited for the focus group session, not 
only to enable the researcher to observe and take field notes but also to ensure 
that the researcher who is a member of the constituency did not overly influence 
the process.  
The focus group took place on 6 November 2019 with 10 of the 13 participants 
taking part. The focus group was arranged in Pretoria Central, which is a 
convenient location for members of governmental departments. In addition, the 
venue was familiar to most of the participants since cluster meetings sometimes 
take part therein. 
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The objective of the focus group was twofold – identification of affinities by 
participants and identification of relationships between them by individual 
participants. 
5.3.3.1 Identification of affinities 
The facilitator began the focus group by laying the foundation regarding the topic 
under discussion. The brief included a description of the crime challenges and a 
high-level indication on how they have been addressed by the clusters. The 
facilitator was careful to avoid judgement and words that might have had an 
influence on the thoughts of the participants.  
Thereafter, the facilitator provided participants with the following issue statement 
from which to share their thoughts.  
“Tell me about the things that positively or negatively affect intragovernmental 
collaboration within the JCPS Cluster.” 
Following a discussion on the issue statement, approximately 15 minutes was 
allocated for a silent brainstorming session in which participants could apply their 
minds without influence from other participants. Participants were requested to 
write a thought, key word, sentence, etc. on a Post-It Note and were thereafter 
instructed to tape the notes on the wall in rows and columns where everyone could 
view them. After clarification and discussion, participants took a break to attend to 
their mobile phones. 
Inductive coding 
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Coding refers to the process of finding meaning in data (Charmaz and Belgrave, 
2007). The Post-It Notes that were written by the participants represented the basic 
building blocks of the coding process. Participants took turns to arrange their notes 
on the board, and all the participants studied the entire wall of Post-It Notes. 
During inductive coding (open coding), participants arranged the notes into 
clusters. This was an iterative process until all members were satisfied with the 
arrangement of the Post-It Notes.  
Axial coding  
Once the researcher and participants had completed the initial clustering process, 
participants were encouraged to review, extend, realign or subdivide clusters to 
arrive at a consensual arrangement of notes. A further five minutes were given to 
rethink the positioning of the notes. Thereafter, participants proceeded to give each 
cluster (affinity) a name.  
5.3.3.2 Interrelationships (Focus group) 
Theoretical coding involves identification of relationships between affinities 
(Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). This began with each participant completing an 
Affinity Relationship Table (ART) to indicate the relationship between the identified 
affinities. For every two affinities, there were three possible relationships: 
1 influences 2 (1 → 2), 2 influences 1 (1 ← 2) or there was no influence (1 X 2). 
The ARTs were completed individually to enable the researcher to identify the 
broad range of individual responses and to facilitate discussions for the 
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semi-structured interviews. Participants were encouraged to explain the 
relationships if they believed it necessary for clarity. 
To conclude the work undertaken through the focus group, descriptions of the 
affinities identified in the focus group were outlined. In line with recommendations 
of Northcutt and McCoy (2014), the write-up was grounded in the text and care 
was taken to use the words of the participants. These descriptions were 
subsequently used to provide background during the individual interviews. 
5.3.4 Semi-structures interviews (Senior Managers) 
The objective of the individual interview phase was to provide an opportunity for 
further exploration of the affinities that were identified during the Senior 
Management focus group session and a discussion of the relationships thereof. 
This initiative provided the researcher with an opportunity to contrast diverse 
individual views in order to develop a deeper understanding of intragovernmental 
collaboration.  
The second objective of semi-structured interviews was triangulation, which 
enabled the researcher to clarify through description the interrelationships that 
Senior Managers identified during the focus group session (Leedy and Ormrod, 
2013; Natow, 2019).  
5.3.4.1 Description of affinities 
Ten Senior Managers were available for the interviews, three of whom did not 
participate in the focus group. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 90 
minutes and were undertaken over a one-month period. 
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For each affinity, the researcher read out short descriptions from the focus group 
and requested participants to provide their own understanding and description of 
the affinity. All eight affinities were thus described. 
The transcripts of the Senior Manager interviews were combined into one 
document and loaded onto Microsoft Excel. Each paragraph of the transcript 
appeared on a separate row for easy identification and to create references for the 
quotations.  
This interview process was followed for the five Top Managers who participated. 
5.3.4.2 Composite Systems Influence Diagram 
Section 2 of the Interview Protocol gave participants an opportunity to revisit the 
relationships between the affinities that they had provided during the focus group. 
For participants who were part of the focus group, this became a process of 
triangulation and confirmation on the one hand and an opportunity to provide 
explanation on the other hand. 
The Systems Influence Diagram (SID) was composed using a number of steps. 
This process included compiling an ART, an Interrelationship Table and SIDs, as 
described hereafter. 
Explanations and examples for each of the 28 relationships were requested, and 
these provided further descriptions of the JCPS collaboration by participants.  
The transcripts of the Senior Manager interviews (including interrelationship 
explanations) were combined into one document and loaded onto Microsoft Excel. 
Each paragraph of the transcript appeared on a separate row for easy identification 
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and to create references for the quotations in regard to the affinities and 
participants. 
5.3.4.3 Combined Affinity Relationship Table 
The composite ART was drawn to show affinity pairs and the frequencies 
(individual votes from participants) from the highest to those receiving no votes.  
To determine the number of these relationships that was deemed important 
enough to explain intragovernmental collaborations, the Pareto Principle was 
applied. This principle was used to determine the maximum number of 
relationships that best explains the variation within the system. This is because it 
is important to explain the system optimally, using the lowest number of affinity 
relationships possible.  
5.3.4.4 Interrelationship Table 
The theoretical coding aspect continued with the development of the 
interrelationship diagram (IRD) for the combined interview input. The 
Interrelationship Table shows a classification of affinities according to the extent to 
which they are drivers or outcomes of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. 
Drivers are those affinities that relatively influence intragovernmental collaboration, 
and outcomes are affinities that are influenced (Davis, 2019; Northcutt and McCoy, 
2004). 
5.3.4.5 Systems Influence Diagrams 
Systems Influence Diagrams are box-and-arrow depictions of the key relationships 
detailed in the ART. Affinities were arranged in such a way that relative drivers 
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were on the left side of the page and relative outcomes on the right. All the 
relationships identified as key on the ART were then indicated with arrows. The 
box-and-arrow depiction represented the Cluttered SID. 
The Cluttered SID was simplified by removing the paths that were redundant. For 
example, where ‘a’ influences ‘b’ and ‘b’ influences ‘c’, then the relationship ‘a’ 
influences ‘c’ is redundant because the path from a to c is already available. This 
then resulted in simplified and easy-to-explain relationship diagrams (Uncluttered 
SID)  
5.3.4.6 Individual Systems Influence Diagrams  
The IQA approach encourages examination of individual realities in addition to the 
combined reality of focus groups and interviews. This is in line with the objectives 
of the current research, which sought a deep understanding of intragovernmental 
collaboration through the experiences of individuals. This in-depth understanding, 
therefore, includes the examination of descriptions, ARTs and SIDs at an individual 
level. 
Comparisons among individual Senior Managers and comparisons between 
Senior and Top Managers were made.  
5.3.5 Semi-structures interviews (Top Managers) 
5.3.5.1 Description of affinities 
The interviews for Top Managers followed the same approach as that used for 
Senior Managers. Short descriptions of affinities from the focus group were read 
out for each of the eight affinities that were described, and the Top Managers 
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provided their own experiences and observations for each. Under Section 2 of the 
interview script, relationships between affinities were described, giving practical 
examples. 
5.3.5.2 Systems Influence Diagram 
The process to draw the composite Top Manager SID was the same as that for 
Senior Managers. 
5.3.5.3 Individual views 
Systems Influence Diagrams were drawn for each of the five participants and these 
were compared and contrasted. 
5.3.5.4 Summary of the IQA process 
The summary of the IQA process undertaken with participants is shown in 
Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1 Summary of the data collection process 
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5.4 RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY 
In line with best practice in qualitative research, the five appropriate measures 
considered for ensuring reliability and validity are discussed in the following 
sections. 
Internal validity / Credibility  
Internal validity refers to the degree to which findings of the research are well 
founded and accurately describe reality (Astroth and Chung, 2018; Morse, 2015). 
The equivalent criterion used for qualitative research is credibility (Morse, 2015).  
The first approach for improving internal validity was triangulation, which refers to 
the use of multiple research methods to corroborate the results of a research study 
(Leedy and Ormrod, 2013; Natow, 2019). For the current research, focus group 
data were triangulated with the semi-structured interviews that were conducted 
with the Senior Managers who participated in the focus group.  
Member checking is the practice of referring data and results to participants for 
confirmation (Creswell and Miller, 2000; Madill and Sullivan, 2018). Data collected 
through the focus group discussions were captured on paper by the participants. 
This in itself provided an opportunity for the researcher and participants to check 
the data as they emerged through the process.  
The researcher collected thick, rich descriptions (Creswell and Miller, 2010) of 
participants’ views through the semi-structured interviews with both Senior 
Managers and Top Managers. These descriptions were presented as quotations 
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to demonstrate and explain the experiences of Senior and Top Management within 
the JCPS collaboration.  
External validity / Transferability 
External validity refers to the extent to which findings of the study can be 
generalised (Lock and Seele, 2018; Yin, 1994). Although transferability is not the 
main reason for undertaking qualitative research, it remains a possibility. 
Transferability depends on the degree of similarity between the original situation 
and the situation to which it is transferred (Carminati, 2018; Hoepfl, 1997). 
Transferability, therefore, refers to readers finding similarities with the detail of the 
research and using it appropriately within their own context (Carminati, 2018; 
Tracy, 2010). 
In order to facilitate transferability, the researcher provided detailed descriptions of 
the case together with detailed descriptions of the context, participants, research 
process and documentation. 
Reliability/Dependability 
Research results are said to be reliable if another researcher is able to repeat the 
study and arrive at the same results (Cypress, 2017). To minimise researcher bias 
in the coding process, the researcher used an external well-experienced facilitator 
for the IQA process. This gave comfort to participants of the study, particularly 
those who were already familiar with the researcher-practitioner. 
Dependability relies largely on the researcher providing a detailed account of the 
process followed to conduct the research (Cypress, 2017; Krefting, 1991; Lock and 
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Seele, 2018). The systematic nature of IQA provides an opportunity to 
demonstrate reliability of the method, the descriptions and the decisions 
associated with the research. The researcher kept a record of mind maps, 
documents, transcripts and detailed analysis for future reference. 
Other strategies for addressing validity such as triangulation and thick description 
have a positive impact on reliability. 
Reflexivity 
Reflexivity refers to researchers’ attempts at locating themselves in the research 
and acknowledging their personal stance within the research (Savin-Baden, 2004). 
This is an acknowledgement that the approach of the researchers and their 
decisions regarding the research are influenced by their values, attitudes and 
experiences. 
Initially, a researcher must reflect upon the choice of the specific topic, the personal 
reasons for the research and the research questions themselves (Lazard and 
McAvoy, 2017). Furthermore, Lazard and McAvoy (2017:9) ask a pertinent 
question: “What is the research process and how am I influencing it?” 
These questions helped the researcher to self-manage her own thoughts and 
ideas and be on the lookout for closed-mindedness and preconceived ideas. 
Lazard and McAvoy (2017) recognise that disclosure of the researcher’s lens is 
not only important for the readers of the final research document but may also be 
important for the participants who are involved in data collection, depending on 
ethical appropriateness. For the current research, the researcher was known to a 
cross-section of participants and did not need to share her background with the 
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participants. However, where appropriate, the researcher reflected portions of the 
research that had elements of her own experience. 
Reflexivity becomes critical in instances where the researcher-practitioner is part 
of the constituency of participants of the research. The researcher was mindful of 
the following two important considerations. First, the researcher acknowledged 
that her experiences may have differed from the experiences of some of the 
participants and, therefore, refrained from influencing or convincing those with a 
different experience. Second, the researcher was careful not to speak for 
participants or to finish their sentences based on her knowledge of the environment 
(Berger, 2015). 
To improve the validity of the research through reflexivity, the following steps were 
taken: 
• The researcher used an external facilitator for the focus group to reduce 
bias, particularly during the crucial step of identifying affinities. 
• The researcher collected and captured rich descriptions as evidence of the 
participants’ views using direct quotations. The IQA process provided an 
opportunity to capture such evidence.  
 
5.5 DELIMITATIONS 
The research study was undertaken within an intragovernmental collaboration 
based within Central Government in South Africa. Local and provincial 
governmental departments and their entities were not included in the current 
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research. However, findings of the research could be applicable to collaborations 
within a local or provincial sector of government but not across subsectors.  
The National Department of Defence (DOD) and the State Security Agency are 
part of the JCPS Cluster, but participants from these institutions were excluded 
due to the onerous process for approval to conduct research. Their lack of 
participation was not critical because they are not one of the key participants in the 
basic criminal justice system consisting of policing, courts and corrections. Their 
absence should, therefore, not have had an influence on the validity of the 
research. 
The focus of intragovernmental collaboration is crime as a wicked problem. Every 
wicked problem is unique because it presents differently in different contexts. The 
framework that was developed addressed the specific context of crime in South 
Africa and advanced the body of knowledge within the broader context of wicked 
problems and intragovernmental collaborations.  
 
5.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
In ensuring that no person or organisation was harmed by the current research 
study, considerations were given to three of the principles of ethical research 
identified in Allmark, Boote, Chambers, Clarke, McDonnell, Thompson et al. (2009) 
Informed consent 
Participants were informed of their right to decline to participate and of their right 
to withdraw from the process in instances where they no longer felt comfortable to 
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proceed. Consent forms for participation and recording of proceedings were fully 
explained. 
Privacy and confidentiality 
Names of participants are not revealed in the research document, and special care 
was taken to ensure that information that directly identified participants was 
masked. To put the participants’ minds at ease, the researcher agreed to share 
the contents of the research report prior to submission and publication.  
Safe storage and disposal of research documentation was undertaken in line with 
the procedures indicated by the University of South Africa. 
Politics and power 
Although the researcher is a practitioner within the environment and is known to 
most of the participants, she held no power over the participants and their decision 
to take part in the research. Although the researcher obtained clearance to conduct 
research in the governmental departments and entities, care was taken to avoid 
participation enforced by Top Management or higher authorities. The researcher 
applied for ethical clearance in line with the policies and procedures of the 
University of South Africa and ensured that all undertakings adhered to these. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
Interactive Qualitative Analysis is a qualitative research approach and stays true 
to the constructivist worldview that seeks a deeper understanding of a 
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phenomenon within an identified context. The use of Senior Managers who 
experience the JCPS intragovernmental collaborations and Top Managers who 
have power over them provided descriptions that were grounded in the field in 
which they operate. 
The IQA approach responded directly to the research objectives and to the 
research questions, as detailed in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Matrix of research questions and data collection 
Research Questions Data Collection 
(1) Which dimensions do managers 
identify as important in intragovernmental 
collaborations for addressing crime as a 
wicked problem at a strategic level? 
Identification of affinities through 
• Axial coding through the focus group 
• Axial coding through interviews 
(2) What are the interrelationships 
between the dimensions identified under 
(1)?  
• Interrelationship diagrams developed 
through the focus group and interviews 
• Systems Influence Diagrams 
(3) How can identified dimensions and 
interrelationships be used to produce an 
intragovernmental framework that will help 
address wicked problems? 
Researcher relates outcomes of the 
research with literature to arrive at a 
framework for intragovernmental 
collaboration. 
 
The key components of the research design are summarised in Table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3 Summary of the research design 
Component Decision 
Research Purpose Exploratory 
Philosophical Assumptions: 
 






Research Approach Inductive 
Research Method Interactive Qualitative Analysis 
Participants Senior Managers and Top Managers of the Justice Crime 
Prevention and Security (JCPS) Cluster 
Data Collection Stage 1: Focus group  
Stage 2: Semi-structured Interviews: Senior Managers 
Stage 3: Semi-structured interviews: Top Managers 
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6 CHAPTER 6: RESULTS  
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the results and findings of the IQA process that was 
instrumental in addressing the first two research questions. The research 
objectives, research questions and chapter contributions are presented in Table 
6.1. 
Table 6.1 Chapter contributions to research questions 
Research Objective Research Question Chapter Contribution 
(1) To uncover the 
experiences of managers 
involved in 
intragovernmental 
collaborations at a strategic 
level and to understand the 
dimensions affecting their 
efforts in addressing crime 
as a wicked problem 
 
(1) Which dimensions do 




addressing crime as a 
wicked problem at a 
strategic level? 
 
Within Chapter 6, the 
affinities described by 
Senior Managers in the IQA 
focus group are identified 
and described.  
 
In Chapter 7, these affinities 





(2) To develop a better 
understanding of how 
dimensions linked to 
intragovernmental 
collaborations interrelate 
(2) What are the 
interrelationships between 




affinities are detailed in 
Chapter 6. 
(3) To produce a framework 
that will guide 
intragovernmental 
collaborations in addressing 
wicked problems  
(3) How can identified 
dimensions and 
interrelationships be used 
to produce an 
intragovernmental 
framework that will help 





The process that was undertaken to identify the interrelationships between the 
affinities is detailed in the current chapter for Senior Managers and for Top 
Managers. 
 
6.2 SENIOR MANAGERS 
6.2.1 Identification of Affinities 
Ten Senior Managers from five different JCPS Cluster departments and entities 
took part in the focus group held on 6 November 2019. Participants completed 
109 data points (Post-It Notes) and grouped them into eight affinities through a 
process of theoretical coding.  
 
 




Figure 6.2 Post-It Notes completed by participants 
 
Affinities identified by the focus group were as follows:  
1. Silos 






8. Sharing Goals 




6.2.2 In-depth description of Affinities 
The interviews with Senior Managers served two purposes. The first was to obtain 
in-depth descriptions of the eight affinities that were identified. The second purpose 
was to obtain in-depth descriptions of the relationships between the affinities.  
To gain a deeper understanding of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration 
meant unpacking and acknowledging the different experiences of the officials who 
are immersed in the JCPS collaboration. In capturing these experiences, care was 
taken to describe the wide views of experiences and express the width of such 
experiences. The experiences that were described are followed by direct 
quotations from the participants.  
Besides assisting the researcher in responding to the research questions, this 
section gives the participants voice. It is for this reason that the researcher has 
provided detailed quotations to capture and reflect the thoughts and experiences 
of the JCPS Cluster participants. 
Ten Senior Managers were interviewed to confirm the relationships that they 
indicated during the focus group and to provide explanations for these 
relationships. Of the ten participants who were interviewed, seven had participated 
in the focus group and three had not. According to Northcutt and McCoy (2004), 
the inclusion of new participants is deemed acceptable if it is in the interest of the 
research. The three additional participants were Senior Managers from Legal Aid 
South Africa, the DCS and the NPA, and their voices were important for the 
research. 
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Most participants were English-second-language speakers and, therefore, minor 
grammatical errors were corrected in the transcript. In addition, filler words such 
as ‘uhm’ and ‘ah’ were removed for clarity. In other instances, certain words that 
were not part of the quotation were included for clarity (e.g. substituting the word 
‘his’ for [State President] where necessary). Such words appear in square 
brackets. 
Quotations are shown per participant and cross-referenced to the paragraph on 
the composite interview transcript. Where similar descriptions can be attributed to 
two or more participants, only one of the quotations is used to avoid repetition.  
Affinity 1: Silos 
Silos described an environment in which organisations of the JCPS Cluster tend 
to work for their own interest; this was described by participants as driving own 
agendas. There was an indication that some people adopt a ‘my way or the 
highway’ mentality and did not seem to work towards compromise. Another 
dimension of this affinity included silos within departments and entities. 
Participants emphasised that silos are both across and within (i.e. inside their 
organisations and within the cluster). 
It was indicated that cluster participants tend to drive their organisational agendas 
that usually fall within their funded legislative mandates before the cluster 
objectives. Some of the descriptions given by participants follow: 
At the moment, everyone is just chasing their own constitutional mandates. If 
that mandate is policing, then they only focus on policing. If the mandate is 
prosecution, they focus on prosecution. (Participant 3: 565) 
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Because people are not coming there with the same understanding of 
objectives, there is this thing of falling back to: ‘At the end of the day, my 
Annual Performance Plan is the one that is important’. (Participant 6: 1454) 
Two Senior Managers indicated that even in instances where they try to work 
together, they are often frustrated and tend to revert to working in silos to avoid 
delays: 
Progress sometimes is delayed because if Department B is not performing, 
there’s an implication for you. So we tend as [a] department to feel more 
comfortable to run alone because it is faster. (Participant 1: 18) 
 No. [I] think I can deliver on my own because these people are delaying me 
and are not making a decision. Or sometimes the challenges in organisations 
can drive other departments within the cluster to do things in silos – in their 
own little corners. (Participant 11: 2519) 
Senior Managers have several organisational objectives that they are obligated to 
meet. Some of these are within their own government department to be achieved 
under their legislative mandates, and some support joint-cluster objectives. One 
Senior Manager indicated that the mandates of their departmental objectives tend 
to prevail. This means that even in instances where joint objectives are pursued 
and are useful in achieving larger objectives, they are deprioritised at some point 
due to departmental pressures:  
Backsliding is that we work together first quarter, second quarter [but] third 
quarter, fourth quarter, you see people not attending meetings or working 
sessions that are critical because they are also under pressure to make sure 
that their APP [Annual Performance Plan] targets are reached because it’s 
towards the end of the year. (Participant 6: 1398) 
All participants indicated that silos and the silo mentality originated within 
departments and that they are not limited to the JCPS Cluster. In addition, silos 
extend beyond the JCPS Cluster where collaboration is needed from other clusters 
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such as the Economic Cluster. The following were among quotations that 
described the experience: 
As much as government’s intention is to break the silo mentality, it is so 
ingrained into institutions that we work for. The reason is we have hierarchies 
and we have leaders and managers. Let’s say the planning environment. So 
the planning environment will work in isolation from the monitoring 
environment. (Participant 9: 2117) 
Even intercluster. If you can look at the Economic Cluster, there are a lot of 
things that they must do to solve problems that downstream create work for 
the Security Cluster. Things like your illicit economy, fake goods coming into 
the country and creating security problems downstream. (Participant 3: 691) 
One participant indicated that some officials push their personal interests ahead of 
those of their departments. For example, a person might defend or push a line of 
thinking that has not been sanctioned by their department or a line of thinking that 
aligns with their personal interests and ambitions: 
It is not the institution itself, but it is personality issues. And because there are 
no clear accountability structures when people go back to their offices, then 
whatever the collective decides can be hampered by the ‘my way or the 
highway’ mentality. If I do not believe in the common agenda of the collective 
because there are no consequences, I either misinform the institutions about 
the direction to be taken or at that particular time or I disengage. (Participant 6: 
1399) 
One participant indicated that although there is silo behaviour within different 
structures of the cluster, there was an indication of it decreasing within the last ten 
years:  
I think it is important to acknowledge that the silos that used to exist maybe 
ten years ago are no longer in place. They are no longer solid silos because I 
think across the JCPS Cluster, we are very well aware that we have to support 
each other if the justice system has to work. So to some extent, the silos are 
not solid silos. (Participant 6: 1379) 
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Four participants indicated that silos become even more pronounced since the 
budget and resources are not controlled within the cluster. This means that even 
on agreed joint projects, the silos result in uneven implementation. Participants 
identified the need for ring-fenced budgets for identified cluster projects to address 
silo-related problems and to avoid the issue of uneven implementation: 
Because projects are allocated per department, now it becomes a problem 
when you have integrated projects. So it means those budgets must still be 
spent in that silo approach, which discourages and defeats the rationale 
behind collaboration and cooperation. (Participant 1: 46) 
Maybe we got an increased overtime budget and [are] able to sustain and 
deploy more resources. Yes, we [the SAPS] have additional R10 m for 
overtime, but do you [the DOJCD] have enough resources to deploy more 
prosecutors, magistrates? You don’t. So how does it impact on you to be able 
to meet up with our expectations of us getting additional funding? (Participant 
x1) 
One participant indicated that communication regarding the successes or the 
challenges of the cluster often follow the silo approach even when the successes 
are a joint-cluster effort:  
But there is more of a culture of, ‘If this is my mandate, I must look good for 
myself rather than have to work with X to make her look good or make the 
entire cluster look good’. The Hawks talk about this on their own rather than 
say [that] maybe the Hawks and the NPA should be communicating this kind 
of message to the country together. (Participant 13: 3700) 
One participant indicated that silos are unavoidable, work undertaken at the 
operational level is largely adversarial, and legal decisions taken in courts by the 
Judiciary may not be in line with policies sanctioned by those at the top level. For 
example, a decision by the cluster to reduce remand detainees due to 
overcrowding may not be implemented because prosecutors are fighting daily to 
 
1 Participant ID not indicated because the quotation could reveal the identity pf a participant. 
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deny bail for the accused. At cluster-leadership level, it was indicated that silos 
cannot be avoided but should be appropriately managed:  
The issue of different departments working in silos – some of it is [a] natural 
phenomenon because they have different objectives. For example, at Legal 
Aid SA, work involves trying to defend people charged with criminal offences 
as best as we can ... whereas the NPA for instance, their main objective is to 
ensure that people are found guilty of offences they are charged with at all 
costs. So already have a sort of a conflict there. … So what happens is 
sometimes the collaborative efforts are made at a higher level, but they don’t 
always filter down to people working on the coalface. (Participant 12: 3093) 
In summary, participants provided descriptions of the silos that they experience at 
departmental and cluster level regarding structures, processes and practices. The 
participants also described behaviours where individuals promoted the objectives 
of members’ own departments ahead of the cluster and in some instances, pushed 
their own agendas.  
Affinity 2: Protocols 
This affinity was identified as ‘Red Tape’ by the focus group due to the bureaucratic 
processes that slow down decision-making processes. The word Protocols was 
found to fit the descriptions of participants better and was adopted post the 
data-gathering phase. 
Participants mentioned that there are too many structures for similar objectives, 
with excessive meetings and little time for implementation. Non-attendance was 
mentioned as an issue that affects continuity and often leads to miscommunication 
of action points and undue duplication of structures that address similar matters. 
An acceptable degree of systems and structures was seen as necessary for the 
effective working of the cluster. 
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Two participants mentioned the importance of bureaucracy in safeguarding public 
funds in general and in keeping citizens safe within the cluster: 
Unfortunately red tape is going to be there for many years into the future 
because you need to prevent corrupt officials and individuals that steal from 
the state. So there, unfortunately, as much as it’s an injuring factor, 
unfortunately, treasury departments need to introduce red tape. (Participant 9: 
2160) 
Within the cluster, there were indications from six participants that Protocols overly 
delay decisions and slow implementation. This happens within the cluster and 
within governmental departments: 
We fund organisations ... Each and every year, we fund them. To me, it doesn’t 
make sense for the Department [of Social Development] to take eight months 
to get the contracts signed. It’s because you have too many people signing [in] 
the Department … Others sign without even looking at it. You can have three 
people signing instead of 11 people. (Participant 1: 239) 
Let me just say that government is a highly regulated environment. So there ’s 
a lot of regulation that creates red tape. There are a lot of unintended 
consequences in a regulated environment. Take the PFMA for instance, and 
the procurement process that follows after that. (Participant 3: 577) 
For me, how I see red tape is the loooong approval framework. It is the fact 
that I cannot take a decision and implement. It has to go to a committee and 
another committee and another committee and eventually, it must be tabled in 
Parliament. Or it must be approved by the DG after it went through the DDG, 
the Chief Director and the Director. For me, red tape is intradepartmental and 
not across departments. (Participant 12: 3313) 
Nine participants felt that the Protocols were complicated with too many structures 
within the JCPS Cluster. The large number of structures means that decisions are 
moved across structures, and this causes unnecessary bureaucracy or Protocols. 
The following are some of the descriptions that were given: 
For instance, within the JCPS Cluster alone, we have more than 24 structures 
that are seeking to address issues of violence against women and children. 
There’s a report to that effect. (Participant 1: 29) 
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Each department will have its own Manco and internal processes, governance 
and all that stuff. It becomes impossible to go and attend all these even if you 
have management. It means you must have 12 DDGs in order to fit into the 
cluster structures. (Participant 11: 2542) 
The problem again with red tape even from the highest level, is that there’s no 
understanding of what all these structures are supposed to be doing. All these 
structures – what informs their existence? (Participant 13: 3668) 
Six participants indicated that due to the large number of structures, appropriate 
Senior Managers are not always available to attend. In some instances, 
low-ranking employees are sent to attend for compliance, and this slows 
decision-making due to unavailability of decision makers. Furthermore, this leads 
to miscommunications and lack of continuity in attendees: 
If you have too many forums that are overlapping, you run the risk of people 
would be consumed by these meetings instead of implementing the 
resolutions. To a larger extent, they become less effective for the purpose. 
(Participant 1: 87) 
Departments send representatives mainly for compliance purposes just to say, 
‘We were represented’. Nobody sits down and says, ‘There’s this meeting’ so 
that a person goes there having been briefed on the issues and to make a 
contribution. And sometimes those people when they come back, they do not 
report back. (Participant 2: 363) 
On the issue of structures, one participant indicated that all the structures are 
needed and should be upheld. This refers to the seven main governance structures 
rather than the many implementation-type coordinating structures. Participant 2 
felt that only a few people attend and are thus overburdened: 
My honest opinion is that the current structures are necessary. The current 
structures are absolutely necessary. If you have one-size-fits-all approach, it 
won’t work. The structures are meant for focus! Focus on, e.g., issues of 
security … People become worried about structures because departments in 
many instances send one person to serve in many structures. That person 
feels overstrained and overstretched. (Participant 2: 359) 
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Two participants felt very strongly that there are insufficient Protocols and that 
there is poor governance within the JCPS Cluster. Participant 2 emphasised that 
there is often poor attendance or inappropriate people attending. In addition, 
decisions are not followed up and enforced, making a mockery of such decisions.  
Many people go there [cluster meetings] to just to sign the register, else there 
would be a complaint. (Participant 2: 364) 
To be honest, I feel that JCPS Cluster does not have red tape. Because there 
are no policies and procedures that hold people accountable, which I would 
call red tape. Then individuals are able to backslide precisely because there 
is no red tape. We rely on individuals. We believe the individual is representing 
the organisation or the institution in good faith and they are doing everything 
right because there’s no report back loop that is red tape related. But that is 
institutional responsibility. (Participant 6: 1409) 
 
Affinity 3: Resources 
Although there was an understanding that resources need to be shared to achieve 
joint objectives, participants instead experienced a competition for resources within 
the JCPS Cluster. Participants believe that budgets can only be increased at the 
expense of others within the cluster. Resource utilisation was identified as an 
important consideration. 
Participants strongly expressed the issue of resourcing within the cluster. Most of 
the participants indicated that the number of officials in the different criminal justice 
service departments is not balanced, and when further resourcing is requested, 
this is not often considered.  
Already at SAPS, they have 1 400 plus stations. They are in communities en 
masse. And that is a good thing; it is required. But when they channel their 
investigation into the NPA, check – Do we have equitable resources for the 
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NPA to be able to handle the number of inputs that they will be getting from 
SAPS? How many magistrates do we have? (Participant 6: 1433) 
The resources are not evenly shared. They are not balanced. We are not 
getting what we are supposed to be getting. For example, police would be 
getting more because their work is more on practicalities but yet, they are not 
prioritising that to assist the cluster again. (Participant 11: 2576) 
Participants indicated the lack of a coherent cluster-resourcing plan that all cluster 
departments could use collectively for requesting appropriate resourcing. 
Departments usually approach the National Treasury on their own and bid for 
funding against other cluster departments:  
When it comes to resources, it is always a question of ‘what more can I get for 
my department?’ It is not, ‘Where are the biggest collective pains in the 
process in the value chain’. So everyone just competes for what they can get 
for themselves. (Participant 3: 594) 
For me, as the JCPS Cluster, we need to work together and put one concept 
of resourcing to say as a cluster, ‘These are priorities that we have.’ The other 
priorities need so many resources. I know that there will be budget for every 
department. (Participant 13: 3683) 
Although there is admission that budgets are indeed increasing at a slow pace, 
two participants indicated that existing resources are not being used optimally for 
maximum impact: 
People keep saying there’s not enough human resources, not enough staff 
capacity. That could be a persistent complaint, but I tell you now, if we could 
do a work study on what people are doing in departments, you will find a lot of 
capacity available there. In all likelihood, more than what is required. 
(Participant 12: 3116) 
I can’t say the resources are limited or not, but it is the way they are being 
utilised. If they can be shared and used collaboratively, I don’t think there 
would be issues of resources within the cluster. (Participant 8: 1902) 
In addition to resources not being used optimally, one participant indicated that 
many government departments return unspent funds to the National Treasury 
every year:  
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Why are your Home Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Development, 
Intelligence and all of them, year after year, returning not just little but huge 
unspent funds? (Participant 2: 379) 
Three participants emphasised concerns regarding the amount of resources spent 
on social crime prevention, which should be an important area of focus in the war 
against crime: 
For instance, there’s a report that we commissioned with the Department of 
Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation looking at resources that government 
deploys towards addressing violence against women and children. Only 9% is 
for prevention programmes. We deploy more on combating violence, on SAPS 
and all that. There’s a lot of research, papers that have been presented by the 
Institute or Security Studies and other researchers that show clearly that we 
need to redeploy our resources on prevention. (Participant 1: 60) 
Of interest to the JCPS Cluster is the promise of greater efficiencies through the 
use of ICT and the use of resources allocated therein. There are indications that 
collaborative efforts in ICT are not providing the gains expected due to delays and 
poor cooperation between departments. One participant eloquently expressed the 
integration challenges experienced within the cluster:  
From arrest, a person is captured on the system. We do not know how many 
people are repeat offenders because systems are not talking to each other. 
We must do rehabilitation. But you are reading a form that is handwritten and 
by the time the court sentences, you do not have the form completed during 
arrest. The charge warrant is not there. (Participant 11: 2578) 
One participant identified issues of ICT resources and poor integration as the 
failure of leadership to guide the identification, implementation and use of ICT 
systems appropriately: 
The one thing that is a big gap is IT resources. But is it not because of financial 
resources that IT doesn’t work? No. It is because of poor management that 
proper IT systems cannot be developed. But sometimes when IT systems are 
developed, the departments can’t get people to use them. You find a 
comprehensive IT system that has been built and people still stick to old 
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reporting ways … In no time, it becomes obsolete and then they start a new 
process to procure a new IT system. (Participant 12: 3117) 
One participant questioned the rationality of allowing departments to spend 
budgets within departmental silos, which means agreements of the cluster are 
subject to people who may not have been part of the decision-making: 
Again, because projects are allocated per department, now it becomes a 
problem when you have integrated projects. So it means those budgets must 
still be spent in that silo approach …. (Participant 1: 47) 
Two participants indicated that where joint implementation is planned, it may not 
be possible to spend the money through the cluster because accountability rests 
with the Accounting Officers. However, they stressed the importance of 
ring-fencing the budget to enable a more coherent response to the crises:  
Each department gets its own funds. Justice gets its own, Police get their own, 
and so on. If there was some sort of integrated financing, you see. Not for 
everything. You would say, for instance, gender-based violence, it’s a big 
issue. You identify about ten issues, for example, issues of victims; there 
would be an integrated pool of funds. (Participant 2: 338) 
 
Affinity 4: Culture 
Culture was one of the affinities with many data points. Participants saw many of 
the behaviours within the cluster being the result of the cluster culture.  
Two participants indicated that the JCPS Cluster does not have its own culture. 
This is because there has not been an attempt by leadership to build a culture 
outside the departments from where the participants originate: 
The cluster system is not a cohesive system. It is more of a cooperation or 
cooperative thing. We come together to cooperate, but we do not necessarily 
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identify ourselves as one. Everyone comes in with their own culture and so on. 
(Participant 3: 606) 
We say culture, but the culture of commitment is different because we have 
not been able to build a JCPS culture yet. We need to develop a JCPS identity. 
(Participant 6: 1453) 
And I’ve said many, many, many times to different people in different 
structures that you really need to understand the complexity of JCPS 
interactions! It’s like a maze. Different things are happening at different levels, 
with different intensities and different objectives because the issues are very 
varied. It is a collective that requires more of a cultural kind of thing, vision, 
understanding the vision of the JCPS cluster, and commitment at institutional 
and staff level because [of the] need to understand the culture that is required 
in JCPS. (Participant 6: 1504) 
The absence of a unique JCPS Cluster means that participants present a 
public-service mentality and culture. This was described by two participants:  
Government work has always been seen historically as a security haven. Once 
you are in there, you are in and you’ll be out at pension age. Whether you 
perform or not, you can’t be fired unless you do something wrong like stealing 
... So it’s a culture of not giving your best. It’s a non-performance culture … 
This is a very bad culture. There is no sense of the spirit of high performance. 
(Participant 3: 613) 
Participants expressed a culture of lack of compliance and lack of accountability in 
general and poor consequence management:  
Before you get to the organisational culture, let’s look at individuals. Individuals 
come from society. Organisations are a reflection of a society we live in. If 
there’s a culture of non-compliance, poor compliance, we don’t pay TV licence, 
we don’t pay water and lights, we don’t pay traffic fines, and we don’t pay 
e-tolls ... So, there’s non-compliance, generally. Now you take the same 
individuals and bring them into organisations, and now you want compliance 
to be 100%. … It’s [an] unrealistic expectation. (Participant 9: 2243) 
Similarly, to the DGs, when they sit, we talk nicely instead of saying, ‘You did 
not submit a report!’ We put it nicely and say DG this and DG that. As long as 
we are doing that, we will remain problematic. The dashboard is there; people 
are red, people are amber, but things are put mildly and diplomatically. 
(Participant 2: 405) 
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I think it goes back to the issue that people come to the JCPS Cluster as 
individuals. I wish we could go back into our institution and our institution 
reverberates because ‘I come from the JCPS that requires this and that done.’ 
(Participant 6: 1589) 
One participant indicated that in failing to hold leaders accountable in meetings, 
Secretariat and other low-ranking officials often take responsibility for areas for 
which they are not accountable. This is because many leaders cannot hold each 
other accountable and risk their relationships:  
To an extent that the Secretariat can even get blamed. Whenever something 
goes wrong, it is the Secretariat. Similarly, with Exco, anything wrong – 
Secretariat. It’s Secretariat; sometimes it’s the Strategy Unit. (Participant 2: 
407) 
Attendance was seen as an ongoing and pervasive issue and participants were 
not held accountable even at the highest level of participation (i.e. at 
Director-General level). Five participants expressed this view, with two of them 
expressing it as follows: 
Also, the issue of participation. There’s that tendency of sending wrong people 
to these meetings. For example, the Directors-Generals’ Cluster meeting, it is 
a DG’s meeting. Expectation is that you will have high-ranking officials but 
instead they would send people who cannot really take decisions. It’s not only 
the DG’s cluster, it’s most of the structures within the cluster … (Participant 8: 
1912) 
I think there is [a] culture of certain departments wanting to play a big brother 
role. For instance, if Social Development is coordinating, certain departments 
won’t take that seriously, but if it’s certain, other departments, everyone, 
collaborates ... (Participant 1: 95) 
Some of the cluster departments (e.g. the DOD, the SAPS and the DCS) are 
military-type environments with command and control. Officials do as they are told 
even if it means malicious compliance. For example, officials may attend a meeting 
even if they do not know what it is about. Two participants expressed this view as 
follows: 
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At the heart of the JCPS Cluster, it is hierarchical. In Defence, an order gets 
given; you follow. You tow the line. Similarly, in the Police, Corrections and so 
forth … That command and control – it’s a very serious factor. If your superior 
says go to that meeting, in most instances, people do not have the audacity to 
question. But also, they do not even ask what the meeting is about because it 
is disrespectful to say, “By the way, what is it about?” As Secretariat, I hear 
people say, “I’ve been sent here ….” (Participant 2: 368) 
But obviously, the Police, because of the fact that they are command and 
control, whatever command comes and the control that comes with the 
command and control, they must just run with it, never looking at what impact 
that might have on any other sector within the JCPS Cluster. (Participant 13: 
3654) 
One participant expressed the presence of a culture of entitlement to participate in 
certain cluster structures. People who attend certain cluster meetings start taking 
ownership and do not want to relinquish the opportunity and extend it to others 
when it becomes necessary to do so: 
Entitlement and ownership of work. Very entitled. They say, ‘It's only me and I 
have been appointed.’ (Participant 11: 2608) 
You have the same people attending and if you are outside, you won't be 
allowed in. (Participant 11: 2611)  
Three Senior Managers highlighted the problem of having to build and use informal 
networks to gain cooperation from cluster departments. In some instances, work 
that took years to achieve is neglected once an individual leaves the employment, 
requiring the building of relationships to start afresh. Formal structures that compel 
Senior Managers to participate and collaborate seem to fall apart in certain 
instances: 
I also said earlier that coordination can be a challenge because you need to 
establish relationships with individuals. If you’ve managed to do that and 
people in those departments happen to leave, it takes time; it becomes a 
challenge to get people that would replace that space. (Participant 1: 97) 
One of the problems that I think is there in the structures and the red tape is 
that it depends on who you know in departments. That is, if you know X, for 
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example, the information will go to X. And if it goes to X and X doesn’t share 
what needs to happen, the entire structure suffers. (Participant 13: 3671) 
Two participants identified the use of task teams to address failure of 
accountability. In some instances, task teams make the decisions that individuals 
are not comfortable dealing with and in others, task teams are appointed to 
address the failure of management to perform their management duties: 
So, intersectoral teams are not there to discuss intersectoral issues only. 
Sometimes you discuss specific technical issues that a member department 
should be able to deal with themselves. You will find that the Directorate – they 
do not want to take decisions on their own. It would all be dealt with by the 
committee. And that committee you find that it forms subcommittees, then after 
subcommittees, you have task teams. In between, you no longer understand 
who is now the holder of the decision-making process. (Participant 12: 3151) 
Is it the task team? Is it the subcommittee? Is it the main committee? If the 
committee makes the decision, who eventually must make the decision? At 
the end of the day, you end up with talk shops. And most importantly, those 
talk shops go on forever. You can go through five financial years still 
discussing the same thing ... (Participant 12: 3152) 
Two participants indicated that part of the culture within the cluster attributes that 
were mentioned were perpetuated by a large cohort of managers who had worked 
their way to the top and were not in a position to see the faults of the culture or 
attempt to make any changes. There seems to be no appreciation of bringing new 
perspectives and broadening management input because the current approaches 
tend to favour bureaucratic experience ahead of management and leadership skill. 
With this approach, managers tend to be older and deeply entrenched in the 
prevailing cultures. 
A career manager coming to the environment, they can make it their task to 
build a new culture. But if the people that are there are still heavily loaded 
towards technical work because they came through the ranks and are 80% 
technical and 20% management oriented, they may not see anything wrong 
with the culture, especially if they came up the ranks because that is all they 
know … (Participant 12: 3142)  
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Affinity 5: Leadership 
Participants felt that leadership is key in driving the work of the cluster and 
identified issues such as poor accountability, poor leadership styles, poor ethics 
and lack of passion associated with leadership.  
Two participants emphasised the importance of having visionary leadership within 
the cluster. They saw Top Managers as ordinary managers who are not able to 
excite the cluster towards addressing the challenging issue of crime: 
A lot of people are just super-managers. They don’t see a role of actually 
leading: bringing people together, inspiring, sharing a specific vision that 
people will believe in and follow. Very few people actually get inspiration from 
their leaders. (Participant 3: 624) 
You go to different types of meetings, and you get there, and we talk about the 
same things over and over and over again. But there is no one who says but 
hang on, we can’t be going in that direction ... There’s never a time to say, ‘Ok, 
this issue was raised. From where it was raised, what is the action? Who is 
the owner of this action?’ (Participant 13: 3718) 
And having said that, one of the things that I’ve observed, not only in the JCPS 
from a leadership point of view, is that if you sit in many of these committees, 
these high structures, you find a few, two, three or four people who are vocal. 
Remember, as you sit in that committee, you are a leader in your own right …. 
Many come there and become spectators and if the wind goes this way, we 
go with the wind. If the wind goes that way, we go with the wind. (Participant 
13: 3719) 
Participants indicated the lack of management skills to deliver on cluster-related 
work at management level. Many managers were seen as capable at performing 
at junior levels but lacking the skills and attitude to perform at management levels. 
In government departments, before we even talk about leadership, you have 
a paucity of management capacity. You have a big issue with having capable 
managers. Not even talking about leadership but having a body of capable 
managers is a big challenge. (Participant 12: 3162) 
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You have people who are technocrats, and they get promoted through the 
ranks. If you tell a lawyer who is now a Director to analyse numbers, it’s Greek 
to him. (Participant 12: 3635) 
Participants indicated lack of commitment to cluster-related responsibilities 
together with top leadership prioritising their own departments. For example, poor 
attendance of cluster committees by chairpersons tends to go unpunished. In 
addition, performance agreements tend to focus on legislative mandates and may 
not show the cluster as an important area of performance: 
But I think generally, cluster issues are treated as ‘by the way’ issues for most 
of the departments, even at leadership level. The mere fact that there was a 
complaint at the JCPS DG’s Cluster that DGs were not attending is an indicator 
of that problem. (Participant 1: 128) 
I think we have good leaders, but I think it is the drive that is problematic. Like 
we are saying, lack of will and passion is a challenge. If we look at the 
leadership at the cluster, the chairs, we know there are co-chairs but most of 
the time, the chairs are not there. So somebody else must chair the cluster, 
which is a problem. (Participant 8: 1935) 
I know one meeting called by the National Commissioner [SAPS], and I saw 
members of the PMC [Planning and Monitoring Committee] attending [lowest 
ranking Senior Managers] and not the Senior Executives of Forums. So you 
invite the DG, and the DG sends a member of the PMC. Look at the levels. 
How do you report back? If the DG is not there, it should be the Deputy DG. 
(Participant 9: 2203) 
Cluster structures are normally chaired by someone from the same rank, and 
holding people of the same rank accountable was identified as an obstacle. In 
governmental departments where rank is highly regarded, this is an important 
matter, as explained by two participants: 
The Heads of Departments are equal. The Ministers – they are all equal within 
the JCPS. The DG of Home Affairs is at Level 16 like the DG of Justice. See. 
It’s a Level 16 thing, like Correctional Services. No one can instruct another 
one. Similarly, to the Ministers, they are all equal. (Participant 2: 335) 
[T]here’s this element of linking respect to the rank. Now if that person that is 
chairing those meetings is not respected, you won’t find Senior Managers or 
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Director-Generals coming for those meeting, especially if it’s an acting person 
that they do not respect. (Participant 1: 116) 
A lack of zeal and energy to succeed was identified as an issue by two participants. 
It was suggested that the lack of zeal and energy originates at the top where 
leaders at both political and administrative levels are past retirement age: 
Similarly, at Ministerial level, your Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, Bheki Cele, they 
are 67 or 68. The leadership is already out of touch. (Participant 2: 392) 
Several posts of Top Management, particularly Heads of Departments, are often 
left vacant for a number of reasons. This leadership vacuum and frequent changes 
in leadership have contributed to issues of instability within departments and the 
JCPS Cluster:  
The Security Cluster in many instances faces high turnover at DG level. At DG 
level! I’d like to stress that. The Economic Cluster departments are better. Dr 
Phil Mjwara has been there for a long time. The Statistician-General, Dr Padi 
Lehohla, was there for 20 years. Uninterrupted!! (Participant 2: 420) 
The other is the issue of change in leadership. Now and then, we see so many 
changes in the leadership in the cluster and that is problematic for continuity. 
(Participant 8: 1937) 
There was an indication of power dynamics within the JCPS Cluster committees. 
One participant indicated that attendance and seniority level of attendance in 
meetings could be linked to the level of respect accorded to the chair of the 
committee or the department that he/she comes from. For example, structures 
chaired by the SAPS Commissioner will likely have other Top Managers attending, 
whereas structures chaired by another Director-General are more likely to suffer 
poor attendance and support: 
I think with the JCPS Cluster, to a larger extent, there is leadership that is 
provided and to a larger extent, departments respect the Secretariat and the 
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department responsible for coordinating. I can’t say the same for the Social 
Cluster because there are different dynamics there. (Participant 1: 113) 
Part of the reason for challenges in the leadership of the JCPS Cluster could be 
related to the political and administrative interface, which was mentioned as a 
challenge. Directors-General are appointed by Cabinet Ministers and there are 
often fallouts as the DGs need to balance administrative and political issues. In 
some cases, DGs are pressured to use their administrative powers in favour of 
political manoeuvres with which they may be uncomfortable: 
Leadership is an even bigger challenge. At levels at which you require 
leadership, then you get political appointments. A political appointee comes 
with a political agenda. So they are not there to provide leadership just on the 
business of the department to move the department forward, they come with 
a political agenda. What’s even worse is if you have political leadership that 
changes from time to time; sometimes within a political term of five years, you 
find you’ve got a change. (Participant 12: 3164) 
If I am somebody who is in a team who knows that I worked very hard to bring 
this case to book and I am being stepped down by the authorities, then 
definitely, team spirit is going to go down. Morale is going to go down. 
(Participant 13: 3703) 
 
Affinity 6: Execution 
Participants identified the execution of cluster plans as crucial to the results of the 
cluster and indicated certain impediments. For example, the cluster often finds that 
the processes within departments impede the ability to execute the plans 
successfully. Other issues include non-adherence to deadlines by member 
departments and the excessive number of reports to be written. Regarding 
collaboration on information systems, insufficient consultation was indicated in the 
implementation of key projects such as ICT.  
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Two participants mentioned the positive developments that have become 
established within the cluster concerning the regular monitoring of performance 
against the cluster plan. There have been improvements in the development of 
cluster plans since 2010 when the Outcomes Approach was adopted by 
government. For the JCPS Cluster, the establishment of the Planning and 
Monitoring Committee has realised some improvement: 
Yes, I’d say to a larger extent, we are trying as departments because we come 
up with the medium-term strategic framework-linked plans every medium-term 
period. If you look at the performance of the JCPS Cluster, we have done fairly 
well. I think it is because we have a strong coordinating body in the form of the 
PMC. Obviously, there have been a number of challenges. (Participant 1: 140) 
Besides the high-level five-year strategic plan (Medium Term Strategic Framework 
[MTSF]) and one-year implementation plan, there are other plans that are created 
by the cluster to address specific issues within the criminal justice system. 
However, there are indications that these plans are not always well executed: 
I think it is a challenge in the cluster, for example, if we look at how many 
strategies we have in the cluster. But how many of them are implemented 
fully? Executed? You know, there was a time when we tried to even follow up 
on them to say, ‘How many strategic plans are we having in the cluster and 
how many are implemented?’ It’s not so many. (Participant 8: 1954) 
We plan; we plan! Everybody says that. We plan; we plan! We’ve got beautiful 
documents, but we do not implement. Our implementation is not thorough. 
(Participant 13: 3753) 
One participant expressed the fact that people who formulate the strategy are far 
removed and are often not aware of what needs to be executed. The reasons 
indicated are that some do not want to be involved in the process and some 
struggle with the execution thereof: 
What I see as the cause of the problem is people in business that are 
supposed to execute the strategy, some of them were not involved in strategy 
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formulation or do not want to be involved in strategy formulation. So basically, 
when strategy is formulated, they are consulted, but I’m sure you can see a lot 
of resistance or indifference. (Participant 12: 3187) 
If you are not involved hands-on in the formulation of the strategy you are 
going to execute, tomorrow someone gives you a 50-page document and 
says, ‘This is our strategy. Go and execute’. It doesn’t work that way. In most 
cases, you can work for years, and you do not even understand what it is you 
need to execute. So execution is a big problem. (Participant 12: 3188) 
Execution often flounders because the cluster plans do not reflect in the 
departmental plans. Governance arrangements for the alignment of plans were 
found to be insufficient. Furthermore, plans compiled in the National Office do not 
necessarily cascade down to provincial, local or service-point level. In some 
instances, cluster departments such as Social Development have provincial 
departments that are overseen by the Premiers of Provinces. Implementation of 
some of the cluster work, therefore, requires concurrence with each provincial 
legislature individually.  
For instance, I indicated that some of the areas that are prioritised at a cluster 
level are not necessarily prioritised at departmental level. If a key performance 
area is not in the APP in the department, it becomes a secondary issue, 
although it is a priority at cluster level. Those are some of the discrepancies 
that are there. (Participant 1: 141) 
Processes within departments also contributed to some of the areas that were 
prioritised as key cluster projects not being executed because you find that at 
Social Development, that project is a project on the operational plan and the 
larger part of it is implemented at provincial level. Now, it is not part of the key 
projects of the Premier or sometimes even the department and now it becomes 
a problem because they prioritise and deploy resources towards cap projects. 
(Participant 1: 142) 
So if that is not prioritised at that level, it becomes a problem for you to receive 
information from the grass roots and be able to report on that at a cluster level. 
That’s one discrepancy. (1: 143) 
Participants indicated the type of misalignment between plans at a high level and 
their execution throughout the organisations. For example, arrest targets in the 
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SAPS result in an overload of cases handled by Legal Aid South Africa at 
significant cost, only to be withdrawn. Similarly, plans to finalise certain joint 
systems are ultimately not executed in the respective departments due to 
execution that is not harmonised. 
But the police still have a target to arrest so many people, and they publish in 
newspapers and say, ‘We’ve arrested so many’. But it is putting pressure on 
the other parts of the system. Instead of us concentrating on the 30% of cases 
that should go through the courts, we take the additional 70%, which in a 
couple of months will be withdrawn … There is no structure that can bring 
everyone together to foster a common goal and a common understanding. 
(Participant 12: 3303) 
Five years or six years later, the Department of Justice is trying to do the same 
thing. But there was a system [initiated by Victim Empowerment, Social 
Development]; it was a good project that ended nowhere. Because of their 
personal experiences of not being supported, people go back into their silos, 
thinking, ‘We will be doing the same thing over and over again. But now that it 
is DOJ, we must jump a hoop and support the same thing that was started five 
years ago’. (Participant 6: 1597) 
Another key factor in implementation lies in organisational skills and capabilities to 
plan and implement large, game-changing projects. One participant indicated that 
many cluster departments do not have the capacity to plan and execute large 
projects, and some might not use rigorous project-management discipline to 
execute successfully.  
When you start talking about game-changing plans, and I want to say 
transformational plans, you want to transform a business from looking like this 
to looking to the other. You need relevant skills to be able to do that. You need 
a culture of project management inculcated in the organisation at enterprise 
level. You need proper monitoring and evaluation of those plans at a senior 
level. You also need to ensure that there’s adequate funding for those plans; 
there’s adequate capacity to carry out the work. (Participant 3: 649) 
Within the JCPS Cluster, a substantial amount of resources has been invested in 
the development of cross-cutting ICT systems for alignment of the integration of 
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cases through the criminal justice system. The following were observations 
regarding the implementation of ICT projects: 
The execution of IT – it does not talk to each other. Simple. It does not talk to 
each other. There is no reason why Police do not have direct access to 
fingerprints. They must go through Home Affairs. The Home Affairs system 
should be directly linked to the SAPS and others and that will fast-track cases. 
(Participant 2: 439) 
But Masters of the High Court do not have access to the GEPF [Government 
Employees Pension Fund] information. No access to [the] GEPF system. 
It’s a shame. The two should be talking to each other. And that in itself 
perpetuates fraud and so on. It’s those kinds of things that say the systems 
that we are developing are inward looking. They are not client or victim centric. 
(Participant 2: 444) 
The Security Cluster is overly dependent on external service providers … Late 
last year when SAPS had a contractual dispute with a service provider, the 
service provider shut down the system. There was a blackout. How do you 
outsource and even give copyrights to a private company? When there are 
disputes, they take them away. (Participant 2: 446) 
For what I notice, SITA [State Information Technology Agency] works across 
environments. Maybe the intention when it was introduced [SITA] was good, 
but also leaves room for corruption, one. Also, they take for granted if it 
becomes government. We take too long to procure. We take too long to 
process. We take too long to approve. (Participant 9: 2329) 
Three participants indicated that in some situations, poor execution points to 
inadequate skills for the complexity of the projects being undertaken. In others, 
poor execution can be attributed to low morale and practices that do not promote 
a high-performance culture and promote poor accountability within some 
governmental departments:  
All of that requires solid management and leadership geared towards 
execution. But if you do not have the right skills and the right level of 
performance, you have low morale, and [if] you don’t have the 
high-performance culture, you will find that plans are just suggestions. People 
are not worried when plans are not executed on time. They always find 
excuses that ‘this was not done because of 1, 2, 3’, and that’s the end of the 
story. (Participant 3: 653) 
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Let’s look at the IJS [Integrated Justice System] Seven-Point Plan. When it 
was introduced, it was for a certain period. The question is: What progress has 
been made with integrating systems across the justice system? We talk about 
e-dockets; we talk about docket scanning. As much as some would advocate 
that much has been done, yes, there’s no two ways. (Participant 9: 2159) 
When there were xenophobic attacks, the Former President ensured that 
committees were established in provinces between 2013 to 2015/16. The 
Offices of the Premiers were supposed to lead and drive these projects to 
ensure that there is integrated planning and ensure that there is integrated 
departmental involvement. Only in the beginning – the first week. Thereafter, 
we saw departments not participating … People gradually stop participating 
for whatever reasons. (Participant 9: 2224) 
One participant articulated that once projects and programmes are executed, there 
is no opportunity to evaluate the impact of the work. Where projects are not 
delivered according to plan, there is no indications of lessons learnt and, therefore, 
similar mistakes keep being made. Within operational environments, projects are 
often declared successful because the SAPS ran an operation and made a certain 
number of arrests. However, follow-ups on what eventually happened to those 
arrested are often not discussed. This was indicated as inadequate execution that 
does not have an impact on the overall criminal justice system. Inadequate 
evaluation post implementation of the project was also identified regarding ICT 
projects: 
Another problem in government is that we like to reinvent the wheel. Where 
things work, we want to leave them and break them and continue on 
something new. We forget to say there have been things that worked. 
(Participant 13: 3758) 
You go to NATJOINTS, it’s Operation what-what, Operation what-what here. 
Success, success! But where’s the impact? (Participant 13: 3667) 
As much as Police says I’ve achieved, as much as Justice says I’ve achieved, 
as much as NPA has achieved, are all our achievements really making a dent 
and a difference in the community? The right kind of leader would be looking 
at that. (Participant 13: 3728) 
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In addressing issues related to the execution of cluster-related initiatives, two 
suggestions were made by two participants. First, in the absence of guidance from 
the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, it is suggested that each DG 
signs a Memorandum of Understanding through the cluster. Performance 
agreements for DGs are signed with their Ministers; however, these address their 
legislative mandates and may be inadequate in addressing cluster-related 
objectives. Second, the Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME) must enforce a set of standard key performance indicators for participation 
and involvement of Ministers and DGs for all clusters: 
If we could have something like a service-level agreement, something like that. 
Maybe it could work. And then two: just robust performance. The DGs as 
Heads of Departments, their performance agreements are inward looking. 
They are not putting focus on members of the public, integration, and so forth. 
(Participant 2: 465) 
Similarly, with DGs, their performance agreements says [sic], ‘You are the 
Police Head’. If we talking about non-attendance, DGs prioritise their own. 
They don’t get penalised for not doing the work of the cluster. (Participant 2: 
468) 
The third one is the lack of indicators that are talking directly to and 
encouraging collaboration and integration. We don’t have those. (Participant 
1: 186) 
 
Affinity 7: Planning 
Participants emphasised the need for an integrated planning approach, and a need 
for specific performance indicators on collaboration was mentioned as one of the 
possible solutions to address planning challenges.  
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Planning within the cluster is established and includes both five-year plans and a 
short-term one-year plan. The plans are finalised and approved in Cabinet and are 
monitored for implementation. This was seen as a positive development that has 
recently taken place: 
No. For me, I will differ from that. I’d say, Planning-–we do perfect planning. 
We do 100% perfect planning. Our plans are making sense. They are well 
coordinated. (Participant 11: 2679) 
If I look at the planning that the DPME [Department of Planning, Monitoring 
and Evaluation] unfolded for the MTSF [Medium Term Strategic Framework], 
I think if you look at it positively, they have started to advance. They looked at 
a 25-year review; they obtained information from the departments; they 
analysed it. They engaged with civil society, with business sector and other 
stakeholders. They did some analysis; they communicated. (Participant 9: 
2353) 
Two participants indicated that although there is a process of planning and that 
plans are being put together and finalised, these plans are often in compliance with 
administrative processes and do not reflect the necessary strategic thinking and 
determination to make an impact and address issues of crime: 
Planning is something that is strategically led. If people are involved in a 
planning process but they do not believe in the outcome because they don’t 
see the vision at all, it becomes a compliance process. It is like, ‘Okay we need 
to sit in workshops twice a year because we are driven by compliance ’. Our 
planning efforts are mainly driven not by changing the organisation but by 
complying … That is the first wrong thing we do in government. (Participant 3: 
668) 
No. We are not. And one of the key examples [of] this [is] when we were doing 
this APP five-year and one-year strategy. I said to all my chiefs, DDG and 
Chief Director, ‘You know what? I can see we are putting more effort trying to 
put these documents together – it's for compliance. None of those things that 
are there we are going to implement’. (Participant 5: 985)  
Five participants indicated that the five-year cluster plan is merely silo-based inputs 
submitted to departments and does not reflect how crime will be fought differently 
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to achieve results. The silo plan does not demonstrate collective efforts at 
addressing crime in general and specific problem areas in particular. For example, 
if trio crimes (car hijacking, home robberies and business robberies) are a priority, 
the plan does not necessarily show how the rest of the cluster will align with this 
priority for maximum impact: 
We spent most of the time implementing the Programme of Action, the MTSF, 
but we don’t have a platform for integrated planning. The cluster does not sit 
down, and has never sat down, for any integrated planning. So, then if that’s 
the case, it would mean that we become reactive. (Participant 2: 341) 
We are not saying, as a cluster, this is where we want to go. So in order for us 
to get there, what do we need to do? We need to come up with a plan that will 
get us there. (Participant 3: 669) 
So you see that that thing is not carried through downwards. So it’s not a 
cohesive approach. It is a cooperative approach. It is a sum of the pieces. It is 
not efforts that would exceed the sum of the pieces. It is like, ‘What are you 
going to do? Give us your inputs.’ Then we put them together. (Participant 3: 
674) 
We all still plan. All our plans are, for all intents and purposes, silos. But we 
bring them together into one document. I’ll give an example. With sexual 
offences courts, I have no idea why we are not planning together every 
year …. (Participant 6: 1411) 
Even in instances where a cluster planning process was initiated to address 
silo-based inputs, cluster departments tended to revert back to their silo 
approaches. One participant indicated that instead of providing inputs and support 
for the top priorities identified through the planning process, departments steered 
away from these plans. The decision taken by the National Treasury to prioritise 
funding for cluster plans ahead of departmental priorities drove departments to 
include their own priorities in the cluster plan:  
When we were working with this MTSF, the idea was to say we needed a 
bigger plan for the cluster. That was the whole understanding. That is why we 
were having meetings to have cluster inputs. But what happened? Every 
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department was pushing their own agendas, not wanting to input into the 
bigger plan. That is why when we were submitting the final MTSF to Cabinet, 
it was very chaotic from the JCPS Cluster. (Participant 8: 1978) 
It was a problem because after we had a report that we thought was a bigger 
cluster plan, departments aside would still send departmental inputs, which is 
problematic. The JCPS is a value chain. So when we talk of the cluster plan, 
it must talk to all the cluster departments and not to individual departments. 
And that is the problem that we don’t win on. (Participant 8: 1979) 
So they want to use the MTSF to source funds, which is very bad. But all we 
needed was a whole cluster plan and the agreement that these are cluster 
priorities. (Participant 8: 1980) 
Two participants mentioned that some of the targets in the cluster plan are easy 
and do not lead to the impact that the cluster should be aiming for. On the one 
hand, this was identified as lack of effort and determination from leadership to set 
targets that would make an impact. On the other hand, it was identified as 
Protocols and bureaucratic processes that make it difficult to implement plans:  
If you look at the previous MTSF, things that we targeted to achieve at the 
25-year review, we have moved. There was an impact in terms of what we’ve 
delivered in terms of plan as a cluster. But we had targeted less. (Participant 
11: 2691) 
Planning is not about sweetheart targets or indicators because you know 
you’re going to achieve them. It’s about fighting what needs to be fought. 
Whether you achieved it or not achieved it, you would give proper reasons as 
to why you have not achieved. And that green does even not say anything. It 
does not have impact in any way and doesn’t satisfy the community about 
anything you do. That is why we lose trust in institutions. (Participant 13: 3818) 
Areas of misalignment identified by participants included misalignment in the 
planning processes, resulting in delays and awkwardness while attempting to 
finalise documents. Due to these processes, departmental plans and cluster plans 
were ultimately misaligned. 
We are still awaiting the signed-off medium-term strategic framework. We 
don’t have that. I think the challenge is with the overlapping time frames … 
Now there needs to be proper alignment of plans to administrative terms. 
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Currently [January 2020], we still working on the plans for the new 
administration. (Participant 1: 184) 
If there can be a way of ensuring that what is prioritised at cluster level gets to 
be prioritised by departments because departments are allocating resources 
both human and financial for certain programmes based on their priorities 
within the department. (Participant 1: 185) 
If we don’t plan at that nitty-gritty level, if we still go back and do our own 
objectives for the year, apart from understanding the objectives of the NPA 
and seeing how objectives of SAPS will impact on the objectives of NPA. And 
the policies must be aligned, else you are definitely going to get what we call 
bottlenecks. (Participant 6: 1435) 
I think planning within the cluster is also problematic because planning and 
monitoring parts do not talk to each other. (Participant 8: 1971) 
One participant indicated that the lack of critical self-reflection of the cluster does 
not assist in addressing issues towards addressing crime. Instead, there is a drive 
to achieve targets and run a positive public-relations exercise rather than address 
blockages and challenges within the criminal justice system: 
The issue about us not even getting to where we are, not getting from a 
planning point of view, is that we are not critical. We are not critical and honest. 
We are absolutely not critical and honest about the things that happen. We all 
know that the conviction rate is what looks good there. It’s good statistics, but 
it doesn’t really tell you anything. You are talking about only cases that you 
took to court. (Participant 13: 3804) 
One participant indicated that a planning task team needs to be convened to 
generate proper well-thought-out plans through considering statistics, human 
capacities and capabilities, budget and other considerations. This task team would 
assist the President in making promises that are achievable and based on realities 
of the criminal justice system: 
As much as we hate task teams, for me, from a planning point of view, before 
even the President comes with all these nice things and whatever political 
statement they will be making from their manifestos and promises made to 
people. But maybe there should be an advisory body first of all that sits and 
advises the President. I know that the President has advisers, the political 
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ones. There must be technical advisers, implementation advisers of most, 
probably each and every cluster, and of the JCPS Cluster. So that when the 
President starts making statements, he makes statements on the basis of 
advice that is evidence based. (Participant 13: 3778) 
 
Affinity 8: Sharing Goals 
Participants indicated that there was no single view regarding the problem being 
addressed. Issues included the lack of shared values and vision, lack of common 
objectives and unclear mandates.  
Three participants indicated that the vision and broad high-level goals of the cluster 
are stipulated in South Africa’s National Development Plan of 2030 and the 
Integrated Criminal Justice Strategy that was completed in 2019: 
Yes, I think to a larger extent, the NDP is trying to give us a hymn book from 
which we should all be singing. But I think strides have been made within the 
criminal justice value chain with the development of the Integrated Criminal 
Justice Strategy. Everyone now is beginning to see him/herself in there, in the 
objectives and the pillars that have been identified. (Participant 1: 214) 
We have a shared vision; we have shared goals. They are said clearly for all 
departments. I can’t say we don’t have shared goals, and they are clearly on 
paper – indicated. But not shared culture, shared identify, cohesive identity. 
(Participant 6: 1578) 
I think Vision 2030 is the shared vision. It is the roadmap and direction and 
gives the indication that that is our vision for 2030. But how much we commit 
to operational it – that’s where the challenge is. (Participant 9: 2376) 
At the heart of the misalignment of goals lies the tension between the conflicting 
objectives of the JCPS Cluster entities. Participants generally felt that more work 
is needed to identify the goals that lead to better functioning of the criminal justice 
system: 
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It’s those conflicting things or whatever. But they are conflicting because 
Correctional Services says we are overcrowded. But on the other hand, the 
Police are arresting more people … Prosecutors, they make sure that they 
record high conviction rates. It is conflicting priorities … (Participant 2: 510) 
This tension also stems from members of the public. Members of the public 
say, ‘Don’t give people bail, keep them in jail’. The tension is not only within 
administrative function and stretches to external people who are our clients. 
(Participant 2: 513) 
It’s a problem. We need to come to a point where we talk of the whole value 
chain. We need to trace a case when it was opened until its finalisation. That’s 
when we will see whether we are winning or not. I think we are still lacking in 
this regard. (Participant 8: 2011) 
Most of the time when they talk about convictions, we ask, ‘These convictions, 
to which arrests are they talking to?’ Even the systems are failing to give us 
that kind of information. Until we can really work on that, we won’t know 
whether we are winning or not. (Participant 8: 2012) 
Let’s look at the Department of Social Development. We are looking at crime 
against women and children. If one side is advocating ‘report more’ and the 
other side wants to prevent, there’s a disjuncture. One is trying to prevent, to 
reduce the crime, whereas the other is trying to increase sensitivity and 
increase reporting ... The targets are working against each other. (Participant 
9: 2148) 
The NPA may want to have as many people as possible found guilty, with the 
heaviest sentences possible. Legal Aid SA would like people to not be found 
guilty and set free. At objective level, we will have divergent objectives. But 
when it comes to outcomes, we can work as a sector and identify the outcomes 
we would like to achieve. (Participant 12: 3271-2) 
Although goals are concluded and well understood by the top levels of the cluster, 
the same does not always apply at operational level. Three participants indicated 
that all key participants of the cluster are not adequately directed to implement 
these goals. For example, the police tend to spend limited resources arresting 
people for all crimes rather than prioritising their resources on identified crimes that 
would bring about the impact that is envisaged:  
I agree that sharing of goals is not done at an operational level. We don't share 
goals at operational level. They are there at the higher level and the Executive. 
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For example, Ministers go to Cabinet Lekgotla ... Come to operational level, 
police arrest; people get remanded before sentencing. They are remanded at 
Correctional Services for a long time – for years. (Participant 11: 2722) 
Can you imagine the graph? Arrests are high. Number of prosecutions drops 
drastically. Why does it drop drastically? They [the SAPS] arrested 
prematurely for numbers. What is it that we are trying to do? (Participant 11: 
2726) 
The reality of the situation is that if you go at court level, you as the magistrate 
or prosecutor, about the seven-point plan, they don’t know. If you ask the 
police officer, he doesn’t. (Participant 12: 3287) 
One participant indicated that it is in times of crisis that the cluster establishes 
common goals towards addressing the issue. These included attacks against 
foreign nationals, campaigns such as #FeesMustFall by university students and 
major projects such as the FIFA World Cup soccer tournament. 
So what then happens is that you only see people coming together to deal with 
a specific goal or to work towards a specific goal if it [were] triggered by a 
crisis. For instance, this thing of attacks on foreign nationals, the tension 
between local and foreign-owned shops in the townships, the so-called 
xenophobic attacks and so on. Once there’s a crisis, you see people coming 
together to come up with Operation this and Operation that. (Participant 3: 
689) 
A major area of misalignment within the cluster is regarding the way in which the 
prevention of social crime is being addressed. The study by Holtmann (2008) 
showed the critical importance of social services to break the cycle of criminality 
within the communities. However, there is overemphasis on crime combating and 
ICT objectives, and underemphasis on social crime prevention, as was mentioned 
by two participants: 
Crime is always in focus and on the frontline, so there’s no running away from 
SAPS. But crime comes in after. How is the Department of Education involved 
in this process? Are they part of the cluster? No. But crime starts with the 
grooming of a child, a teenager, or at higher education. That is not featuring in 
the cluster. We need to look at a bigger picture. We need to look at a 30-year 
plan. (Participant 9: 2140) 
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It’s the culture within JCPS cluster. The current culture is to essentialise IT 
above any other. So the current culture, the 65%, essentialises ICT above 
social crime prevention. Social crime prevention is sitting with its back on the 
wall. It doesn’t even have anything near what departments are getting for ICT. 
(Participant 6: 1745) 
The Ministers are political appointees and become Executive Authorities of 
Departments for a period of five years. Although DGs themselves have five-year 
contracts, they work within administration towards achieving long-term objectives. 
Objectives often differ and are part of the possible reasons for the high turnover of 
Directors-General: 
The issue of political versus administrative goals – the commitments in the 
leaders. Political interference I think is problematic. I think the Executive 
(Ministers), they don’t want to respect administration. I don’t know the correct 
word, but there is always a conflict between our political leaders and 
administrative leaders. Our administrative leadership – the political leadership 
is their masters. (Participant 8: 2018) 
Not long within the cluster, there was that cry saying there is no commitment 
and we need leadership to be committed. The leaders were saying in their 
defence that other issues are out of their control because of political 
instructions. They say, ‘We cannot fully commit because we are being 
controlled by the Executives. You plan to have a meeting and the political 
leadership says but we want you in Cape Town’. That is why it looks like they 
are not committed. (Participant 8: 1936) 
 
6.2.3 Relationships between Affinities 
6.2.4 Affinity Relationship Table 
The eight affinities that were identified during the focus group have 56 possible 
relationships between them (i.e. 28 in one direction [7+6+5+4+3+2+1] and an 
additional 28 in the other direction). For example, in one direction, Affinity 1 would 
have a possible relationship with seven others, and Affinity 2 would have a 
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relationship with six others. All the votes for the 56 relationships were counted 
using Microsoft Excel. 
To determine which of the 56 relationships would be useful in explaining the JCPS 
intragovernmental collaborations, the researcher used the Pareto Principle as 
described in Northcutt and McCoy (2004). This step determines the optimal 
number of relationships that best explains the variation within the system. 
In the first step, the relationships were arranged in order of frequency with the 
highest relationship frequencies at the top. For example, Leadership  Execution, 
Leadership  Planning, and Leadership  Sharing Goals all scored 10, which 
means that all 13 participants denoted these relationships. The last five 
relationships did not receive any votes, as detailed in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2: Affinity pairs and Pareto calculations  
 
Cumulative frequency values were then calculated for all 56 relationships. These 
cumulative frequencies were shown as a percentage of the 56 relationships (see 
Column F). 
Given that there are 56 relationships in the eight-affinity system, each of the 
relationships represent on average, 1/56 or 1.8% of the total. The cumulative 
percentage (Column E) was computed for each relationship.  
The power of a relationship was calculated as the difference between the 
cumulative percentage based on frequency and the cumulative percentage based 
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on the number of relationships. The optimum figure meant that the cumulative 
frequency (Column F) needed to be maximised while the cumulative relations 
(Column E) was minimised. The Maximum Value of Power was found to be 30.9, 
and this was reached at the 28th relationship.  
The analysis revealed that 28 relationships were key in explaining the JCPS 
collaboration, using the 80-20 principle. This means that at the 80% cumulative 
percentage level, 28 relationships that explained interrelations were identified. 
6.2.5 Interrelationship Diagram 
The theoretical coding aspect continued with the development of the IRD, which 
entailed classifying affinities according to the extent to which they were drivers or 
outcomes within the JCPS collaboration.  
The 28 relationships identified following the Pareto step were tabulated on the 
interrelationship diagram (Table 8.3). Each relationship was shown twice on the 
table using arrows that pointed up and left. For example, if Affinity 2 influenced 
Affinity 1, then two arrows, one facing up and the other facing left, would be shown 
as illustrated in Table 6.3. Arrows facing up were tabulated under ‘out’ and those 
facing left were tabulated under ‘in’. The difference between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ (delta) 






Table 6.3 Interrelationship diagram for the focus group 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Out In ∆ 
1   ← ← ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 3 4 -1 
2 ↑   ↑ ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 5 2 3 
3 ↑ ←   ← ← ↑ ← ↑ 3 4 -1 
4 ↑ ↑ ↑   ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 6 1 5 
5 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑   ↑ ↑ ↑ 7 0 7 
6 ← ← ← ← ←   ← ← 0 7 -7 
7 ← ← ↑ ← ← ↑   ← 2 5 -3 
8 ← ← ← ← ← ↑ ↑   2 5 -3 
 
6.2.6 Affinities as drivers and outcomes 
The IRD was then arranged in order from the highest delta to the lowest to assist 
with easy classification of the eight affinities, as shown in Table 6.4.  
Table 6.4 Interrelationship diagram arranged in decreasing delta values 
  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Out In ∆ Affinity Identification 
5 ↑  ↑ ↑ ↑   ↑ ↑ ↑ 7 0 7 Leadership Primary Driver 
4 ↑  ↑ ↑   ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 6 1 5 Culture Secondary Driver 
2 ↑    ↑ ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 5 2 3 Protocols Secondary Driver 
1   
 















← ← ← ← ↑ ↑   2 5 -3 Sharing goals 
Secondary 
Outcome 
6 ←  ← ← ← ←   ← ← 0 7 -7 Execution Primary Outcome 
 
A primary driver is an affinity that has substantial influence on the phenomenon 
under discussion (Northcutt and McCoy, 2004). In the context of the current 
research, a primary driver represents an affinity that has the most influence on the 
success or failure of intragovernmental collaboration. On the IRD, a primary driver 
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has all ‘out’ arrows and no ‘in’ arrows, which means that it influences other affinities 
without being affected in return.  
A secondary driver is an affinity with more ‘ins’ than ‘outs’, which means that the 
affinity influences others but is also influenced by others. A secondary driver has 
relatively more affinities that it influences than affinities that influence it (positive 
deltas). A secondary driver has a causal relationship with the phenomenon being 
studied. 
A secondary outcome is an affinity with more ‘outs’ than ‘ins’, which means that 
the affinity influences others but has more affinities that influence it (negative 
deltas).  
A primary driver is an affinity with no ‘outs’, which means it does not influence any 
affinities but is entirely influenced by others. A primary outcome represents the 
effects or results of the phenomenon.  
6.2.7 The Cluttered Systems Influence Diagram 
The eight affinities and the 28 relationships are represented in the Cluttered SID 




Figure 6.3 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram for Senior Managers 
 
Detailed descriptions of the interrelationships given by the Senior Managers are 
shown in Annexure E. 
6.2.8 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram 
The Uncluttered SID was simplified by taking out any paths that were redundant 
using the process described in Section 5.3.4.5. For example, in Figure 6.3, the 
path Protocols → Execution was removed because the path Protocols → Sharing 
Goals → Planning → Execution already existed. 





Figure 6.4 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram for the focus group 
 
The Uncluttered SID was subsequently rearranged to display a simplified diagram 
(Figure 6.5). 
 
Figure 6.5 Simplified Systems Influence Diagram for the focus group 
 
6.2.9 Individual Senior Manager interrelationships between affinities 
In line with the constructivist approach that recognises multiple realities and an 
epistemological stance of generation of knowledge through these multiple realities, 
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it is imperative to present results at an individual level to capture the multiple 
realities. This means inclusion of a discussion on individual variances together with 
the discussion on the composite results. The ten participants who took part in the 
focus group and the additional three participants who only took part in the 
interviews had individual SIDs constructed.  
Eight of the 13 Senior Managers indicated Leadership as a primary driver of the 
JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. This was followed by Culture, which was 
indicated by three participants. Other primary drivers designated by participants 
were Protocols and Silos. 
Regarding outcomes, a similar pattern was observed. Eight of the 13 participants 
indicated Execution as a primary outcome, and this was followed by Silos and 
Sharing Goals. 
It should be noted that some of the participants did not indicate a primary driver or 
a primary outcome. In these situations, the driver with the highest delta and the 
outcome with the lowest delta were designated primary. This allowed for the 
simplified summary shown in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5 Primary drivers and primary outcomes for individual Senior Managers 
Participant Primary Driver Primary Outcome 
2 Leadership Execution 
3 Leadership Execution 
12 Leadership Execution 
13 Leadership Execution 
7 Leadership Execution 
8 Leadership Execution 
4 Leadership Sharing goals 
10 Leadership Silos 
11 Culture Silos 
6 Culture Execution 
9 Culture Execution 
1 Protocols Silos 
5 Silos Sharing goals 
 
System Influence Diagrams for each Senior Manager, shown in Annexure G, 
provide a more detailed report and a pictorial view of the individual SIDs. 
 
6.3 TOP MANAGERS 
Top Managers have been identified as a different constituency from Senior 
Managers and, therefore, their descriptions and IRDs are discussed separately for 
comparison and contrast.  
6.3.1 In-depth description of Affinities 
This section represents the voice of the participants and in line with the 
constructivist approach, represents the multiple realities and explanations of the 
participants’ experiences. Five Top Managers from five different entities and 
departments participated.  
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Most participants were English-second-language speakers and, therefore, minor 
grammatical errors were corrected in the transcript and filler words such as ‘uhm’ 
were removed for clarity. Some words may not have been part of the quotation but 
were included for clarity (e.g. substituting the word ‘his’ for [Director-General] 
where necessary). Such words appear in square brackets. 
Quotations are shown per participant and are cross-referenced to the paragraph 
on the composite interview transcript. 
Affinity 1: Silos 
One participant provided a historical context on the JCPS Cluster and emphasised 
that the formation of the cluster was to address the issue of silos within the criminal 
justice system and government in general and indicated that it has been an 
on-going challenge ever since:  
The silo system has always been difficult, and I do think that perhaps when 
Cabinet in the early 1990s took a decision to set up the commission that would 
enquire as to how we could bring about coherence, which commission came 
up with the proposal of clusters. It was specifically tried to address this problem 
of working in silos. (Participant 16: 788) 
Silos were not only found in the cluster but also within the departments and entities 
themselves. Units expected to work closely together for the achievement of 
organisational goals are often found not to be working close enough. Furthermore, 
silos were found to be government wide and interclusteral. For example, work done 
through the Economic Cluster has a major influence on the work of the Security 
Cluster (JCPS): 
Within the **** itself, very big silos. Always have been, and I don't think they're 
getting any better. … I definitely find that people stick to their unit and their 
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group and defend that group’s stance against the other groups, even though 
it is wrong. Even when it’s clearly wrong and everybody can see it that it’s not 
right. (Participant 18: 1410) 
Once you start touching on someone else’s turf, then they get very defensive 
and there’s not really a willingness to work together or to take one step towards 
the next person. So, we’re extremely defensive about what’s wrong. 
(Participant 18: 1409) 
I want to say that the five clusters of government actually work in silos and that 
is a bigger danger because we need, in actual fact, [a] collaborative approach 
between the various clusters, and we need bigger coordination between the 
various activities of the clusters ... The causes of crime have a social 
dimension. It’s not JCPS. And if the Social Cluster don’t come to the fore and 
assist the JCPS Cluster with dealing with the causes of crime, we can’t 
succeed. (Participant 17: 1123) 
Another participant recommended that in addition to the formal JCPS Cluster, a 
matrix structure of collaboration needs to be introduced. This means more 
formalised interactions with clear lines of responsibilities and accountability:  
I think for me, the silos are generated from the perspective that we work within 
our departmental organisational structure. But we are big organisations and if 
we need [to] migrate to matrix to enhance the work of the cluster … as 
branches, we must have that matrix way of working through you are 
communicating with another Chief Director …. If a person is a Deputy Director 
and you are a Deputy Director in another department, according to me, you 
have to work collaboratively because also, we have got one common goal. 
(Participant 14: 12) 
 
Affinity 2: Protocols2 
The general sentiment is that a certain level of bureaucracy is needed to run the 
cluster. The participants emphasised the need for documents to serve at 
 
2 The Affinity Red Tape was renamed Protocols after interviews were conducted. 
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DevComm, Cluster DGs and Cluster Ministers en route to Cabinet. For example, 
one participant stated: 
I think it is a bureaucratic process, but I think it is a process that is necessary 
because it serves as a very important consultative forum because you have 
people from all the relevant departments in the criminal justice system sitting 
at that forum and very often, we get good suggestions. And very often, we get 
a sense of what the representatives of the Ministers express about different 
proposals we’re taking (Participant 15: 627) 
Top Managers expressed that the delays in the perceived lengthy process 
regarding approvals originate in two areas. The first issue lies in the quality of 
documents that serve at the different fora and require iterations of corrections. The 
second issue is the lengthy processes of approval that take place outside the 
cluster. The example protocols that allow changes in processes within court 
processes need to be signed by the individual DGs within their departments: 
For me, if you look at them, these structures are not many. They are only four. 
The biggest problem, if people are not informed about the quality of the 
documents that have to go and sit in that structure ... I’ve read some of the 
documents. I would say, ‘Wow, this is not even supposed to come here. It 
needs to be edited, even the facts, everything that has been written.’ 
(Participant 14: 40–41) 
There was an admission that there is room for improvement in the way that the 
subcommittees of the JCPS Cluster are structured and interact with each other. 
The rationalisation deals with agenda items and how they feed into the main 
structures of the cluster: 
I think there is a challenge with the coordinating structures. For example, you 
come to the JCPS DG Forum and then NATJOINTS would present a report, 
but the report doesn’t take into consideration what happens in the other 
committees. So, the law enforcement one is very much a purely police type of 
report … So, it’s not necessarily bureaucracy, etc., but it’s a redefining of what 
the structure should be doing and making sure that they have proper terms of 
reference that will promote alignment and coordination and given a bigger 
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picture in terms of the criminal justice system and the JCPS Cluster. 
(Participant 17: 1155–1156) 
You find that one of the challenges that we have, for example, is that how 
activities needed to be prefaced by proper intelligence, and there’s a big gap 
at the moment. So, I wouldn’t want to call it necessarily red tape, but there’s a 
lack of governance and those types of activities are for me the bigger 
challenge. I don’t think there are too many meetings necessarily, but what is a 
challenge is that you will have the same type of activities being dealt with in 
different meetings where the same people go and that creates a problem. 
(Participant 17: 1158) 
In relation to governance, a major area of neglect seems to be with the interface 
between national departments and local government, as illustrated: 
So, we need greater cooperation, coordination between national and 
provincial and local levels. For example, the JCPS DGs, etc. is a national 
structure. They don’t have a similar structure at a provincial level and that’s a 
big gap, and we’re now looking at how do we then deal with that because now 
the Premiers are starting to have their own committees, etc. (Participant 17: 
1160) 
So you will find, for example, that the Civilian Secretariat of the Police, which 
drives crime prevention in terms of white paper of policing and safety and 
security, they propagate that we must have community safety forums in 
various provinces, but the community safety forum falls under the 
municipalities. And the municipalities just say, ‘Sorry, we hear what you say; 
we see the need for it, but we don’t have budget for it.’ (Participant 17: 1128) 
 
Affinity 3: Resources 
The issue of skewed resource allocation in favour of frontline departments, 
particularly the SAPS, was raised. In addition, there has been a general 
competition for resources since departments individually have to motivate for 
additional resources at the National Treasury. 
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Although it was generally admitted that there is a need for visible policing and 
well-staffed police stations, other entities on the value chain do not receive an 
equitable share to ensure a balanced flow of cases: 
I think the frontline criminal justice departments generally get a huge share of 
the budget …. By frontline, I mean SAPS and Defence, most particularly 
SAPS. I mean as crime increases, we want to have more police. We want to 
see more police, but I think the understanding of how the Courts would deal 
with this increasing number of cases is not always taken into consideration. 
(Participant 15: 634) 
Yeah, the problem is, especially within our cluster, everything is a priority. The 
one can’t work without the other one. So yes, we are competing for very scarce 
resources. But I do think National Treasury does play a very important role 
and to make sure that the resources are fairly allocated in terms of a budget 
perspective. (Participant 18: 1430) 
There were attempts to present a holistic picture when motivating for increased 
budget at the National Treasury. But the efforts were not always sustained and 
successful: 
National Treasury said, ‘Why don't you as a DGs [sic] come out with a joint 
bid?’ Now, that's a brilliant idea. Do you know what it means? It means you all 
come together, you see. These are the things that we’re focusing on as a 
cluster. We’ll reduce corruption for start. Violent and serious crimes, right? 
Deal with gender-based violence, for example … So, it's a joint bid. We have 
all agreed this thing, and then you submit. That’s what was suggested. Even 
last year I think it was, they tried that ….This thing has not become entrenched; 
it has not become a culture of entertaining joint bids, especially on those very 
strategic matters. (Participant 16: 868–869) 
I think in terms of resources, there’s a lack of general resources across the 
whole of government. But the JCPS Cluster started to deal with that, and it has 
started to look at things in an alignment process where you have to look at 
how do you share resources, how do you make sure that there’s an integrated 
approach in dealing with it. And that slowly but surely, we’re starting to move 
towards an integrated resource and human resource as well as [a] financial 
resource planning process. (Participant 17: 1164) 
One participant was sceptical and believed that competition for resources is 
inevitable and will always be there. The participant also acknowledged the role that 
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the National Treasury plays in taking the final decision regarding budget based on 
the individual proposals of departments: 
Government does not have money, so the budget for the whole criminal justice 
system value chain is reducing …. There’s no department that can say, ‘I’m 
prepared to cut’. Hence, we force National Treasury [to] tell us that they are 
going to cut even if we can have those discussions as a cluster. So, some of 
the things, the competition of the limited resources like money, it will always 
be there. (Participant 14: 95) 
The integration of IT systems was seen as a vehicle that would enable the cluster 
to monitor the criminal justice system throughout the value chain. Although there 
have been recent developments and improvements, progress remains slower than 
anticipated. The views of Top Managers on IT integration were as follows: 
That’s a recommendation from the cluster’s side, on the IJS Board 
activities. So that one can look at the billions of rand that have been 
invested – what is the value that has been added to it and is it in line with 
what is needed now for the current fight against crime and what is the use 
of technology? So, there is that challenge. (Participant 17: 1190) 
When it comes to IJS, as a cluster budget, they allocate money but the 
delivery of services, the achievement that is really integration, it’s moving 
very slow. (Participant 14: 77) 
It’s also a question of police want to have most probably about 50 or 60 
different projects in terms of IT, where they want cameras for each of their 
police stations and for each building, etc. … So, competition between 
departments is there. We’re moving slowly towards greater integration. 
(Participant 17: 1170)  
 
Affinity 4: Culture 
One participant indicated that there is no uniform cluster culture and that 
individuals reflect the organisational culture from where they emanate. However, 
there was acknowledgement of the effect of departmental cultures that are 
underpinned by issues relating to public-servant mentality: 
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I don't know if we've got a shared culture. Let's start with that. I don't know if 
you can say there is one JCPS culture. There definitely is a SAPS culture, a 
very strong one. There's a SAPS, NPA, strong NPA one, a strong Judiciary 
one, and there’s a strong DOJ culture. But I don’t know that there is a cluster 
culture. I haven’t personally experienced that we have a joint culture. 
(Participant 18: 1444–1445) 
Within different cluster organisations, pockets of commitment have been 
recognised. These are people who work under challenging environments and 
consistently present their best efforts: 
Look, I do think that the pockets of the commitment and passion are not 
confined only [to] the JCPS; it’s just in the public sector in general … Yes, 
there are people who are committed. You know, there’s a lady that works at 
****. I can tell you about ****; he’s an ideal public servant. Even as he’s sick, 
he doesn’t miss meetings. So, it’s those kinds of people. Even in the Police, 
there are lots. You know, there are people when I call, they will return my call 
if they can’t take my call. (Participant 16: 873) 
Although there are pockets of excellence, participants admitted that there are 
pervasive negative behaviours in many areas within the public service that 
demonstrate the undesirable public-service mentality. These include lack of 
decisive action where it is needed and lack of accountability: 
Do you know what the problem is? We introduce a particular culture of being 
considerate. They say, if I take this kind of action against this person, it's not 
only he or she who’s affected. There are the children, the entire family. So, we 
become empathetic. (Participant 16: 900-901) 
So, you will find that you have to do a country report for example, with input 
from all the various departments, etc., but one department or sub-department 
will just not assist and that I think is a challenge because as a result of lack of 
accountability and consequence management, then the report suffers at the 
end of the day. (Participant 17: 1195) 
Lack of accountability and decisiveness at certain times lead to situations 
deteriorating, which in turn, lead to the need for task teams to address such 
management failures. One participant felt that the use of task teams was not 
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negative and should be one of the instruments used to bring about change and 
improvement. The participant’s description is as follows:  
There was a newspaper article about a situation on one of [the] facilities. But 
through the cluster visit, we started to implement strategies to address the 
situation. We went there with the local team. There was NPA from Head Office; 
there was Court Administration from Head Office; there was Legal Aid and 
then there was NPA local; there was court administration local; there was 
Legal Aid local. We’re moving around there closing our noses! And the next 
time we visited, the place was breathing; the place was clean; there was a lot 
of improvement. (Participant 14: 119-124) 
Another behaviour that was identified within the cluster is the perceived 
gatekeeping that has developed through the years. People who have been 
participating in the cluster tended not to accept or allow other people to participate. 
This situation resulted in complacency and the lack of new thinking and 
approaches to address problems. 
I think people have forgotten that the JCPS is a committee that was intended 
to improve coordination. But, I actually find that key people have stayed in all 
the committees for many years to the extent that their culture has become 
institutionalised in a committee. And a committee for me shouldn’t become like 
an embedded department. You’ve got to see different people getting 
nominated for the cluster. (Participant 15: 636) 
If you want to clean out the culture that is impeding the work, right, and I think 
the culture is impeding the work because you have gatekeepers within the 
cluster; you have people who have silo mentalities, and it has become 
embedded within the culture of the committee. And if you want to change it, 
you have got to change the representation on the committee. You’ve got to 
bring in new people. You've got to bring in fresh ideas. (Participant 15: 637) 
I was sitting in another meeting that I got invited to. I won’t tell you which one 
it is, but it’s a similar – a structure similar to the cluster. And I think it actually 
came out of the cluster. And you can just see the gatekeepers there. And 
people. The new person going there, they look at you. What are you doing 
there? Do you have an invitation? Do you have a ‘clearance’ to be here? It’s 
all these kinds of things. I think we need to clean the whole thing out. We need 
to take out the gatekeepers. We need to reconnect with the purpose of what 
the clusters were intended to do. (Participant 15: 780) 
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Finally, there is a perceived overemphasis on the integration of information 
systems and this, therefore, means constant and dominating conversations around 
IT, which tends to alienate some participants: 
And also, you know, I find that coming out of the cluster, I’m not against IT 
people, but that IT language and those diagrams …! (Participant 15: 780) 
 
Affinity 5: Leadership 
The leadership discussion was dominated by poor attendance, lack of 
consequence management and absence of visionary leadership where it is 
supposedly desperately needed: 
But also, I think the whole issue of leadership is a kind of reflection of what has 
been happening in the JCPS Cluster …. It has failed because of poor 
leadership, and we are simply not doing anything. I mean, can we say that the 
criminal justice system in our country is working sufficiently? It’s not because 
I think it is at its lowest point right now. And so, I think it has a lot to do with 
leadership. (Participant 15: 642) 
We would try to name and shame even in Cabinet. That’s what I used to say. 
They say, ‘This target was not achieved, in quarter one.’ They say it was not 
achieved. They give their reason, and they told us what they were going to do. 
Now, [it] is still not achieved. The reason that they give is the same as the one 
that they gave …. But you see, because of lack of accountability and what they 
call consequence management … I think it's something that you need to focus 
on. (Participant 16: 925–931) 
Secondly, you also find that in many instances, the meetings are not attended 
by the Directors-General but by representatives of them and that then has a 
further impact in terms of leadership, vision and continuity. And if you have 
that sort of challenge, then obviously, it impacts on the accountability of a 
cluster. (Participant 17: 1101) 
Now, if the DG’s cluster is not working well, then the subcommittees and task 
teams which fall under it, are also impacted on because they take their lead 
from the DGs, etc. So, you will find the same is happening at subcommittees, 
like, for example, NATJOINT and the Development Committee where you 
don’t have senior representatives. DGs don’t attend it. DDGs don’t attend it. 
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You have at the most, perhaps Chief Directors or Directors and sometimes, 
even below that attend. (Participant 17: 1102) 
Top leaders within law enforcement agencies became entangled in corruption, as 
has been extensively reported in the media. This has had a major impact on the 
work of the cluster and has affected crime-fighting activities throughout 
organisations: 
And that has an impact in terms of having a proper accountability in terms of 
dealing with the government-wide priorities and the implementation of priority 
programmes of action. It also makes consultation difficult in terms of that. So, 
leadership is a big thing. We’ve had in the past, I think, a lack of leadership in 
the criminal justice system because of, to some extent, State Capture, where 
you’ve had a lack of responsibility from the NPA’s side, from the DPCI ... 
(Participant 17: 1103) 
But in a lot of our places, and *** was one of them, our leaders were fingered 
in the report of the State of Capture. There are various people that had to 
address State Capture. We now hear Magistrates; we knew of Judges; we 
know the NPA; we know the Masters are currently under a huge investigation. 
(Participant 18: 1457) 
Besides issues of lack of accountability, there was an indication that leaders within 
the cluster struggle to transcend the issue of silos. Even in meetings where joint 
issues are discussed, participants generally do not hold each other to account and 
do not question the reports that are submitted. This is shown to apply not only to 
Top Managers within the meeting but often, also to the Senior Managers who are 
attending: 
For us to do it, you’ve got to get people that can see. They have vision and do 
not want to just protect their own but have a common goal. And we've got this 
MTSF, but really, it's still very much the SAPS say what they want in there and 
that's it. The NPA says what they want in there and nobody challenges it. The 
Presidency is not pulling us together the way they should, with all due respect, 
to force us to have integrated things. (Participant 18: 1461) 
What happens is those people are arrested. The report must say that x number 
are now in Court, x number we found that the case had no merit and, therefore, 
they've been released, right? NPA must be able to say yes, either x number 
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has pleaded guilty; this is the sentence. That's a complete report. But all we 
get is the arrests. And I say the arrests in themselves are not a success. It's a 
step towards success. And I kept on pleading, ‘We want a report that has more 
information than what the Police are giving’. And you know, because of the 
silo thing, they would never go to find missing info. (Participant 16: 922) 
One participant expressed views regarding the challenge of having the leader of 
the cluster being at the same level as other members of the committee. On the one 
hand, the participant indicated that DGs should be able to submit to the leadership 
that has been chosen, be it political or otherwise, irrespective of the similarity of 
levels. On the other hand, the participant accepts that it requires a certain type of 
leadership to lead heads of organisations:  
And this thing that a person must be above your level for you to be able to 
respect that person, also it becomes a big problem. Can’t you work as 
colleagues? And you have a chair amongst yourselves because that requires 
commitment. We need to revisit this thinking that a person that is a chair must 
be a person that is of higher authority than me. The DGs must be able to have 
someone that is a chair amongst them. There’s nothing wrong because that, 
that – a position of being a chair, it rotates. (Participant 14: 216) 
This is very difficult because for me, leadership in the cluster is not easy 
because you are leading people that are coming from different departments. 
So as you lead them, it becomes difficult to stand your authority with regard to 
anything. Yes, even if you are providing an effective leadership. But it becomes 
difficult to implement a disciplinary action, to enforce even the disciplinary 
measures for the lack of cooperation for some of the things, and for me, it’s 
one area of the leadership that is key. (Participant 14: 197) 
Views were expressed by three participants on the Chairperson of the DG being 
from the department with the strongest political executive. Instances where the 
strongest political executive was not from the core criminal justice departments of 
the SAPS, the DOJCD or Correctional Services were cited as a problem: 
I think it's a good rule to have where they say that the most senior Minister will 
be the Chair of the cluster. And so, necessarily, the DG of that most senior 
Minister becomes the cluster Chair. So, I think from that perspective, it's a 
good system to have because you have leadership at the highest level and 
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you would expect that people will follow. But I'd been to a couple of meetings 
where there's been an acting Chair. So, and I think that is not good because I 
think cluster meetings are very important. It happens once a month and it must 
be chaired by the Chairperson. I think it must be prioritised. (Participant 15: 
641) 
I think if we look at leadership at the moment, the cluster is led by Defence. 
And as a result of that, there’s a bit of a disjointment in terms of relevance of 
that leadership to the criminal justice system in particular. There’s an overall 
greater focus on security of a country and the borders and things like that than 
there is on the rest of the activities that’s required. But I just say that as an 
aside. It does not mean that the cluster is not functioning and that there’s no 
leadership from Defence side. (Participant 17: 1100) 
Defence requested DOJCD to chair DevCom (Development Committee), 
though [Defence] is the cluster chair because they realised that they are not 
content specialist. To chair something that you are not a content specialist on 
becomes difficult. Then how do you make a decision of the area [that] is not 
yours? Hence, they have requested to Justice to chair. (Participant 14: 221) 
Participants recommended a type of leader that would be appropriate for the 
cluster given the challenges of crime in South Africa and the socio-economic 
issues associated with it. Descriptions included vibrancy, ethics, diplomacy and 
the ability to coordinate and unite the cluster: 
You need vibrant leadership. You need energetic leadership. You need people 
who are respected, people who are from high ethical standing. And because 
it’s a coordinating structure, that person must be able to pull people together. 
And you pull people together by showing that each one has a contribution to 
make and at the same time that the contribution is valued and ideas are shared 
openly. (Participant 15: 644) 
If you’re a leader, you need to define what leadership style you are really 
utilising. Because if you are using those autocratic ones, it won’t work because 
participants don’t report to you. So you really need to be very transformational 
because we must move from the traditional way of functioning to this matrix 
where you’re functioning. So, the transformational type of leadership, for me, 
is very critical. (Participant 14: 198) 
You need also to do it diplomatically. Diplomacy as well is very much 
important. So, for me, I think it makes – it’s not easy to really provide 
leadership. Because also, you are a leader even if you are a chair. You are a 
chair of DGs and these DGs themselves are leaders. So how do you lead 
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them? They must also have belief in you. If they don’t believe in you, it 
becomes a big problem. (Participant 14: 204) 
 
Affinity 6: Execution 
Execution of JCPS Cluster responsibilities takes place within governmental 
departments and entities. This, therefore, means budgets. Even funds ring-fenced 
for specific programmes such as the IJS are spent within entities, guided by 
legislation and approved by Accounting Officers (DGs). The cluster is responsible 
for the coordination and overseeing of this work, and individual departments are 
expected to deliver their part of the target. Two participants captured this role as 
follows: 
For me, the execution is supposed to be done at departmental level and as 
long as the strategic document is clear, which is a guiding document. 
(Participant 14: 161) 
So, where you start having your own cluster targets, then you become a 
structure for your own sake. And that means you’re not performing that 
function of the collaboration and the alignment. (Participant 15: 663) 
The cluster must ensure that the work gets done. That is why it is so important 
for DGs to get it written on their performance agreements so that the DGs sit 
at the meetings to ensure alignment. You need the highest-level leadership 
there to hold them to account to the alignment that is supposed to be taking. 
(Participant 15: 669) 
For instance, if we say that we want to fight corruption and Justice doesn’t do 
that legislation, they impede the Police in their investigations. The cluster must 
be the one to say, ‘You Justice, you are impeding the work of SAPS. Give us 
a timeframe by when you're going to complete it’. And then our DG must go 
there and say, ‘By this date, I'm going to this, that and the other’. And then he 
starts reporting, ‘By that date, I didn't do this, and this is why I haven't done it 
yet’. (Participant 15: 670) 
Concerns were raised with targets that are believed to be unachievable but are 
presented nonetheless. These targets do not consider issues relating to skills and 
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the capacity to implement. And importantly, the targets are not often discussed or 
agreed upon between the people who sit at the cluster and those who will be 
tasked with the implementation: 
So our plans might be nice, and if we’re not going to be able to execute, the 
plans are useless; they mean nothing. But I also think again, the plans are 
sometimes too ambitious. And then it’s impossible to deliver. And we set 
people up for failure, so they just say, ‘Agh, you know what? Never going to 
make it in any case, so I’m not going to even try’. That goes back to the culture. 
(Participant 18: 1473) 
But the real problem for me is a skill. And you need skill to be able to execute. 
And we've had an exodus of skill in all our areas. We haven't had an effective 
transfer of skill programmes in any part, anywhere in government. If you look 
at the quality of Police investigations, you look at the quality of prosecutions; 
you look at the quality of a lot of our work; you compare to what people were 
doing, it’s scary. (Participant 18: 1470) 
So, inasmuch as you can participate in those plans, still you need an 
endorsement at the departmental level because also, when it comes to 
implementation, it’s driven whether there is budget for that. And also, 
overcommitting your department without resources, it’s a big problem. Those 
are the things that have happened previously where there will be over 
commitment and then there is no delivery. The functional units will be saying, 
‘Who committed us on this because we don’t have resources to deliver on 
this?’ (Participant 14: 264) 
Another participant raised a conflicting view regarding targets and indicated that 
cluster departments tend to set easy targets that do not advance the work of the 
cluster.  
Now, the problem with departments is that they don't want to be seen to have 
underachieved. Now, what they then do is to set themselves lower targets that 
is that they're easy to achieve. What is the impact? They had lots of greens, 
what is the impact? In fact, the number [of] people who feel unsafe has gone 
up. A number of crimes, I mean the murders have even gone up since around 
2013 because we’re now at about 22 000. And they had come down during 
Selebi’s era to about 15 000, just under 16 000. And they started going up. 
Consistently, they’ve been going up – the murder, including attempted 
murders. (Participant 16: 940–946) 
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We say to them, drugs are one of the drivers of crime. You know what they 
do? They set themselves target of confiscation of drugs. It’s an easy target to 
achieve. You know it that Nigerians are some of the major drug kingpins here. 
Now, just think when last you saw a major Nigerian drug lord standing trial – 
that’s because the syndicates are never touched. And those people who run 
this – they're our neighbours. Some of them are here – in gated communities. 
(Participant 16: 948) 
Within government departments in South Africa, Strategic Management units 
conduct support functions and are responsible for coordinating strategic and 
operational planning and monitoring the implementation thereof. A disconnection 
was identified between the role of Strategy Units and core functions where, for 
example, the key performance indicators and targets are often being finalised 
without the concurrence of both areas. These issues illustrate internal coordination 
issues that extend into the cluster:  
Now, some of them even query some of the actions that have been identified 
in a joint plan because departmental, they weren’t involved with it. Do you 
understand? That is why when we as DPME, we used to call these meetings. 
I used to say, we want people who are in strategic planning, people who are 
in budgeting; we want people in M and E – those are the critical people. And 
we would say to them because some of them are Deputy Directors, ‘Deputy 
Director’ – occasionally Chief Director – ‘When you make this input, please 
make sure they go right up to the DG level. So, by the time [we] meet, we can 
say our department commits to this’. (Participant 16: 971) 
At times also, within the cluster because there are so many structures, some 
of the coordinators of the structures are fighting with the core businesses. And 
those politics are between the coordinators of those reports and the core 
business areas. If the coordinators don’t define their roles clearly, it becomes 
a big problem. (Participant 14: 169-170) 
The strategic planning person who’s sitting in a cluster plan cannot negotiate 
for the core business – he must go to this core businesses and discuss with 
them. You guys [Strategy Units], you don’t have that picture that these people 
[core business] have. Remember also, as core business, we point fingers. 
(Participant 14: 250) 
A major challenge regarding implementation was that compilation of the cluster 
plan is focused on Senior Managers at National Offices. This process tends to 
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exclude the people who must implement these strategies at service-point level and 
those who must oversee the implementation: 
And I think there our planning is really challenging because you don’t get the 
buy-in then from that clerk that actually needs to deal with the work and 
contribute to the big plan …They don’t see what the big plan is and what the 
impact is if they don’t do it properly and things like that …. (Participant 17: 
1235) 
First of all, I think the problem is we set targets that are unrealistic. So we 
promise to the world and to the people and to everybody things which we know 
when we promise are going to be impossible to deliver. Because a lot of the 
institutions are huge. I mean, the Police are what? 180 000 people? To 
mobilise them, you've got to move slower in terms of that. (Participant 18: 
1467) 
One participant indicated the difficulties in holding DGs accountable for the 
execution of cluster-related initiatives. This lack of accountability was found to 
extend to Cabinet where the Ministers themselves were not always found to be 
accountable:  
Now, execution. Once they go away to go and implement their part, when they 
come and report, they don't have a report. There is no information. Something 
they don't even submit … Even as we took it to Cabinet, but they will not say, 
‘This is what should happen. Minister, we want you to do this’. Even Zuma 
couldn’t get them to do [it]. So, we struggle with consequence management. 
Hopefully, the new, it's not new, but the resuscitation of the performance 
agreement of Ministers will enable that to happen. (Participant 16: 972) 
 
Affinity 7: Planning 
Top Managers indicated that planning remains a challenge despite the inroads that 
have been made through the years. Even when five key crime categories were 
identified for the five-year cluster plan, the issue of target setting around these was 
not well thought out and implementation across the value chain was not done. For 
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example, if illicit trade crime was identified, targets should at least involve the 
police, the NPA and the DOJCD: 
Targets, etc. are the main worrisome problem. From the criminal justice 
system review side in 2017, we needed to have integrated target setting. We 
need to have a common vision and performance management and things like 
that. We’re still not there in terms of that … So, planning I think is a big 
problem. (Participant 17: 1232) 
Yes, to bring togetherness. Joined-up action so that you together identify or 
actually agree on indicators and agree on targets. But even as we were doing 
that, still it was very difficult for them not to default into their individual 
mandates. (Participant 16: 802) 
Secondly, I think we also, we don’t plan together. All our strategy units and 
departments deal with their own. I mean, it’s very difficult. It’s only lately that 
we’re starting to invite other role players as well. But we don’t have joint 
sessions where we say as a cluster, ‘Let us look at a cluster in terms of our 
strategic planning, and what we need to do, etc. before we go and have 
individual ones’. We don’t have. (Participant 17: 1233) 
But in terms of the planning, when the Police say, for example, we intend to 
reduce crime by x percentage, that percentage that they arrive at, it tends not 
to be informed by an engagement with, for example, the NPA, right? So, the 
NPA will set its own targets, right? Now, I think that that is for me the problem. 
So, realistically, by how much can we bring this crime down? (Participant 16: 
797) 
Absolutely. Like I said, even the MTSF. Take that document now and find me 
one indicator in there that forces us to work together. There isn’t one. And 
there were meetings held and people said ‘bout some of the indicators: ‘This 
is not going to fly; it's not good enough’. But what happened? Those indicators 
went in. If you take the SAPS plan and you put it next to the NPA plan, you 
won’t be able to say how we’re all going to achieve something together .… 
(Participant 18: 1479) 
The idea of identifying indicators to measure the extent of collaboration in order to 
reflect and evaluate on the work done by the cluster was presented. In addition, 
the need to set these indicators on the performance agreements of DGs and 
Ministers was identified: 
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And I support the view of having a goal for collaboration. How do you measure 
it? What should we be doing to say that the cluster is succeeding in what it 
was intended for? What purpose was it intended to serve? It must be written 
into the DG’s performance agreements. (Participant 15: 648–650) 
 
Affinity 8: Sharing Goals 
One participant questioned the concept of sharing goals and indicated that 
members of the cluster cannot work towards a common goal due to the different 
mandates that they carry: 
The word common goals – Let’s remove it because we can never have 
common goals. But let’s have the goals that will ensure an effective functioning 
criminal justice within limited resources – but not common. (Participant 14: 
298) 
It should be to create a well-functioning criminal justice system within limited 
resources; so which means we have to look at the areas that we have to deliver 
on. Not to say these are common because SAPS, the role of SAPS is to arrest. 
But we can change the model of arrest. When is it critical for me to arrest? 
Arrest when you have investigated, yes? Then it makes the case to move 
faster … Now you arrest a person, [and] you go and dump the person in 
Correctional Services while you are conducting investigation. (Participant 14: 
302) 
Participants shared their experiences on matters related to the lack of sharing 
goals. These included long-standing issues that could have been addressed 
through the involvement of the cluster. For example, the arrest targets of the SAPS 
often result in wrongful arrest, which in turn, uses resources of the State through 
Legal Aid South Africa and results in large court rolls through which the DOJCD 
must work. Furthermore, wrongful arrests result in high costs of litigation against 
the State:  
And the impact of unlawful arrest and detention across the cluster has an 
impact on Corrections. It has an impact on Justice and the Courts and now 
211 
civil rolls and criminal rolls, and it had an impact on civil litigation against the 
State. (Participant 15: 692) 
It is one thing that had an impact throughout the cluster but yet, it's been going 
on for years, more than ten years. And no solution has come from the cluster. 
So, the cluster failed in addressing that very big problem? (Participant 15: 694) 
Secondly, crime prevention is still a big challenge and that is where the civilian 
Secretariat is now coming in with their whole activities relating to the White 
Paper of police and safety and security to make sure that there are more 
crime-prevention elements. (Participant 17: 1255) 
You’re not going to be able to say how we’re all going to achieve something 
together because DCS wants to reduce the number of people in jail [and] the 
NPA wants to increase long-term sentences because there’s pressure to do 
that. The SAPS want[s] to send everybody to jail forever, okay. Social 
Development – you know, we struggle with them coming to the party in terms 
of their issues. (Participant 18: 1481) 
Some of the recommendations proposed by participants included the importance 
of the cluster in addressing the key strategic issues of fighting crime. For example, 
the cluster should determine the extent to which social crime prevention versus all 
other traditional approaches of combating crime should be adopted:  
The cluster should not operate at a base level where departments are. The 
cluster must be the one that has that umbrella view to say and to ask, to really 
ask, the difficult questions. Are we, like when you have the discussion on bail, 
how do we take that discussion forward? Do we provide more resources to 
build more prisons, right? Or do we do more work in the communities through 
social development so that we lessen the cause of the crime on the ground? 
So, where do we put our resources? So, those kinds of discussions are what 
should be happening in the cluster. (Participant 15: 682) 
 
6.3.2 Relationships between Affinities 
6.3.3 Affinity Relationship Table 
For the eight affinities that were identified by the focus group, 56 possible 
relationships between them were noted. The process that was followed to arrive at 
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the critical number of relationships to explain intragovernmental collaborations is 
detailed in Section 5.3.4.3. 
Using this process, 26 relationships were found to be responsible for 81.5% of the 
variation within the Top Manager system. The relationships are shown in 
Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6 Affinity pairs and Pareto calculations for Top Manager data 









A B C D E F G 
1 1  →  6 5 5 1.8 3.7 1.9 
2 1  →  7 5 10 3.6 7.4 3.8 
3 1  →  8 5 15 5.4 11.1 5.8 
4 2 ←  4 5 20 7.1 14.8 7.7 
5 2 ←  5 5 25 8.9 18.5 9.6 
6 3 ←  5 5 30 10.7 22.2 11.5 
7 3  →  6 5 35 12.5 25.9 13.4 
8 4  →  6 5 40 14.3 29.6 15.3 
9 4  →  7 5 45 16.1 33.3 17.3 
10 5  →  6 5 50 17.9 37.0 19.2 
11 5  →  7 5 55 19.6 40.7 21.1 
12 5  →  8 5 60 21.4 44.4 23.0 
13 6 ←  7 5 65 23.2 48.1 24.9 
14 1 ←  4 4 69 25.0 51.1 26.1 
15 2  →  6 4 73 26.8 54.1 27.3 
16 2  →  7 4 77 28.6 57.0 28.5 
17 3 ←  4 4 81 30.4 60.0 29.6 
18 4  →  8 4 85 32.1 63.0 30.8 
19 6 ←  8 4 89 33.9 65.9 32.0 
20 1  →  2 3 92 35.7 68.1 32.4 
21 1 ←  5 3 95 37.5 70.4 32.9 
22 2  →  8 3 98 39.3 72.6 33.3 
23 3  →  7 3 101 41.1 74.8 33.7 
24 3 ←  8 3 104 42.9 77.0 34.2 
25 4 ←  5 3 107 44.6 79.3 34.6 
26 7 ←  8 3 110 46.4 81.5 35.1 
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6.3.4 Interrelationship Diagram 
The theoretical coding aspect continued with the development of the IRD. This 
entailed classifying affinities according to the extent to which they are drivers or 
outcomes within intergovernmental collaborations. The identification was 
undertaken using the process detailed in Section 8.4.2 and the results are shown 
in Table 6.7.  
 
Table 6.7 Interrelationship diagram for the Top Manager composite 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Out In ∆ 
1   ↑   ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 4 2 2 
2 ←     ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 3 3 0 
3       ← ← ↑ ↑ ← 2 3 -1 
4 ↑ ↑ ↑   ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 6 1 5 
5 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑   ↑ ↑ ↑ 7 0 7 
6 ← ← ← ← ←   ← ← 0 7 -7 
7 ← ← ← ← ← ↑   ← 1 6 -5 
8 ← ← ↑ ← ← ↑ ↑   3 4 -1 
 
6.3.5 Affinities as drivers and outcomes 
The Interrelationship Table was rearranged in order of delta, with the highest delta 
at the top. The delta values shown in Figure 8.8 resulted in the classification of the 
eight affinities as drivers and outcomes using the process detailed in Section 6.2.5. 
Table 6.8 shows the affinities and their identification. 
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Table 6.8 Interrelationship diagram for Top Managers in decreasing delta 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Out In ∆ Identification Affinity 
5 ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑   ↑ ↑ ↑ 7 0 7 Primary Driver Leadership 
4 ↑ ↑ ↑   ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 6 1 5 Secondary Driver Culture 
1   ↑   ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 4 2 2 Secondary Driver Silos 
2 ←     ← ← ↑ ↑ ↑ 3 3 0 Pivot Protocols 
3       ← ← ↑ ↑ ← 2 3 -1 Secondary Outcome Resources 
8 ← ← ↑ ← ← ↑ ↑   3 4 -1 Secondary Outcome Sharing goals 
7 ← ← ← ← ← ↑   ← 1 6 -5 Secondary Outcome Planning 
6 ← ← ← ← ←   ← ← 0 7 -7 Primary Outcome Execution 
 
6.3.6 Cluttered Systems Influence Diagram 
All 26 relationships discussed were drawn on a Cluttered SID as shown in Figure 
6.6. 
 
Figure 6.6 Cluttered Systems Influence Diagram for Top Managers 
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Detailed descriptions of interrelationships provided by Senior Managers are 
presented in Annexure F. 
6.3.7 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram 
The Uncluttered SID was simplified by following the process detailed in Section 
5.3.4.5. For example, in Figure 6.6, Protocols → Execution was removed because 
the Protocols → Sharing Goals → Planning → Execution route already existed. 




Figure 6.7 Uncluttered Systems Influence Diagram for Top Managers 
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The Uncluttered SID was then rearranged to display an easy-to-follow diagram 
(see Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.8 Simplified Systems Influence Diagram for the Top Manager composite 
 
6.3.8 Individual Top Manager Interrelationships between Affinities 
In line with the constructivist approach to research that recognises multiple realities 
and an epistemological stance of generation of knowledge through these multiple 
realities, the results at an individual level are presented.  
Three of the five Top Managers indicated Leadership as a primary driver of the 
JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. The remaining two Top Managers indicated 
Culture as a primary driver. Regarding outcomes, four Top Managers indicated 
Execution as a primary outcome whereas one Top Manager indicated Protocols. 
The summary is presented in Table 6.9.  
Table 6.9 Summary of drivers and outcomes for Top Manager participants 
Participant Primary Driver Primary Outcome 
14 Leadership Execution 
15 Leadership Execution 






Systems Influence Diagrams for each Top Manager were completed for 
comparison. All five are shown in Annexure H. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
Senior Managers indicated the need to identify appropriate cluster leadership at 
Top Management level. This involves first defining the profile of the leader deemed 
appropriate for the difficult undertaking of addressing crime. Second, the Senior 
Managers expressed the need to hold leadership accountable and indicated 
weaknesses in the prevailing governance arrangements. It was emphasised and 
acknowledged that there are leaders within the cluster who are doing their best 
despite the challenges they are experiencing. 
Regarding Culture as a secondary driver, Senior Managers described a 
public-sector mentality as a common threat among most of the JCPS Cluster 
departments and entities. This included people doing the absolute minimum and 
poor levels of accountability. There was a need to establish a cluster culture that 
would address some of the difficulties that were identified within the other affinities. 
16 Culture Execution 
17 Culture Protocols 
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The final affinity classified as a driver was Protocols. This terminology best fits the 
description presented by the participants. Within this affinity, there was emphasis 
on the need for a strong governance framework within the JCPS Cluster. In some 
cases, the governance is not properly enforced and impedes the continuity and 
work of the cluster. In others, the governance results in many meetings and 
structures, creating difficulties for Senior Managers to participate and to implement 
the work of the cluster. 
The composite SID for Senior Managers indicated a feedback loop consisting of 
four affinities, namely Resources, Silos, Sharing Goals and Planning as shown in 
Figure 6.9. According to Northcutt and McCoy (2004), a feedback loop is a 
subsystem and can be isolated and described within the larger system. In addition, 
the loop can represent a virtual cycle, and breaking the cycle requires intervention.  
These four affinities are all closely linked to the process of Planning, as was 
described by participants. Planning in silos results in a virtual cycle that has a major 
impact on the execution of the objectives of the JCPS Cluster and, therefore, 
contributes to the difficulties in addressing crime as a wicked problem. Therefore, 
the feedback loop was named ‘Planning in Silos’. 
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Figure 6.9 Systems Influence Diagram for Senior Managers indicating feedback 
loop 
 
When zooming out and looking at the system, the virtual cycle collapses into an 
affinity labelled Strategic Planning, as shown in Figure 6.10.  
 
Figure 6.10 Zoomed-out version of the focus group Systems Influence Diagram 
 
In summary, the SID for Senior Managers illustrates the need to position a 
leadership that will be able to build a strong culture for collaboration and to develop 
appropriate structures and processes to address Protocols. Leadership needs to 
address the silo-planning approach in order to implement plans that will lead to the 
successful execution of the JCPS Cluster plans. 
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Five Top Managers were interviewed to investigate their experiences regarding 
the eight affinities that were identified by the Senior Managers. The aim of the 
exercise was to solicit a Top Manager perspective despite the non-viability of a 
focus group for Top Managers. These views enriched the research study.  
Top Managers identified Leadership as a primary driver of the JCPS collaboration. 
Appropriate leadership included visionary leadership, collaborative leadership and 
the ability to envision and engage cluster participants. The issue of corruption was 
identified as a matter that the cluster had grappled with throughout the preceding 
five to ten years.  
Culture was seen as a consequence of Leadership, and part of the solution to 
address leadership at all levels was through appropriate recruitment, training and 
accountability systems. 
Some of the Top Managers were long-serving officials who were part of the 
establishment of the cluster. They indicated that the JCPS Cluster was created 
precisely to address the silo approach and foster a system that includes joint 
problem-solving, collaboration and implementation. Although much progress has 
been made in establishing cluster structures to address silos, the Top Managers 
indicated that much remains to be done. From the interviews with the Top 
Managers, the issue of Silos was considered more of an issue than Protocols. 
The affinity Protocols was not identified as a driver or an outcome but as a bridge 
between drivers and outcomes. Top Managers indicated the need for proper 
governance and the need for appropriate structures to address key issues relating 
to crime and corruption. 
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Regarding outcomes, Protocols as an affinity affected Sharing Goals, which affects 
Resources, which in turn, affects Planning and Execution. Execution was identified 
by Top Managers as the primary outcome of the JCPS collaboration. 
The simplified diagram is shown in Figure 6.11. 
  




7 CHAPTER 7: INTERPRETATION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapters 6 provided a detailed report on results of the research. Within this 
chapter, the following were finalised: 
• Identification of affinities for intragovernmental collaborations by a focus 
group of Senior Managers 
• Descriptions of interrelationships between affinities provided by Senior 
Managers and a final SID for Senior Managers 
• Descriptions of interrelationships between affinities provided by Top 
Managers and a final SID for Top Managers 
Chapter 7 provides the interpretation of the research findings and includes 
comparisons and contrasts between the Senior and Top Managers’ descriptions 
of the JCPS intragovernmental as well as comparison against literature.  
 
7.2 AFFINITIES 
Having used the same set of affinities for both Senior Managers and Top 






Leadership was identified as a primary driver by both Senior and Top Managers 
due to its impact on the work of the JCPS Cluster. Descriptions of shortcomings 
and challenges within the collaboration include the following:  
• Ineffective leadership results in suboptimal functioning of some cluster 
committees. 
• Leadership that is not efficiently focused on key cluster initiatives: In some 
cases, Top Managers who should be key drivers of the cluster were found 
to have their priorities elsewhere. 
• Leadership that is not always held accountable: Both Senior and Top 
Managers are not sufficiently held to account for lack of participation and 
poor implementation of programmes. 
• Both Senior and Top Managers indicated challenges relating to tensions 
between the political and administrative interface within the JCPS Cluster 
that resulted in resignations of DGs and posts remaining vacant. 
Senior Managers and Top Managers assigned different levels of emphasis as 
follows: 
• Visionary leadership and the need to inspire action tended to be 
emphasised by Senior Managers. This is because Senior Managers expect 
Top Managers to lead; however, there were situations of helplessness as 
they observed leadership deficits. Top Managers tended to emphasise lack 
of accountability frameworks and requested ways of holding cluster leaders 
accountable. 
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• Senior Managers were concerned with the age of Top Managers and 
Cabinet Ministers and the possible lack of zeal and energy that 
accompanies people nearing or exceeding retirement age. 
• The issue of gatekeeping was raised by a Top Manager, suggesting the 
need to refresh the cluster with new thinking and a broader range of 
participants. 
• Top Managers expressed views on the idea of the highest-ranking Cabinet 
Minister within the cluster chairing the Ministerial cluster and having his/her 
Director-General chair the DG structure. Although this was positive from an 
alignment point of view, there was admission that it has its shortcomings 
and may allow a leader with unfitting attributes to occupy the office. 
It should be mentioned that although Senior Managers referred to leadership and 
were scathing when referring to Top Managers, they themselves are leaders of the 
cluster and play a crucial role in the success of the JCPS Cluster. The point was 
made by one of the Top Managers that all Senior Managers as participants need 
to be reflexive about their role in promoting collaborative goals.  
Some of the leadership roles identified by both Senior and Top Managers include 
gatekeepers who tend to prefer to keep the same participants. Another is 
leadership that does not effectively deal with participants whose participation is not 
in line with cluster objectives. These behaviours align with those identified by Eden, 
Colin and Huxham (2001): 
• Outlying individual episodes: When individuals push their own agendas 
outside those of the collaboration or of their own organisation. For example, 
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Participant 6 indicated that decisions taken in the cluster are often not 
implemented by participants for their own reasons and their organisations 
may not even be aware.  
• Vetoing individual or vetoing organisation episodes: Where certain 
members frustrate participants by consistently blocking or delaying certain 
decisions. Participant 15 indicated that she found some of her approvals 
delayed due to this behaviour. It is one of the reasons that some Senior 
Managers attempt to implement initiatives alone where a cluster effort would 
be more effective.  
• Sceptical group or sceptical individual episodes: These are organisations 
that show little interest in the cluster and often send inappropriate 
delegations simply for compliance. For example, Participant 9 gave an 
example of two government departments.  
Leadership as a primary driver is at the core of transforming the JCPS Cluster into 
a collaboration that can address crime. It is important to recognise that the way 
leadership is structured needs to be reconsidered. Leadership accorded on a 
rotational basis or using other considerations such as alignment of political and 
administrative heads might not assist the cluster in obtaining the results that are 
required. Instead, there are attributes, personalities and behaviours that have been 
identified in the existing body of knowledge that are necessary to address wicked 
problems such as crime. This includes models by Beinecke (2009) and Termeer 
et al. (2013). 
In Chapter 8, a model for leadership for the JCPS Cluster was proposed as part of 
the Framework for Strategic Management in Intragovernmental Collaborations.  
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Protocols 
The extent to which Protocols was an issue differed between the two groups. 
Senior Managers indicated that there are too many structures, too many meetings 
that they must attend, and many implementation efforts that they need to lead. 
Many of these participants are at director level (Level 13), and there were 
indications that some of them have been representing seniors as high as DG 
(Level 16) at cluster engagements.  
On the contrary, Top Managers emphasised the need for sufficient JCPS 
structures to address the ongoing challenge of silos. It was further emphasised 
that it is not the number of meetings or structures that is the issue but rather the 
extent to which these structures assist in collaborative efforts. An issue was raised 
regarding duplication of efforts where matters are raised and handled in different 
structures.  
Another reality raised by Senior Managers was that the attendance of JCPS 
structure meetings generally appeared to be delegated to lower ranking Senior 
Managers. These managers might not be willing to support decisions that their 
seniors have not specifically mandated, and this could delay decision-making. 
The other dimension of Protocols mentioned by Senior Managers relates to the 
fact that decisions are not always made by the appropriate structures. In some 
cases, a decision is deferred to another structure, which can cause delays. This, 
therefore, leads to the need to rationalise and properly define and enforce the 
mandates of different committees. 
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The solution to the dilemma lies in rationalising structures, appointing appropriate 
participants and building accountability frameworks that guide the conduct of 
participants.  
Silos 
Three Top Managers within the JCPS Cluster indicated that the cluster was 
primarily convened to address the issue of silo thinking, silo planning and silo 
implementation in all its manifestation.  
There is realisation from Senior and Top Managers that the criminal justice system 
is a system that needs its individual parts to work together for an outcome that is 
greater than the sum of its individual efforts. It is for this reason that the silo 
mentality was highlighted as one of the prominent issues. This was more 
pronounced in Top Managers than it was in Senior Managers. 
Breaking down silos means working together at a level of cooperation, coordination 
and collaboration. With reference to the 3Cs model of Keast, Brown and Mandell 
(2007), the cluster tends to do well at the level of coordination where cluster 
structures are used to solicit inputs on action plans and require subdued support 
from cluster organisations. For example, legislation en route to Parliament is 
considered by the Development Committee, and once all implementation issues of 
the legislation have been addressed, the legislation is submitted to the DG of the 
JCPS Cluster who will in turn, recommend it to the JCPS Ministers and finally, to 
Cabinet.  
Where a higher level of integration is needed (i.e. collaboration), for example, in 
capital infrastructure projects that require an intensive effort from players, this was 
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found to be challenging. Capital project decisions are expected to follow rigorous 
and formal engagements within appropriate governance arrangements, but these 
engagements were found to be informal and were undertaken as an option rather 
than a requirement for proper planning. This issue was confirmed by one 
participant who stated that in identifying service points to be built, little 
consideration or consultation occurs with local government or other stakeholders. 
With the spatial planning approach adopted in 2019, it is expected that the South 
African government will begin addressing this shortcoming. 
Participants also mentioned that the strategic plans of the JCPS Cluster reflected 
silo planning. Despite numerous attempts over the years to address the issue, this 
continues to be a problem. 
A number of solutions were proposed by participants to break down silos. These 
included using matrix structures that enable more informal interactions between 
officials at different levels in different organisations. In some structures such as the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Child Justice, these matrix-like interactions are 
common and were described by Senior Managers within the implementation 
structures of the JCPS Cluster.  
Sharing of Goals 
Both Senior and Top Managers indicated their awareness of the vision of ensuring 
that all people in South Africa are and feel safe. This vision needs to be translated 
into shared goals, shared objectives and joint action plans. Both Senior and Top 
Managers identified Goal Sharing as a long-standing issue that has not been 
successfully addressed. 
229 
In particular, there was admission that the JCPS Cluster has not resolved the issue 
of conflicting objectives at operational level. Participants overwhelmingly 
expressed that the shared-goal paradox is one of the most difficult problems that 
they have grappled with and never resolved. Some of the issues that were 
mentioned were difficulties in defining system-wide indicators that the criminal 
justice system can buy into and the insistence of entities to drive their own narrow 
agenda in regard to performance of the entire criminal justice system. One 
participant referred to the shared-goal paradox as “the elephant in the room”.  
The aspirant goal of ensuring that all people in South Africa feel and are safe lacks 
consistency in the approach to make it happen. The goal has not been analysed 
sufficiently to find common translation within the JCPS Cluster itself (system-wide) 
and within cluster organisations. Even in instances where lower level goals are 
shared, entities act alone and inconsistently in fulfilling these goals.  
Coordination takes place but to a limited extent, for example, in drafting legislation 
and policies, and there is no follow-through with implementation. In addition, there 
is inconsistent application of the law, for example, bail and sentencing. 
At operational levels, these goals do not have meaning. For example, a Legal Aid 
lawyer will work towards clearing their client of the criminal charge or securing the 
shortest sentence possible without consideration of priority crimes such as 
femicide. Similarly, the NPA will try to deny a suspect bail as far as possible even 
when overcrowding remains a problem for remand detention. It was understood 
that these goals at case level will continue independent of conversations and 
decisions at the strategic level. 
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Individual performance appraisals and incentives remain in opposition despite 
attempts to address them. For example, performance for police is still measured 
through the number of arrests made, regardless of whether these arrests are 
related to identified priority crimes. Furthermore, many of the arrests result in major 
legal costs for wrongful arrest, and these are borne by government. 
Performance agreements of top managers and ministers should substantially 
include cluster-related work but often do not. In instances where they do, there 
appears to be little consequence for poor performance even at the highest level. 
Bernard et al. (2005) emphasise that since the criminal justice system is a 
processing system, the ultimate goal consensus for this system is the efficient and 
effective processing of people. Peculiar to the criminal justice system is that this 
processing needs to be seen by stakeholders as fair and constitutional (Bernard et 
al., 2005; Dandurand, 2014). 
Within the criminal justice system, efficiency refers to the speed at which cases are 
processed. Although some delays are unavoidable, there are indications that laws, 
rules, regulations, processes and practices also play a major role in the efficiency 
of the system (Dandurand, 2014).  
Effectiveness is the extent of success associated with the criminal justice system, 
which includes analysis of reported cases within the police services and those that 
are successfully prosecuted. It is not necessarily the objective for every act of 
criminality to result in a jail sentence, nor is it desirable. However, it is an important 
measure of how often people get away with crime and in South Africa, this is 
particularly problematic. Some of the issues that should be jointly addressed 
231 
include improvement in the quality of investigations, legislative reforms in the 
Criminal Procedure Act and amendments in the rules of court. 
Planning  
Regarding planning, Senior Managers and Top Managers shared similar views. 
There was general agreement that planning within the JCPS Cluster takes place 
but is inadequate.  
One Senior Manager expressed quite strongly that planning has significantly 
advanced and that there are noteworthy successes, particularly during the 
2015−2019 period. Although there were some coordination issues regarding dates 
and timelines of planning, a government-led planning framework is followed.  
Despite reported progress, some challenges remain. First, there are indications of 
plans being put together for compliance purposes, and in some instances, targets 
are soft and do not make a meaningful impact in the fight against crime and 
corruption. One Top Manager indicated that plans are found to be unachievable 
and their complicated implementation in large organisations such as the SAPS is 
not considered. The level of planning in areas, including the critical area of ICT, 
was found to be inadequate due to poor participation of the relevant Senior and 
Top Managers. As mentioned previously, the level of maturity in planning within 
the organisations themselves was found to be inadequate. 
As indicated strongly by a number of Senior and Top Managers, the understanding 
that the cluster plan is not an integrated plan is critical. Instead, most participants 
from both groups saw the cluster plan as a collection of inputs from different 
departments and entities. One Top Manager stated that this is improving but 
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admitted that even in integrated objectives, the implementation plans are still silo 
based. 
Although the DPME attempted to facilitate an integrated plan, there was admission 
that the level of success was less than expected. One Top Manager suggested 
that departments do not want to be told by others what to do.  
Consensus building towards a collaborative or joint plan is a long and challenging 
process (Huxham and Macdonald, 1992; Ansell and Gash, 2008). A five-year plan 
for the JCPS Cluster requires an appropriately facilitated process over time. The 
consensus building model of Innes and Booher (1999) for complex systems 
includes both process and outcome criteria that need to be adapted to the JCPS 
Cluster situation.  
It should also be noted that some of the necessary factors for consensus building 
include data sharing and knowledge sharing, and these need to be in place to 
compile a well-thought-out JCPS Cluster plan. 
Resources 
Unbalanced resource allocation was raised as an issue brought about by the silo 
approach to resourcing. Some Senior Managers indicated a need for ring-fenced 
funds to address implementation challenges associated with cluster priorities 
whereas Top Managers recognised the JCPS Cluster as a collaborative body that 
does not have implementation responsibilities.  
Mechanisms to determine resource requirements for the criminal justice system 
were found to be inadequate. Departments pitched for their own resources and 
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relied on the strength of their leaders to raise money for their own priorities. 
Following attempts to present a joint campaign to the National Treasury, one Top 
Manager felt that this is human nature and is unlikely to disappear. However, it 
should be noted that the success of the criminal justice system is in the sum of 
appropriately resourced and functional parts working interactively towards a 
common goal. In line with systems thinking, this approach of joint planning is 
necessary. 
Regarding capital projects for building or establishing new facilities (courts, police 
stations and correctional centres), it was found that there is no joint capital budget 
nor is there a forum for joint planning around such facilities. Officials responsible 
for infrastructure spending deliver on what they have been asked by stakeholders 
and only coordinate with other affected entities.  
Using the 3Cs continuum on cooperation, coordination and collaboration (Keast, 
Brown & Mandell, 2007; McNamara, 2012), it is clear that at the level of 
collaboration (highest level of interdependence), joint resourcing is unavoidable. 
Within the cluster, funding for the IJS (a transversal system that tracks cases from 
the police through to the correctional centres to monitor performance of the entire 
system) has been ring-fenced for over a decade. Once ICT integrations are 
identified, the funds are then transferred to the relevant departments and entities 
for implementation. Although this model works well, it was not implemented for all 
priorities. 
Another critical resource for intragovernmental collaborations and the taming of 
wicked problems specifically is knowledge sharing. The effectiveness of the 
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intragovernmental collaboration also lies in effective knowledge management, 
which includes the transfer, receipt and integration of knowledge across 
organisations and participants (Weber and Khademian, 2008).  
Although knowledge sharing was mentioned on one of the Post-It Notes, it was not 
identified as an affinity because there were no additional references to it by the 
other participants of the focus group. However, during the semi-structured 
interviews, two Senior Managers mentioned the importance of sharing and 
analysing data and any intelligence related to crime: 
One affinity that is a driver of the process is the lack of data and business 
intelligence. This is one very important one. The lack of data and business 
intelligence! (Participant 12: 3613) 
If you would have any common strategic plan across the sector, it would 
depend on the quality of data across different government departments. I know 
now that it is a challenge within departments. If it is a challenge within 
departments, I do not see how you can do anything across the sector in the 
absence of any data. (Participant 12: 3615) 
Knowledge sharing is even worse. People have done things. Nobody knows 
what Lebo has done. We don’t even have systems that put this knowledge 
there … (Participant 13: 3830) 
But if you don’t have a super-secretariat that enables the establishment of that 
shared culture, shared values and even shared knowledge management, 
there’s a huge knowledge management gap. (Participant 6: 1581) 
It should be emphasised that common understanding of the problem and 
consensus building towards a solution relies on sharing and joint analysis of data 
and information.  
235 
Culture 
Organisational culture is described by the way things are done in organisations 
and represents assumptions, behaviours and perceptions that guide thinking, 
decisions and behaviour within an organisation. (Longman, Daniels, Bray & Liddell, 
2018; Kerns, 2020). Importantly, culture is driven by leadership and involves what 
is rewarded, punished, encouraged and discouraged. It is also important to note 
that because of the influence of leadership on culture, there are possibilities of 
subcultures within the organisations themselves. 
Both Senior and Top Managers identified an underlying public-service culture that 
is characterised by poor performance and poor accountability. This was believed 
to be caused by the sheltered environment of public sector employment with a 
reluctance to discipline and dismiss poor performers. Although not prevalent in all 
cluster organisations, public service culture was mentioned as an issue.  
One participant indicated that there is no uniform culture in the cluster and finds 
that the behaviour of participants mirrors their organisational cultures. It should be 
noted that allowing participants to behave the way they please and the absence of 
cohesion and discipline is itself a reflection of culture. A cluster culture exists and 
it is not conducive to an effective collaboration. 
Although culture does not enjoy prominence in literature, an important article by 
Weare, Lichterman and Esparza (2014) was found to be the most appropriate in 
describing culture in interorganisational networks. This was explained through the 
Culture Theory. In the article, the authors position culture as a missing variable 
between structure and high performance in interorganisational networks (Weare, 
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Lichterman & Esparza, 2014). The current study not only confirms culture as a 
factor but also affirms it as a driver and important variable in intragovernmental 
collaboration. 
Execution 
It is a common criticism that the cluster plans that have been developed by the 
JCPS Cluster are not integrated or explicit in addressing crime. For this reason, 
the implementation will be inadequate even if carried out according to the plan. 
Execution of the JCPS Cluster plan lies with individual departments and clusters. 
Therefore, all issues raised in Execution such as lack of accountability and poor 
alignment with cluster plans are a reflection of the capabilities and efforts of the 
individual departments. An accountability model to ensure appropriate execution 
of plans needs to be built within the cluster and within individual departments. The 
proposed strategic management framework for the cluster in Chapter 11 includes 
a governance framework. 
 
7.3 AFFINITY RELATIONSHIPS 
The interrelationship tables showed 28 significant relationships for Senior 
Managers and 26 relationships for Top Managers. Most relationships (23) were 
common to both Senior and Top Managers, with five being different. The 





Table 7.1 Divergent relationship pairs between Senior and Top Managers 
Senior Managers Top Managers 
Contrasting relationships 
Silos  ← Protocols  Silos  → Protocols 
Resources ← Planning Resources → Planning 
Resources → Sharing goals Resources ← Sharing goals 
Additional significant relationships 
Silos  → Resources 
- 
Protocols → Resources - 
 
Silos (1) and Protocols (2) 
Silos and Protocols were found to affect each other in both directions. Some 
participants indicated that Protocols discourage officials from pursuing or 
continuing with collaborative efforts. This is because once decisions are taken 
within the JCPS Cluster, they still follow normal governance procedures that are 
built within cluster organisations. For example, the DGs and other departmental 
officials who may not be participating in the cluster (e.g. Chief Financial Officer and 
Head of Human Resources) are often delegated in terms of their organisational 
procedures to undertake approvals, but these protocols discourage cluster 
representatives to work jointly due to the associated bureaucracies. Instead, 
projects are undertaken within their own organisations/departments to avoid 
delays. In the Senior Manager group, seven participants indicated this direction 
and five indicated the opposite.  
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Three Top Managers stated that the silo mentality breeds the ‘Red Tape’ described 
in Chapter 8. In other words, if there was no silo mentality within the cluster and 
government in general, the accompanying protocols would not be there. 
Silos and Protocols presented the greatest tensions between and within 
constituents and led to grey areas for participants in general. Clarification of 
appropriate models for addressing Silos and Protocols for the JCPS Cluster would 
possibly make the most effective contribution to the functioning of the cluster.  
Resources (3) and Planning (7) 
Senior Managers mainly indicated that they compile plans and find the resources 
needed to achieve those plans. Seven of the ten Senior Managers who 
demonstrated a relationship indicated Planning to Resources. Conversely, three 
Top Managers indicated that realistically, limited resources drive the plans that 
need to be put together. In other words, mandates cannot be fully discharged and 
are limited to the resources that are available.  
Findings suggest that Top Managers and Senior Managers do not express a 
decisive direction either way. This is because in an ideal situation, a plan is an 
expression of priorities, which should be followed by resourcing. In reality, the 
Government of South Africa is a service-driven industry with high fixed labour 
costs. For example, for the DOJCD, R11 billion is allocated for employee costs and 
only R5 billion for goods and services. Under these conditions, planning tends to 
be driven by how much money is available.  
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Resources (3) and Sharing goals (8) 
Six of the ten Senior Managers indicated that limited resources drive the cluster to 
identify and achieve Shared Goals, whereas two did not indicate any relationship. 
This view is supported by the RDT, which stipulates that interorganisational 
relationships benefit organisations by enabling them to achieve goals that they 
would otherwise not achieve. This achievement is through the joint use of 
resources with other organisations. Although the majority of Senior Managers 
indicated this relationship (Resources → Sharing Goals), the margin was thin. Top 
Managers indicated that sharing goals leads to better management of resources 
(Sharing Goals → Resources).  
The majority of the participants expressed a strong relationship between resources 
and the sharing of goals, which represents one of the key tenets of working within 
intragovernmental collaborations. However, this ideal remains to be realised, given 
the challenges mentioned by the participants. 
Part of the reason for the disconnect between the vision and the implementation 
could lie in poor execution or operationalisation. It was indicated that leadership is 
often absent from important meetings and over delegates the critical function of 
leading the JCPS Cluster towards the envisioned future. 
Silos (1) and Resources (8) 
Senior Managers indicated overwhelmingly (eight participants) that the silo 
mentality within the cluster leads to the existing resource problems. This means 
that the silo mentality within the JCPS Cluster makes effective sharing of resources 
difficult. This was one of the significant relationships identified by Senior Managers. 
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For Top Managers, both directions of the relationship received two votes each 
while one participant considered it immaterial.  
Protocols (2) and Resources (3)  
Nine Senior Managers indicated that protocols lead to poor use of resources. In 
other words, there was an indication that protocols prevent the seamless and 
efficient sharing of resources for the benefit of the cluster. However, Top Managers 
demonstrated two votes for the two directions, leading to both being insignificant. 
This relationship expresses the importance that Senior Managers attach to 
Protocols as a driver within the JCPS collaboration, which is in contrast with Top 
Managers who did not identify it as a driver.  
 
7.4 DRIVERS AND OUTCOMES 
At composite levels, Senior and Top Managers indicated Leadership as a primary 
driver and Execution as a primary outcome, whereas secondary drivers show a 
divergent picture, as seen in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Drivers of the JCPS collaboration: Senior Managers vs. Top Managers 
Drivers: Senior Manager SID Drivers: Top Manager SID 





Senior Managers indicated that Protocols is manifested in the number of structures 
and the excessive number of meetings to attend. Most of the Senior Managers 
participate in many such structures and are often overwhelmed by the time and 
effort spent. There was an indication that many Senior Managers attend meetings 
in structures where their principals should be attending and that the load of cluster 
work is not equitably shared. It is, therefore, reasonable that Senior Managers 
indicate Protocols as a major factor influencing the work of the cluster. 
Top Managers identified Silos as a driver and emphasised that the cluster exists 
to address the silo mentality, silo planning and silo implementation. In this regard, 
they tended to be in favour of having structures that enable sharing and planning 
and the implementation of programmes. Top Managers, therefore, tended to find 
the structures beneficial.  
In relation to Protocols, Senior Managers identified Silos as a driver whereas Top 
Managers identified it as neither a driver nor an outcome, with a sum of zero for 
arrows indicating ‘in’ and ‘out’. 
 
7.5 SYSTEM INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS 
The SID presented in Figure 7.1 shows that both Senior and Top Managers 
indicate Leadership and Execution as a primary driver and a secondary driver 
respectively. The next significant driver for both Top and Senior Managers is 
Culture. The key differences lie in four affinities. 
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Whereas Top Managers had a linear succession of secondary drivers, the picture 
for Senior Managers showed a virtual cycle of strategic planning formed by four 
affinities, namely Silos → Sharing Goals → Resources → Planning. 
Senior Managers identified Silos as an outcome and expressed concern regarding 
Silos as it relates to Planning. This is because cluster planning and monitoring is 
led and undertaken by Senior Managers within the Strategy Units of the 
departments and entities. It is for this reason that Silos forms part of the virtual 
cycle with planning, sharing goals and resources. 
Top Managers identified Silos as a driver rather than an outcome, and this shows 
more concern with the persistent silo mentality and less concern with the number 
of structures or meetings. 
 
Figure 7.1 Senior Manager vs. Top Manager Systems Influence Diagram 
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Although Senior and Top Managers considered the same set of affinities, it was 
not advisable to construct a composite SID because of the differences in the 
number of participants. The SID for Senior Managers involved 13 participants 
whereas the SID for Top Managers was constructed with data from five 
participants. The composite, therefore, would present a picture skewed towards 
Senior Managers. 
The final SID is based on the Senior Managers because these Managers represent 
a large portion of the participants in the intragovernmental collaboration. Figure 7.2 
presents the Senior Manager SID as a final presentation of the intragovernmental 
collaboration. In this representation, the virtual cycle of ‘Silo Planning’ has been 
converted into a linear representation in order to present a useful diagram. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Affinities and their relationships for the JCPS collaboration 
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The findings of the focus group and the interviews provide the building blocks for 
the strategic management framework that is described in Section 7.7.  
 
7.6 FROM AFFINITIES TO DIMENSIONS OF INTRAGOVERNMENTAL 
COLLABORATION 
Northcutt and McCoy (2004) define affinities as categories of meaning identified 
by people who experience the phenomenon being studied. The naming of the 
affinities is usually done by participants through consensus. In the current 
research, an independent facilitator led the focus group session in a process that 
included the naming of the affinities. These affinities were, therefore, not 
pre-determined by the researcher through literature but were experiences 
described by the participants.  
Within this section, descriptions and explanations from participants were matched 
with those in literature to contribute insights that were fully grounded in the 
experience of the participants. In addition to the description and naming of 
dimensions, the process included identification of appropriate solutions that 
address challenges of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. 
Leadership 
This research found that the concept of leadership, identified through the focus 
group, aligns with leadership described in literature. However, leadership issues 
within the JCPS Cluster were found to be acute and pervasive. This finding was 
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not unexpected due to the nature of mandated and directed collaborations that 
have no profit motive. 
The challenges of leadership were found to originate beyond the JCPS Cluster 
itself. For example, one participant indicated that the issue of lack of accountability 
within the cluster was not resolved even when issues were escalated to Cabinet. 
Given the difficulties in removing underperforming leadership, it is important to 
develop a model that will help identify leadership that will perform and make an 
impact within the cluster. 
The political system in South Africa makes it difficult for the State President to hold 
his Cabinet accountable because politically, these are the people who support and 
uphold his Presidency. However, the identification of strong and appropriate 
leadership within the cluster will likely be sufficient to ensure a well-functioning 
collaborative effort. 
This research emphasised the importance of having a visionary and transformative 
leader to address crime as a wicked problem. It is important for this leader to cut 
across silos and bureaucratic challenges, to set out a vision and to work 
persistently towards the vision. This is by far the most important attribute and is 
considered the primary driver of intragovernmental collaborations.  
Three leadership attributes (inherent characteristics) include facilitation and 
management skills; ability to take appropriate action (act, enable, observe); and 
reflexivity, resilience, responsiveness and revitalisation (Termeer et al., 2015). The 
onus, therefore, is on the people or person selecting the leader to seek out such 
attributes specifically.  
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On issues of behaviours, the JCPS Cluster leaders should be able to lead and 
encourage action from people over whom they may not have full control. 
Leadership for wicked problems needs to demonstrate an appropriate balance 
between transformation leadership to excite and inspire action and a collaborative 
leadership style that is persuasive, builds trust and communicates effectively 
(Head and Alford, 2015). In addition, the leader needs to be persistent and resilient, 
given the persistent challenges facing the JCPS Cluster. Unlike attributes, 
behaviours are learnt and are, therefore, less critical than attributes. The current 
model of cluster leadership based solely on the position is, therefore, rejected.  
Findings suggest that the highest-ranking Cabinet Minister can lead other Cabinet 
Ministers as the Cluster Ministerial Head. The DG reporting to the highest-ranking 
Minister could, therefore, head the Cluster Directors-General Forum. Although this 
arrangement sounds acceptable, it was found not to work well. One participant 
indicated that despite this model being used for some time, it did not address 
leadership issues within the cluster. Another participant indicated that if the 
Minister and the DG are not in the core entities of the criminal justice system 
(i.e. the policing, courts or correctional facilities), then this creates issues of 
inadequate focus on cluster-related responsibilities.  
Based on the identified issues, this research arrives at the model shown in 
Figure 7.3 for the assignment of chairpersons for leadership of the cluster to assist 




Figure 7.3 The Leadership Model for the JCPS Cluster  
Source: Author 
 
The base of the triangle, the most important section, indicates visionary and 
transformational leadership attributes. This is followed in importance by 
collaborative skills that inspire action and thereafter, the need to be responsive and 
reflexive amidst a wide range of interests, inputs and considerations. Although it is 
advisable for the Minister and the DG of the cluster to be from one of the key 
criminal justice departments, this cannot be at the expense of the attributes and 
behaviours needed to tame crime within the South African context.  
Based on the description, the common practice of placing most emphasis on 
aligning the leadership of the cluster with the highest-ranking political head in the 
cluster is discouraged.  
It should be emphasised that some of the reforms needed to support leadership 
within the JCPS Cluster should include an appropriate legislative framework to give 
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the DPME the power to support cluster collaborations and take system-wide 
decisions that tend to be avoided. 
Culture 
Some participants indicated that there is no single culture for the cluster. However, 
based on the concept of culture, the cluster as a social grouping has a culture. 
These participants, nonetheless, described behaviours that were in line with those 
who provided descriptions of the JCPS Cluster.  
Culture, as a dimension of interorganisational networks, is not explicitly widely 
studied (Weare, Lichterman & Esparza, 2014). For the current research, it was 
found that culture was not only one of the identified dimensions but was also 
identified as a driver for collaboration. Participants described behaviours that 
indicate a poor-performance culture, lack of accountability and a public-service 
mentality of sheltered employment. This dimension reflects the uniqueness of the 
mandated and directed collaborations found to be prevalent in the public sector. 
Silos and Collaborative Capability  
Based on the descriptions of the participants, this affinity aligns with the description 
of collaborative capability of Huxham (1993a) as a key requirement when 
considering the readiness of an organisation to collaborate with others.  
The JCPS Cluster was founded precisely to address the situation of silos within 
the criminal justice system. More than 20 years later, this research found that silos 
still persist and that the cluster has not made major strides in dealing with the 
persistent challenge of crime. 
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The silo issue was found to be prevalent at cluster level and within cluster entities. 
At the highest level, the silo challenge exists due to lack of leadership. The JCPS 
Cluster does not have a single leader with powers and delegations to lead. This 
means that decisions are mere recommendations and cannot be enforced by 
anyone within the cluster. For example, the Minister of Justice, even as a Chair of 
the Cluster, is not in a position to give instructions to the Minister of Police. The 
DPME does not have any decision-making delegations to break stalemates and 
stand-offs between departments.  
All decisions in government are made in line with legislation or regulations. Current 
regulations do not allow any Chair of the Cluster or anyone within the DPME to 
make decisions that will address silos. As was indicated by the participants, despite 
major efforts at a system-wide strategic plan, individual departments have simply 
abandoned the effort and reverted to their own silo-based objectives.  
The key finding of this research in addressing silos is the need for a legislative 
instrument that will transfer powers of strategic planning from individual 
government departments to the DPME. This will enable the DPME to facilitate and 
propose system-wide planning and system-wide performance indicators for a fair 
and impartial evaluation of the performance of government departments and their 
leaders. 
The second challenge with silos lies within the government departments 
themselves. The interconnectedness of criminal justice entities means that the 
JCPS Cluster cannot be abolished. This means that imperfections originating 
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within individual departments must be identified and dealt with in order to enable 
the cluster to function optimally.  
To improve collaborative capability within the JCSP Cluster, it is important to 
assess each organisation’s readiness to collaborate and where possible, to plan 
interventions to improve. An instrument to assess collaborative capability or 
readiness to collaborate has been developed by Huxham (1993a) and is shown in 
Table 7.3.  







Degree of organisational autonomy    
Degree of individual autonomy    
Cohesiveness of organisational structure    
Development of strategic processes    
Degree of elaboration of their own 
strategy statement 
   
Degree to which collaboration is an issue    
Source: Huxham, 1993b 
A full assessment is required to determine the readiness for collaboration, followed 
by a collaborative capacity-building strategy. Thereafter, collaborative capacity 
should be reviewed annually to accommodate changes in structures and 
strategies. Key coordinators of the cluster (i.e. the DPME or the Cluster 
Secretariat) should use this model to identify short-term risks that will impede the 
functionality of the cluster. 
Protocols and Governance 
Participants’ descriptions of Protocols refer to governance structures, 
decision-making processes and practices that often impede the work of the cluster. 
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Within interorganisational literature, these refer to governance of an 
interorganisational network.  
Senior Managers described protocols as ‘red tape’ because of the extent to which 
decisions are delayed and the fact that the JCPS Cluster impedes their work. This 
research found that one level of Senior Managers (Level 13) within the JCPS 
Cluster are overworked with attendance of numerous meetings and 
implementation of plans, and in some instances, stand in for their DGs (Heads of 
Government Departments), whereas there are two other levels of leadership 
whose participation is limited and often laissez-faire and aloof. The Governance 
Framework of the cluster needs to identify explicitly the levels of management for 
strategic thinking and those for alignment and implementation. Given the pervasive 
silo mentality, there is a need to rationalise and ensure appropriate alignment and 
broader participation rather than decrease the number of meetings. 
In developing a governance model, care needs to be taken to balance the cost 
associated with collaboration with the value attained through the collaboration. A 
governance model is part of this cost and includes the human resources and the 
administrative costs of ensuring the smooth running of the collaboration.  
The key model of Provan and Kenis (2008) is appropriate for understanding the 
JCPS Cluster and is shown in Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4 Model for governance in interorganisational networks 
Forms of 
Governance 












Few High Low Low 
Lead Organisation  Narrowly 
distributed 








Moderately high High High 
Source: Provan and Kenis, 2008 
The current governance framework within the cluster shows two approaches. The 
first is the Participant-Governed Network Model in which all participants of a 
collaboration participate on an equal footing. The cluster approach is 
long-standing, and the Secretariat is traditionally chosen from one of the cluster 
institutions. Secretariat for the Cluster would be a Senior Manager and his team 
from one of the key departments such as the DOJCD. This Secretariat is allocated 
on a five-year rotational basis, with the last two years being in the DOJCD and the 
DOD.  
Although this model is cost effective, it is ineffective where goal consensus is low. 
Within the JCPS Cluster, the vision of a safe South Africa is shared. However, 
organisations seem to be pulling in different directions in critical areas where 
consensus is needed. These include strategic decisions on the approach to 
addressing crime and arriving at joint performance targets and budgets.  
The second model, the Lead Organisation based on the model of Provan and 
Kenis (2008), was found most appropriate for mandated networks (Mandell, 1988). 
Within the JCPS Cluster, the DPME is the lead organisation. The department was 
established in 2010 to fulfil the function of overseeing government departments 
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and facilitating planning within clusters. Because the DPME is a government 
department that is close to the Presidency, it is in a more powerful coordinating 
role for Outcome 3: All People Are and Feel Safe. 
Given the existing government-wide systems, two models are recommended. It 
should be noted that the use of more than one model is not unusual (Koffijberg, 
De Bruijn & Priemus, 2012) and, therefore, instead of adopting the 
Participant-Governed or the Lead Organisation, both are recommended.  
In this scenario, it is recommended that the DPME acts as the Lead Organisation 
in addressing goal consensus issues that cannot be resolved by cluster 
departments. However, regarding government-wide accountability systems, the 
cluster needs to be led by one of the government ministers responsible for 
implementation of plans. This means that the cluster still needs a 
Participant-Governed model. 
The main difference between this model and the current model used within the 
cluster lies in the role of the DPME. In its current state, the DPME tends to play 
only a coordinating role regarding cluster planning. This shortcoming was identified 
by participants as needing ‘teeth’ in dealing with highly contested and challenging 
cluster issues, which include joint budgeting and system-wide performance 
indicators that are often highly contested, and where cluster departments find it 
difficult to balance cluster and departmental priorities. 
The proposed governance model distinguishes between the role of the DPME and 
that of the JCPS Cluster as indicated in Table 7.5.  
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Table 7.5 Role of DPME vs. JCPS Cluster in governance 
 DPME 
(Lead Organisation) 
JCPS Cluster  
(Participative Governance) 








Cluster implementation plan 
Reporting 
Policy coordination 
Issue addressed Address the issue of cluster departments 
lobbying for budgets on their own 
 
Address intercluster issues 
 
Address provincial and local government 
linkages 
 
Address operational and 
implementation issues within 
the criminal justice system 
Source: Author 
In summary, a more aggressive administration of government clusters needs to be 
implemented and in particular, the DPME should consider playing a more formal 
administrative role as the Lead Organisation for government clusters. The 
formalities considered should include legislation, regulation or a policy that would 
be able to empower the DPME to make certain decisions in the interest of service 
delivery.  
Shared Goals to Goal Consensus 
Every organisation of the cluster exists to discharge its own constitutional and 
legislative mandates. In discharging these mandates with limited resources, 
organisational goals impede each other. For example, the SAPS works tirelessly 
on investigating and arresting suspects. The NPA routinely tries to remand 
suspects in detention, whereas the DCS experiences overcrowding. In addition, 
the SAPS may be focusing on easy crimes such as common theft and not focusing 
enough on difficult but impactful cases such as illicit trade. This shared goal 
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paradox was clearly articulated by all participants because it is at the heart of 
dealing with crime in South Africa.  
Achieving consensus on shared goals is difficult and takes considerable time 
through a negotiated process. It has been stressed by scholars such as Wood and 
Gray (1991), Innes and Booher (1999) and Cheng (2013) that this process should 
not be hurried because it is the core of the collaboration. It is important to obtain 
the right people, adopt the right facilitative process and do whatever it takes to 
ensure that all participants are in agreement.  
Arriving at a consensus of goals for a wicked problem is an even more difficult 
undertaking. Based on the Complexity Theory, the success factors that the 
consensus-building process should include are as follows: 
• Knowledge management: Approaching crime from a pluralist point of view 
by synthesising as many perspectives as possible from a wide range of 
angles through a number of stakeholders in order to understand the 
problem better (Richardson, 2008). This means an obsession with data and 
the development and management of knowledge that assists the JCPS 
Cluster in understanding crime and all its manifestations.  
• Active citizenship: Taming crime as a wicked problem is a societal problem 
that needs to involve a broad range of members of society that includes not 
only victims of crime but also those who work extensively within the criminal 
justice system. These stakeholders must include non-governmental 
organisations such as those dealing with crimes against vulnerable groups 
to help make sense of and share issues related to pervasive crimes.  
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• Organisational Learning and Mental Models: Driven by strong leadership, 
the JCPS Cluster needs participants who are able to confront long-standing 
assumptions and knowledge (Cassidy and Stanley, 2019; Kim and Senge, 
1994). In their work on organisational learning, Kim and Senge (1994) 
described a concept of ‘shared mental models’ that can assist in the process 
towards confronting prevailing thoughts. 
Building consensus towards a common understanding of the problem proceeds in 
an iterative style as follows: 
1. Involve as many people as possible to understand the issue from all 
possible angles. This includes citizens, non-governmental organisations 
and academic institutions. An obsession for data and analysis is critical to 
the process of seeking consensus among a wide range of stakeholders. 
This is not a once-off process; it is iterative. 
2. The common themes that assist the criminal justice system in addressing 
crime is approaching problems through issues of efficiency, effectiveness 
and fairness (Bernard et al., 2005). This means that all players of the 
criminal justice system, regardless of the mandate, should have these three 
issues as common themes. Arrival at definitions, descriptions and high-level 
targets for an efficient, effective and fair criminal justice system would 
represent consensus on which crime can be addressed.  
3. These themes could then be translated into objectives and targets for 
implementation within the different departments of the cluster. 




Figure 7.4 Consensus-building process for the JCPS cluster 
 
This process should ideally be led by the DPME, which has an interest in the 
creation of a safer South Africa. This department would not be defensive and would 
be more likely to make decisions in the interest of the criminal justice system as a 
whole.  
It should be emphasised that the process is long and tedious and will most 
probably span more than one or two years. It should also be noted that the model 
is dynamic and includes feedback loops at critical areas of discussion. Some of 
the critical issues that require in-depth analysis include common understanding of 
the importance of social-crime prevention in the fight against crime; issues such 
as gender-based violence; economic crimes that affect the economy such as illicit 
trade; and balancing all of these with issues of common assault, murder and 
robbery.  
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Once a common understanding of the problem is established, a collaborative 
strategic management approach will address the details where specific crimes are 
targeted and funding is ring-fenced.  
Planning and Joint Planning 
A meta-strategy was defined by Huxham (1993b) as a high-level statement of the 
meta-mission and meta-objectives of a collaborative effort. An improved 
formulation of a collaborative strategy by Clarke and Fuller (2011) includes a joint 
course of action and implementation. A collaborative strategy or meta-strategy 
should include an implementation plan.  
On achieving goal clarity, the next step for the JCPS Cluster would be to formulate 
a meta-strategy that translates the goal into a five-year operational plan that is in 
line with the South African Government Plan of Action. Given the level of 
interdependence between the entities of the JCPS Cluster, this plan should include 
meta-objectives. This, therefore, means that the medium-term strategic framework 
or five-year plan can only produce tangible results if preceded by an in-depth 
process of consensus building.  
Resources to Joint Resourcing 
For the JCPS Cluster, resourcing surpasses a five-year strategic plan and a 
one-year implementation plan. Resourcing also refers to the way in which the 
entire criminal justice system is resourced in addressing the crime situation, thus 
exceeding the five-year planning horizon.  
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Participants expressed the need for long-term, system-wide consideration of key 
resources. Without a well-considered and in-depth goal consensus, resourcing for 
the JCPS Cluster will reflect imbalance and incoherence. For example, some 
organisations within the cluster have staff growth that is disproportionate, thus 
causing backlogs in other areas.  
Other key areas of resourcing that need urgent attention are capital spending and 
the roll-out of service points. A common approach is needed to avoid having police 
stations, courts and correctional centres rolled out in different directions. 
Once goal consensus is achieved and key long-term resourcing is put together, 
the JCPS Cluster would be ready to consolidate the five-year strategic plans and 
the one-year implementation plans in line with a common understanding of the 
long-term goals. 
Execution 
Execution was identified as a primary outcome for the collaborative process. 
Although the long-term outcome of the collaboration is addressing the crime 
problem for a safer country, the short- to medium-term outcome is effective 
execution of a well-thought-out plan to address crime. 
In summary, the affinities identified by the focus group are conceptualised as 
dimensions of collaborations for the JCPS Cluster as indicated in Table 7.6. 
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Table 7.6 Translation of affinities to dimensions of collaboration 
# Affinity identified by the focus 
group 
Factor of the JCPS collaboration 
1 Leadership Leadership 
2 Culture Culture 
3 Silos Collaborative Capability 
4 Protocols Governance 
5 Sharing Goals Goal Consensus 
6 Planning Joint Planning 
7 Resources Joint Resourcing 
8 Execution Execution 
 
7.7 FINAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTRAGOVERNMENTAL COLLABORATION 
The literature review in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 identified dimensions of 
collaborations through the RDT, the TCE and the GST. The conceptual framework 




Figure 7.5 Literature-based conceptual framework for intragovernmental 
collaboration  
Source: Author 
Participants who took part in the IQA process identified eight affinities associated 
with the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. Participants did not have access 
to the conceptual framework beforehand, which meant that the affinities identified 
were grounded in their own experiences and not led by literature. 
The affinities were subsequently classified in terms of the extent to which they are 
drivers and outcomes. The identified affinities were compared with the factors of 
collaboration as conceptualised in literature and the conceptual framework. Key 




Figure 7.6 Key changes to the literature-based conceptual framework for 
intragovernmental collaboration.  
Source: Author 
Some collaboration dimensions identified through literature were found to play a 
less significant role within the JCPS collaboration. The first of these was Trust. 
Although Trust is an important determinant in voluntary networks, it is also 
identified as an important consideration for mandated networks (Huxham and 
Vangen, 2004; McGuire, 2006). For the JCPS collaboration, Trust did not play an 
important role in the collaboration itself. However, rather than mentioning trust 
among members of the cluster, participants alluded to the issues of corruption that 
had been identified through the Judicial Commission of Enquiry on Allegations of 
State Capture. 
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Power is often used by participants to influence the network in different ways. For 
example, some influential participants can threaten to withdraw their participation 
from a network and others can withdraw resources that are useful for the 
partnership. Rodriguez et al. (2007) found that power plays a critical role even in 
mandated networks. In contrast, Gray (1985) found that power plays very little role 
in terms of a mandated network. Within the JCPS collaboration, power was not 
used to intimidate participants, to threaten withdrawal or to push certain decisions 
to the extent often described in literature.  
Some of the issues that were vaguely mentioned in relation to power were a 
symptom of leadership issues rather than destructive power play. For example, 
one participant mentioned that importance accorded to a subcommittee of the 
cluster is based on how powerful its Chairperson is. For example, a forum led by 
the SAPS General will be well attended whereas a forum led by a different 
organisation may have lower-level delegates attending. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that power was not one of the affinities identified by the participants in the 
focus group.  
The researcher initially identified collaborative capability as a matter to be 
addressed in the process of collaboration within the cluster and not as an 
antecedent. In contrast, participants identified collaborative capability (referred to 
as Silos) as one of the drivers (antecedents) of the JCPS collaboration. Top 
Managers emphasised the fact that the cluster system was established primarily 
to address the persistent challenge of working collaboratively. The final framework, 
therefore, shows collaborative capability as an antecedent. 
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Regarding culture, this research revealed practices and norms that are prevalent 
in cluster entities and that impede the ability of the cluster to function. These 
include the lack of performance-driven culture, the lack of accountability and other 
behaviours associated with tendencies of sheltered employment. Although within 
literature, the issue did not come across as prevalent, within the JCPS Cluster, it 
was addressed as a driver and is included in the framework. 
An important area that forms part of the conceptual framework but received little 
mention from participants was related to the Complexity Theory. In addressing 
crime as a wicked problem, these dimensions become critical and game-changing. 
Knowledge management, organisational learning and active citizenship exist as a 
feedback loop and in line with systems theory should be used continually to gather 
insights, to reflect and to move forward towards taming a wicked problem. The 
feedback and interaction with external players introduce a state of disequilibrium 
within the criminal justice system, which in turn, introduces the change and 
innovation needed to move the system back into a state of equilibrium.  
The final framework is shown in Figure 7.7. 
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7.8 COMPARISON BETWEEN LITERATURE-BASED FRAMEWORKS AND 
MODELS 
The outcome of the research is a strategic framework to assist the JCPS Cluster 
in addressing crime. The building blocks of the framework consist of dimensions 
of collaboration. The discussion on literature-based frameworks, therefore, begins 
with these building blocks. 
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Literature identifies and describes dimensions of interorganisational networks with 
a number of meta-analyses. For example, the study by Kozuch and Sienkiewicz-
Malyjurek (2016) identifies 68 factors that determine and influence public 
interorganisational networks. Other studies that identified factors include those of 
Mattessich, Murray-Close and Monsey (2001) and Emerson et al. (2006).  
 Absent from the list of factors is interorganisational culture, which was found 
prominent in the JCPS collaboration. Among reasons for the strength of this factor 
within the JCPS network could be the difficulties associated with mandated and 
directed networks. Similarly, power was found to be a less important factor, and 
this is in line with previous studies by Gray (1985) and Hall et al. (1977), which 
found that the mandate reduces power dynamics. Trust was found to be less 
important, and one of the key reasons is that participants are not in a position to 
threaten the existence or working of the network.  
With the exception of the three factors that are in contrast with those in literature, 
the seven remaining dimensions identified by participants in this research are 
included in the framework of Emerson et al. (2011). It should be noted that 
Emerson’s framework considered the works of other scholars such as Ansell and 
Gash (2008), Thomson and Perry (2006) and Wood and Gray (1991) and is, 
therefore, comprehensive. 
Three additional dimensions that strengthened the response to crime as a wicked 
problem (Active Citizenship, Knowledge Management, Organisational Learning) 
were sourced from the Complexity Theory and were shown explicitly on the 
framework as a feedback loop. Studies of the Complexity Theory and governance 
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networks have been undertaken in other areas associated with complexity such as 
game theory by scholars including Eppel (2017) and Erik-Hans Klijn (2008). 
However, the feedback loop was found most appropriate for the context under 
which the JCPS Cluster is operating. 
The framework presents a practical solution to improving the JCPS Cluster 
network and will make it possible for leaders to begin to address systematic and 
deep-rooted issues relating to crime. The framework is the first step in creating an 
enabling environment to address the problem.  
 
7.9 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The framework presented in Figure 7.2 could be used to improve the functionality 
of the JCPS Cluster. In addition to implementation of the framework, the following 
are recommendations that could further assist in strengthening the JCPS cluster. 
Key participants within the cluster tend to be Senior Managers who shoulder both 
planning and implementation responsibilities. It was found that most of the 
responsibilities of the JCPS Cluster are delegated to Senior Managers (Directors), 
and this over-delegation leaves two higher levels of management out of touch and 
Senior Managers overworked. It is therefore recommended that the terms of 
reference of the key cluster structures include the participation of Deputy DGs and 
Chief Directors as part of the quorum requirements.  
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Participants indicated frustration with the planning calendar that is in conflict with 
the realities of the cluster. This misstep was identified during both the five-year 
planning and the annual planning periods. It is recommended that timelines are 
revised and that leadership enforce the deadlines that have been agreed upon. 
There is an urgent need for the cluster to use data to debate and discuss issues 
relating to crime in South Africa. There were indications that in some situations, 
data that were important in guiding better decision-making are not consistently 
shared. The feedback loop indicated in the framework for intragovernmental 
collaboration requires rigorous and honest feedback from both insiders and 
outsiders. It is, therefore, recommended that data become central in all cluster 
meetings to enable common understanding of problems, to garner support for 
solutions and to monitor progress. Furthermore, decisions not supported by 
appropriate data should be avoided. 
The involvement of civil society, academia and other non-governmental role 
players should form part of the feedback loop shown in the Framework for 
Intragovernmental Collaborations. Although participation in decision-making is not 
necessary, reports, research and other guidance could play a critical role in 
broadening the knowledge base in addressing crime and could provide insights 
that might not be available within government. 
A legislative framework needs to be developed to strengthen the role of the DPME. 
This includes taking decisions where members of the cluster are in conflict and 
tend to act in their own self-interest. Although consultation must continue, 
long-outstanding decisions could be made by redefining the role of the DPME in 
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leadership and assisting decision-making. The role of the DPME could, therefore, 
include coordination of the cluster outcomes and drive decisions that are crucial 
for improving the functionality of the cluster.  
In ensuring a clear demarcation between the roles of the DPME and the JCPS 
Cluster, it is important to differentiate the collaborative and coordinative roles. It is 
recommended that the DPME play a collaborative role of joint planning and joint 
resourcing for the JCPS Cluster plan. This means that the DPME should receive 
inputs and finalise the plan for approval by the President. The final decision on the 
quality of the plan should lie with the DPME rather than with individual members of 
the cluster. This is important in avoiding a cluster plan that is silo-based and targets 
that are too soft. More importantly, the plan should reflect a systems-based 
approach to addressing identified priorities.  
Responsibilities of the Chairperson of the JCPS Cluster (Director-General) could 
be steered towards implementation of the plan through coordination within the 
cluster. This could take place once the well-thought-out plan led by the DPME is 
finalised. 
Regarding cluster leadership, the decision to appoint leaders could be centred on 
the attributes of the leaders and their capability to lead complex networks. A leader 
should be considered for his/her ability to inspire action, inculcate a performance-
driven culture, address silos and produce results. 
More creative communication channels within the cluster could be considered. 
Even where there is limited participation, the other employees in the departments 
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and entities need to remain informed so that they can support the work of the 
cluster. 
Goal consensus for wicked problems is a lengthy process. For the JCPS Cluster, 
this process includes decisions on the relative importance of crime prevention 
versus crime combating. Other key decisions include consensus on the crime 
priorities that would make the most difference in addressing crime and on how to 
resource the JCPS Cluster across departments and entities. Resourcing involves 
consensus on the approach to service delivery, investment in service points and 
the appropriate capacitation thereof. A major facilitative process needs to be 
undertaken for this consensus-building process to ensure that all stakeholders are 
committed to and ready to implement the well-thought-out cluster plans.  
Directors-General are an equivalent of Chief Executive Officers in the private 
sector and are, therefore, highly experienced administrators whose next career 
moves are linked to success in their current posts. Ministers are politicians with 
limited tenure and are linked to political dynamics within their parties. Rogue 
politicians have been found to interfere with the effectiveness of the criminal justice 
system, with Directors-General and other key leaders removed from office for 
allegedly refusing to take decisions that are favourable to politicians. To void the 
conflicts associated with this interface, it is recommended that the Public Service 
Commission becomes involved in both the selection of the Directors-General and 




The focus group and interviews undertaken with Senior and Top Managers 
provided an in-depth understanding of intragovernmental collaboration within the 
JCPS Cluster. Detailed quotations demonstrated issues and challenges that are 
experienced by the two groups. 
Within the current chapter, an in-depth discussion of the affinities was undertaken, 
and these were translated from affinities identified by the research participants to 
dimensions identified through literature.  
A final system influence diagram for the research was compiled, and this was used 
as a precursor to the final framework for the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration. 
In addition to the framework, recommendations emanating from the research are 
discussed. 
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8 CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The JCPS Cluster is an intragovernmental collaboration tracing back to 1996 that 
was established to improve collaborative efforts in addressing crime. Although 
some successes have been registered through the years, there were indications 
that further exploration was needed to improve its functioning in addressing crime 
in South Africa. The key objective of the research was to consider issues within 
the JCPS Cluster and produce a strategic management framework that would 
guide the cluster towards improving the collaboration. The strategic management 
framework is presented in Chapter 7.  
 Chapter 8 outlines the research process and indicates the extent to which the 
research responded to the three research questions of the study. The chapter also 
provides a summary of the objectives of the research, the theories underpinning 
the research, the detailed literature review and the findings.  
In addition to the summary, the chapter details the contributions made by the 
research to the body of knowledge within interorganisational networks in general 
and intragovernmental collaborations in particular. Limitations of the research and 
areas of future research are also identified. 
In closing, the researcher presents a personal reflection and concluding remarks. 
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8.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
8.2.1 Motivation for the study 
Interorganisational partnerships vary extensively. Within the public sector, some 
networks are mandatory and some are voluntary, with the latter tending to include 
the public and the private sector on narrow policy initiatives. 
Unlike voluntary networks, mandatory and directed networks are the easiest to 
form but are challenging in sustaining good results (Schopler, 1987). Many of these 
networks address wicked problems, which are long-standing, pervasive and 
multifaceted problems that the public sector is often called upon to solve. The lack 
of a profit motive is one of the key reasons that these networks are difficult. 
However, there is a need and a drive to improve the performance of such networks 
and to provide value to stakeholders. The collaboration of the JCPS Cluster for 
addressing crime is such a network.  
Research conducted thus far does not explicitly differentiate between networks 
that are mandated and furthermore, does not differentiate between directed and 
self-directed networks. For this reason, factors of collaborations are mostly 
generalised. The current research focused on intragovernmental collaborations, 
which are both mandated and directed. 
Following the development of their broad framework for collaborative governance, 
Emerson, Nabatchi and Balogh (2011:22) make a specific call for researchers to 
develop frameworks that are context-specific: 
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Additional research is needed to discover which relationships matter in what 
contexts, that is, researchers need to identify where, when, and why which 
components are necessary, and to what degree, for collaborative success. 
Further calls to understand different forms of networks continue to be made: 
Future research could further improve our understanding of different types of 
networks and their implications by drawing upon, extending, and refining 
existing typologies. (Gazley and Guo, 2020:10) 
Other calls for studies in mandated networks include those by McNamara (2012), 
Putansu (2015) and Gil-Garcia et al. (2019). 
Given that wicked problems are unique and require unique solutions, this research 
proposed a framework that applies to South Africa and its historical context and to 
the governance context under which crime is addressed. This presented a 
compelling reason to undertake the research.  
The research, therefore, sought to gain an in-depth understanding of the JCPS 
intergovernmental collaborations and to produce a framework that provides 
solutions for the cluster and thus contributes to the literature of intragovernmental 
collaborations.  
8.2.2 Developing a theoretical framework through literature  
In understanding the JCPS collaboration and working towards a framework, a 
literature survey was undertaken to identify dimensions of collaboration and to 
produce a literature-based theoretical framework.  
Factors of intragovernmental collaboration were identified through theories 
associated with interorganisational networks, and this enabled the researcher to 
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anchor the dimensions of collaboration in theory. The three theories that were 
identified were the RDT, the TCE and the Complexity Theory.  
The RDT explains the reliance of organisations on other organisations to achieve 
some of their goals. The TCE explains costs (in all its manifestations) and expected 
benefits that need to be considered for participating in networks. Given that the 
criminal justice system consists of individual parts that need to work together 
towards a larger common goal, the GST and the Complexity Theory were deemed 
appropriate for the current research. 
The dimensions of collaboration that were identified were as follows: 
• The RDT: Goal Clarity; Power and Trust  
• TCE: Collaborative Advantage; Collaborative Strategic Management; 
Governance and Knowledge Management 
• Complexity Theory: Knowledge Management; Organisational Learning; 
Active Citizenship; and Leadership Capabilities. 
A further review of the literature regarding the factors of collaboration was 
undertaken to describe and understand these factors and to produce a conceptual 
framework as detailed under Section 5.6. This framework was developed by the 
researcher using a body of knowledge of interorganisational networks.  
8.2.3 Research design 
The research was undertaken through a constructivist approach, which 
acknowledges the development of knowledge through multiple realities and 
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experiences. Qualitative research was adopted in line with the objectives of the 
research. 
Interactive Qualitative Analysis was found to be an ideal method due to its 
relevance to the research being undertaken. The method allowed for identification 
of the dimensions of intragovernmental collaborations (Research Question 1) and 
the interrelationships between the dimensions (Research Question 2). 
The important consideration in the use of IQA was that participants identified 
affinities of intragovernmental collaborations without being guided by literature 
studies. This meant that the affinities of the JCPS collaboration that were identified 
by the participants through the current research are authentic and are grounded in 
the environment and experiences of the participants.  
Regarding the interrelationships between the affinities, the IQA allowed for a 
detailed investigation into all possible relationships between the affinities, which 
led to the identification of those that are prominent in explaining the JCPS 
intragovernmental collaboration. 
The two constituencies that were identified for providing input into the JCPS 
collaboration were Senior Managers who are extensively involved in the 
collaborative efforts and Top Managers who have power over the workings of the 
collaboration. Ten Senior Managers took part in the focus group that identified 
affinities and ten Senior Managers and five Top Managers took part in the 
semi-structured interviews. Availability and access to high-ranking leadership 
within the criminal justice system and their willingness to share their thoughts was 
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facilitated by the researcher as an insider. This privilege would have been difficult 
for an outsider. 
The participation by Senior Managers and Top Managers presented the 
opportunity to triangulate the research results. Furthermore, the use of the focus 
group and the semi-structured interviews provided an additional triangulation 
opportunity. Another aspect of triangulation was the heuristic framework that was 
developed through the literature review. Data gathering for the research was, 
therefore, extensive and rigorous.  
8.2.4 Results 
Eight dimensions that are important in the JCPS collaboration were identified. The 
key driver for the JCPS collaboration was found to be Leadership. This is in line 
with literature on interorganisational networks. The current study went further and 
proposed a model for leadership that is appropriate for intragovernmental 
collaborations in general and for the JCPS Cluster in particular.  
Two key areas of divergence within the literature were identified. First, Power and 
Trust did not feature as key dimensions of collaboration. This study confirms that 
contrary to the literature for intragovernmental relationships, power as a factor was 
not found to be prominent in the JCPS collaboration. Power dynamics such as 
threats of withdrawal from participation and withdrawal of resources were not 
identified. Similarly, trust was not found to be a key factor; participants did not 
indicate any fears, doubt or uncertainties regarding ongoing participation or 
regarding other players. 
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The second area of divergence was Culture as a secondary driver. Particularly in 
public-service organisations, mandated networks often require members to 
participate and discharge the mandate as understood by the mandating authority. 
For the JCPS Cluster, there were indications that some members showed less 
interest than expected in the cluster and in the behaviours that negatively affect 
the collaboration. Culture was second to Leadership in importance whereas it was 
not found to be prominent in literature. 
When comparing the results of the Senior and Top Managers, the descriptions of 
the different dimensions of collaboration and the interrelationships between them 
were similar. For this reason, the inclusion of Top Managers provided triangulation 
of the Senior Manager results.  
The area of divergence between Senior and Top Managers was largely in their 
relative views of the importance of collaborative advantage (silos). Top Managers 
felt strongly about the importance of breaking the silos in the cluster and ensuring 
achievement of a collaborative advantage on addressing crime. Collaborative 
Capability was, therefore, identified as a driver for the JCPS collaboration. Senior 
Managers identified Governance as the third driver due to the challenges they 
experience with attendance of numerous meetings, harmonisation of decisions 
and inadequate participation by Top Management. A key recommendation for the 
JCPS Cluster is to work towards a healthy and appropriate balance between 
collaborative capability and an appropriate governance framework that supports 
this objective.  
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Although voluntary networks typically have clarity of goals at the beginning of the 
partnership, for wicked problems, this goal may not be as clear or full consensus 
may be difficult to obtain. For the JCPS Cluster, the vision of addressing crime in 
South Africa is well understood; however, participants indicate that there is no 
broad consensus on objectives to work towards this vision. One participant 
referred to this goal paradox as ‘the elephant in the room’ because of its 
complexity. For a wicked problem, arriving at goal clarity is a long, difficult and 
protracted process. Within the JCPS Cluster, it was found that Goal Clarity is an 
outcome that requires appropriate leadership, the right culture, appropriate 
governance and collaborative capability within all the participating organisations. 
Three factors of collaborations that are associated with the Complexity Theory and 
that address wicked problems did not feature prominently in the research. Only 
four participants described issues relating to knowledge management and 
attitudes towards data sharing and analysis. The second factor that did not feature 
was active citizenry, which involves the provision of feedback, data, research and 
ideas through organisations that do not participate fully as members of a 
collaboration. The third factor, organisational learning, promotes and encourages 
self-reflection and open-mindedness in addressing wicked problems. All three are 
appropriate factors to provide ongoing feedback that is important in addressing 
wicked problems. 
Regarding interrelationships between dimensions, the results of this research not 
only identify dimensions of collaboration in terms of drivers and outcomes but also 
presents their strengths as drivers and outcomes. The simplification process 
allowed for the preparation of a SID, which shows relative strengths of dimensions 
280 
as drivers and how they influence one another. For the JCPS Cluster, the SID was 
drawn as shown in Figure 8.1. 
 
 
Figure 8.1 System Influence Diagram for JCPS Cluster  
 
This SID can assist the JCPS collaboration in prioritising the issues that have been 
identified for a more effective collaboration. For example, arriving at goal 
consensus is important, but until issues of leadership, culture, governance and 
collaborative capability are dealt with, the collaboration will continue to remain a 
challenge. 
The strategic management framework for the JCPS collaboration that was 
produced through the current research differs from literature in the following ways: 
• Power and Trust were not identified as key dimensions and were removed. 
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• Culture featured prominently in the JCPS collaboration as one of the drivers 
of the collaboration and was thus included.  
• Goal Clarity was identified as an outcome due to the nature of crime being 
a wicked problem. 
• The JCPS framework captures the relative importance of drivers and 
outcomes. This standpoint provides a more refined perspective on the 
dimensions of collaboration. 
8.2.5 Responding to research objectives 
The first research objective was to uncover the lived experiences of managers 
involved in the JCPS Cluster in order to understand the intricacies of their 
intragovernmental collaboration. In understanding the nature of their collaboration, 
the research sought to identify the key dimensions of the collaboration. Eight 
dimensions were identified through the IQA process and interpretation by the 
researcher. See Table 8.1. 
The second research objective was to explain how the identified dimensions of 
collaborations interrelate. This was essential to understand the relative importance 
of these dimensions. The SID shows the order of importance from the primary 
driver of the collaboration (Leadership) to the primary outcome (Execution). The 
SID is shown in Figure 8.1 and summarised in Table 8.1. 
The third research objective was to produce a framework that can be used by the 
JCPS collaboration to make improvements in the functionality of the cluster as it 
addresses crime. Inputs from participants and the literature were combined to 
arrive at the framework shown in Figure 8.2. In addition, literature-based models 
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for Leadership, Collaborative Capability and Governance were drawn to provide 
further guidance on improving the JCPS collaboration. 
 
Table 8.1 Translation of affinities to dimensions of collaboration 
Research Objective Research Question Chapter Contribution 
(1) To uncover experiences 
of managers involved in 
intragovernmental 
collaborations at a strategic 
level and to understand 
dimensions affecting their 
efforts in addressing crime 
as a wicked problem 
(1) Which dimensions 




addressing crime as a 
wicked problem at a 
strategic level? 
The eight dimensions that were 
identified through this research 
were as follows: 
Leadership; Culture;  
Collaborative Capability; 
Governance; Goal Consensus; 
Joint Planning; Joint Resourcing;  
Execution 
(2) To develop a better 
understanding of how 
dimensions linked to 
intragovernmental 
collaborations interrelate 






Dimensions were classified as 
drivers and outcomes. The 
Systems Influence Diagram from 
Primary Driver to Primary 
Outcome is as follows:  
Leadership → Culture → 
Governance → Collaborative 
Capability → Goal Consensus → 
Joint Resourcing → Joint 
Planning → Execution 
 
(3) To produce a framework 





(3) How can identified 
dimensions and 
interrelationships be 
used to produce an 
intragovernmental 
framework that will help 
address wicked 
problems? 
The Framework is shown in 







Figure 8.2 Framework for Intragovernmental Collaborations for the JCPS Cluster 
 
8.3 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
Schopler (1987:704) described mandated and directed networks (Type I) as 
“Reliable Compliance” because their formation is straightforward but the level of 
compliance is expected to be high. The author furthermore predicted low levels of 
member satisfaction and minimal quality of output from such networks (Schopler, 
1987). 
Given the importance of such networks in the public service and in addressing 
wicked problems, there was a need to investigate and propose solutions that are 
relevant to address the shortcomings associated with these networks. 
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It should be noted that previous studies on mandated networks did not specifically 
focus on the peculiarity of networks that are both mandated and directed. For this 
reason, the existing body of knowledge was found to be over-generalised. The aim 
of the current study was to investigate the peculiar type of networks that the public 
service depends upon for effective service delivery. 
This research study made a substantial contribution to intragovernmental 
collaborations, both at an academic level and for the community of practice. In 
broad terms, this included the theoretical background that guided the research, the 
research methods used and the findings that were contrary to existing literature. 
8.3.1 Contribution to the body of knowledge 
The theoretical background of the research study was based on the RDT, TCE and 
GST. The dimensions of the collaboration that were proposed for the conceptual 
framework were, therefore, drawn through a thorough analysis of leading theories 
rather than the predominance of articles based in literature. This combination of 
theories was not found in literature for interorganisational networks. 
The research used IQA as the method to identify both the dimensions of the 
collaborations and the interrelationships between them. Participants identified 
dimensions of collaborations from first principles using an inductive approach. This 
meant that the dimensions of collaboration that were identified by participants were 
authentic and based solely on their experiences. No other interorganisational 
network study was found in literature that used this approach.  
The research was undertaken through three different layers of triangulation. The 
first was a comparison between data collected from Senior Managers and data 
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collected from Top Managers. The second was the data collected during the focus 
group and the semi-structured interviews. The third was the comparison between 
the conceptual model developed through literature and the model developed 
through the current research. 
Using the IQA method, the relationships between dimensions were identified and 
were arranged in the order of causal effect from primary driver to primary outcome. 
Research in interorganisational networks classifies dimensions as drivers and 
outcomes without indicating relative strength of these dimensions. This research 
has made a contribution towards a continuum of drivers and outcomes.  
Seven of the eight dimensions identified in this study were found in literature. 
Culture was the exception, with insufficient mention in the context of 
interorganisational networks. This affirms the usefulness of the IQA within 
interorganisational network research. 
A major area of contrast lies with the importance of Trust and Power. These are 
two of the most-studied factors due to the impact that they have on 
interorganisational networks. Although they were strongly associated with 
voluntary networks, they were also considered significant in both directed and 
mandated networks such as intragovernmental collaborations. However, the 
current research found to the contrary. Neither were part of the affinities identified 
by the participants and, therefore, were not substantial dimensions of the JCPS 
intragovernmental collaboration. Power and Trust are found to be prevalent in 
private sector networks. However, for public sector networks such as the JCPS 
Cluster, collaborating bodies do not exercise power over others in the same 
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manner as in private-sector-based networks and cannot withdraw participation or 
resources. Similarly, Trust was found not to play a substantial role because public 
sector participants have known mandates and the extent of participating is more 
predictable. 
The difficulty of intragovernmental collaborations lies in participants who are 
mandated and directed to participate. For the JCPS Cluster, Culture was identified 
as a driver of the collaboration second to Leadership due to the negative 
behaviours associated with participation that is mandated and directed. Culture 
does not enjoy prominence in interorganisational network literature, whereas it was 
prominent in the current research and was identified as a driver. 
This research identified three additional dimensions of collaboration linked to 
complexity and systems theory. Active Citizenship, Knowledge Management and 
Organisational Learning help the role and involvement of non-governmental 
participants who provide crucial and important feedback into the intragovernmental 
collaboration. The three practices guide the collaboration in becoming more 
reflexive and open-minded and more engaging in matters addressing crime. These 
dimensions were identified in literature but were not addressed as part of a holistic 
group of factors of interorganisational networks. 
The researcher was a participant within the JCPS Cluster and, therefore, had 
access to the appropriate Senior and Top Managers involved in the research. 
Access to these participants and the rich data they provided would have otherwise 
been difficult.  
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The study was based on addressing crime as a wicked problem within a developing 
country and broadens the body of knowledge of interorganisational networks to 
non-traditional contexts. Table 8.2 shows the contribution to the body of knowledge 
linked to literature.  
Table 8.2 Contribution of the research linked to literature 
Area Contribution Seminal Authors 
Research Questions 
(1) Which dimensions 
do managers identify 
as important in 
intragovernmental 
collaborations for 
addressing crime as a 
wicked problem at a 
strategic level? 
Dimensions of collaboration in 




• Collaborative Capability 
• Goal Consensus 
• Joint Planning 
• Resources 
• Execution 
Wood and Gray (1991) 
Huxham and Macdonald, 
(1992) 
Vangen and Huxham 
(2011) 
Provan and Kenis (2008) 
 
 
Dimensions of collaboration in 
literature but not prominent in the 





Wood and Gray (1991) 
Klijn, Edelenbos & Steijn 
(2010) 




Factor not prominent in literature 
but included in the current study: 
• Culture 
Weare, Lichterman & 
Esparza (2014) 






Drivers and outcomes of 
collaboration identified by 
different authors – Models found 
in literature do not indicate the 
process of classification of 
drivers and outcomes. 
 
Chen (2010) 
Ansell and Gash (2008) 
Emerson, Nabatchi & 
Balogh (2011) 
Thomson and Perry 
(2006) 
Continuum of drivers and 
outcomes through the IQA 
process 
Not found in the literature 





Area Contribution Seminal Authors 
Research Questions 
interrelationships be 
used to produce an 
intragovernmental 
framework that will 
help address wicked 
problems? 
Dimensions of collaboration 
arranged in order from Primary 
Driver to Primary Outcome 
 
 
Dimensions identified through 
Systems and Complexity Theory 
explicitly included in the 
framework: 
• Active Citizenship 
• Knowledge Management 
• Organisational Learning 
 
Head and Alford (2015) 
Bovaird (2008) 
Alford and Head (2017) 






No previous research for 
interorganisational networks has 
been done using IQA. 






IQA allowed for identification of 
dimensions by participants. 
Dimensions identified through 
this process are, therefore, 
authentic and not based on any 
available literature. 
- 
Quality of data The rich descriptions collected 
and the availability of senior 
government officials would be 
challenging for an outsider.  
- 
 
8.3.2 Contribution within the community of practice 
Senior managers in government are aware of the ongoing challenges with 
intragovernmental collaborations and with the implementation of the cluster 
approach adopted by the South African government. These issues are not uniquely 
South African and have been studied throughout the world. 
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Different solutions are often proposed and implemented. Within the context of 
addressing the wicked problem of crime, it is not easy to determine where to start. 
It is even more difficult when the strategic management area itself is a wicked 
problem. This research assists managers and policy makers by identifying the 
main dimensions that need to be addressed to improve the strategic management 
framework of the JCPS Cluster and other government clusters.  
The interrelationships between the eight dimensions of intragovernmental 
collaboration provide managers a means of prioritising dimensions in the order of 
importance. For example, in addressing the pervasive challenge of Goal 
Consensus, it is evident that Leadership, Culture, Governance and Collaborative 
Capability need to be addressed.  
To build further on the framework, literature-based models for Leadership, 
Governance, Consensus Building and Collaborative Advantage were developed. 
It was important for the research not only to identify the dimensions but also to 
propose solutions for improving the functionality of the JCPS collaboration in areas 
of importance.  
The current research provides a synopsis of the JCPS collaboration in 2019. The 
research will inform future generations of participants about how the JCPS Cluster 
has changed and evolved over the years. 
8.3.3 Implications 
The objective of the research was to compile a strategic management framework 
that would help senior and top managers to improve their collaboration in 
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addressing crime. The contributions of this study present certain implications for 
theory and the community of practice. 
The IQA process arrived at a set of dimensions of collaborations that have been 
broadly confirmed by seminal works, as well as dimensions that were not as 
generally discussed. The research, therefore, confirms the applicability of IQA 
within interorganisational network theory, and this provides researchers with a 
technique to progress beyond identification of dimensions and to determine the 
relative importance of these dimensions against each other. 
Addressing wicked problems is overwhelming for managers, and this often leads 
to a state of paralysis and despair. In an environment where challenges are 
pervasive, it is often difficult to identify key dimensions confidently and to work 
towards addressing them. This research identified eight key dimensions affecting 
the JCPS collaboration and furthermore, indicated the relative importance of these 
in terms of drivers and outcomes. This is revolutionary because it clarifies a way 
towards improving the JCPS collaboration.  
Although research cannot be generalised, these factors and outcomes present a 
framework for other government-led collaborations in South Africa and other 




An area of concern prior to data collection was the availability of Top Managers to 
participate in the research given their demanding schedules and the small 
population size. Five Top Managers participated in the semi-structured interviews 
and two of them had been acting in Top Management roles for over two years. 
Although the number of participants was lower than recommended, the IQA for 
Top Managers achieved the objective of giving voice to Top Managers as important 
constituents in the process. It should be noted that the purpose of the research 
was qualitative, and their inclusion enriched the research study.  
 
8.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Although the research achieved a number of objectives, there are areas of further 
research that could extend the work that was undertaken: 
• Further research should explore trust and power – these were unique 
findings that require additional research in order to generalise.  
• Conceptualisation of culture within intragovernmental collaborations 
(mandated and directed collaborations) needs to be explored.  
• Further research on intergovernmental collaborations should include a 
number of municipalities working towards a joint objective. This study could 
contribute to collaborations that span different legislatures in the same 
sphere of government. 
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• Additional research into intergovernmental collaborations should be done 
within all three spheres of government to contribute knowledge in 
addressing vertical policy formation and full implementation through 
different spheres of government.  
 
8.6 FINAL REMARKS 
As a Senior Manager and practitioner of strategic management within the JCPS 
Cluster, this research was part of a personal journey to understand 
interorganisational networks and to address a pertinent issue of which I was a part. 
Most of my professional life involved strategic management at an organisational 
level. However, within government, I understood the importance of collaborative 
strategic management and most importantly, the need to make collaborations work 
effectively.  
As a practitioner, I have often heard remarks made by Senior Managers regarding 
the JCPS collaborations such as:  
“It is poor planning that needs to be addressed”.  
“It is the organisational structures that are making it difficult for us to be effective”. 
“It is the political-administration interface that hampers our abilities to plan and 
implement”. 
“It is poor integration of systems that is the problem”.  
“We need a super-department to give direction and break deadlocks”.  
“The only problem we have is poor implementation”.  
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It is these debates that prompted the research to understand the collaborations 
within government better and to identify a roadmap for how to build on the 
successes within the cluster and address some of the pervasive issues that still 
exist. 
I am grateful to both the Senior and Top Managers within the JCPS Cluster who 
supported this research because they saw value in reflecting on what works and 
in addressing the shortcomings. 
This research and the framework that was presented will hopefully respond to the 
question that is often asked, “Where do we start and how?” 
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Annexure B: List of Senior Manager and Top Manager participants  





Chair: Integrated Justice System (IJS) 
Programme 




Director: JCPS Cluster Secretariat DOJCD X X 
Chair: JCPS Performance Monitoring 
Committee 
State Security Agency 
X  
Senior Outcomes Coordinator: Outcome 3 
Department of Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
(DPME) 
X X 
Head: Monitoring and Evaluation 
(Brigadier) 
South African Police Service 
X X 
Director: Office of the Deputy Director of 
Public Prosecutions 
National Prosecuting Authority 
(NPA) Gauteng Region 
X  
Director: Strategic Planning NPA National Office 
 X 
Director: Victim Empowerment 
Programme 
Department of Social 
Development 
X X 
Director: Victim Support; and 




Director: Court Operations DOJCD 
X  
Director: Facilities Management DOJCD 
X X 
Chief Director: Intergovernmental 
Relations 
Department of Correctional 
Services 
 X 
National Legal Manager Legal Aid South Africa 
 X 
 
 Interview participants (Top Managers) 
Participant Organisation 
Deputy Director General: Legislative Development 
Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development (DOJCD) 
Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
Acting Chief Deputy Commissioner: Remand 
Detention 
Department of Correctional Services 
Acting Chair: Development Committee (DevCom) DOJCD 
Outcomes Coordinator: Safety and Security 
Department of Planning, Monitoring 
and Evaluation (DPME) 
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Annexure C: Eight affinities and their descriptions noted by focus 
group participants 
 
# Affinity Descriptions by participants 
1 Silos 
Silo working mentality No Egos (institutional) 
Silo implementation "I" mentality 
Driving own agenda Poor Co-ordination 
Ego Protecting turf 
Eliminate Silos Barriers created: Rank, Gender, 
Race 
My way or the highway 
 
2 Protocols 
Too many structures for similar 
objectives 
Poor continuity 
Many structures within the cluster Many structures within the cluster 
Bureaucracy Misunderstanding the mandate at 
different levels 





Lack of Speedy decision making 
Lack of Continuity Non-adherence to meetings by 
JCPS 
Wheels turn slowly in government 
 
3 Resources 
Lack of Resources to implement the 
APP 
Competition between Departments 
and structures 
Share resources = save costs Reduce/Eliminate Duplication 
Need to use IT systems in place for 
easy monitoring of cases 
Competing priorities 
Alignment of priorities Resources: Financial, Human, 
Time 
Integration of budgets for JCPS 
projects 
Stronger together 
Budget shortage Non-filling of posts 
Share/shared resources Increase efficiency 
Need adequate resources 
 
4 Culture 
Not my problem Poor Teamwork 
No Zeal to compete Sending one message to clients 
Decreasing competitiveness Exclude rather than include 
Common goal setting Lack of buy-in 
Commitment and patience needed Establish Task Teams 
No joint problem ownership No Big Picture 
Team Spirit Lack of mutual respect 
Poor Participation Teamwork - build 
5 Leadership 




Poor accountability Lack of ownership 
Need Learning opportunity/ Skills 
transfer 
Lack of will and passion 
Build capacity for coordination Shared accountability framework 
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# Affinity Descriptions by participants 
Sharing of skills/resources Positive mind set 
Leadership challenges Lack of trust 
Leadership and styles of leadership Lack of cooperation (private 
sector) 
6 Execution 
Problem solving approach Schedules out of sync 
Too many reports Ad-hoc requests 
Non-adherence to timeframes Departmental processes impede 
Agreed timeframes not kept IT Systems not talking to each 
other e.g. SAPS, DCS, DOJCD 
Robust performance monitoring 
needed 
Implementation of IT systems 
without proper consultation 
Too many service providers in place  
7 Planning 
Planning problems Policy vs implementation 
misalignment 
Project Execution Plans (Timelines) Programme and Portfolio needs 
improvement 




Common goals Non-commitment 
Shared values and vision Not understanding or valuing the 
value chain within JCPS 
Brainstorm common objectives Clear desired outcomes 
Co-operation No single view of the problem 
Shared passion Political vs. Administration 
 Over-committed officials 
Unclear mandates Understanding impact 
Collaboration helps people or 
organisations to complement each 
other. This enables knowledge 
sharing. It leads to team 
spirit/teamwork 




Annexure D: Interview protocol for Senior and Top Managers 
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SECTION A: DESCRIPTION OF AFFINITIES 
 
1. SILOS: 
Key descriptive words: Silo working mentality; Driving own agenda; Egos; Protecting turf; 
Poor coordination; No joint budgets; Misalignment of goals; Wheels turn slowly in 
government. 
 






2. RED TAPE: 
Key descriptive words: Too many structures within the cluster; Poorly co-ordinating 
structures; Bureaucracy; Too many meetings - no time for implementation; Complex 
approval processes; Miscommunication between departments; Misunderstanding the 
mandate at different levels; Lack of continuity. 
 







Key descriptive words: Lack of resources to implement programmes; Poor use of 
resources; Misalignment of priorities; Lack of integration of budgets for JCPS projects; 
Competition between Departments and structures for funds; Duplication of efforts; Poor 
management of IT resources. 
 







Key descriptive words: Public Service Mentality; Lack of accountability; Culture of non-
compliance; Command and Control leading to malicious compliance; “Not my problem”; 
No zeal to compete; Rank issues; Poor Participation; Poor teamwork. 
Establish Task Teams; Exclude rather than include; Lack of buy-in; No Big Picture;  
 







Key descriptive words: Lack of accountability; Poor leadership and poor leadership 
styles; Poor ethics; Lack of ownership; Lack of will and passion; No shared 
accountability framework; Lack of cooperation; No generational mix; No visionary 
leadership 
 







Key descriptive words: Too many reports; Non-adherence to timeframes; Robust 
performance monitoring needed; Too many service providers in place stifling execution; 
Planning schedules out of sync; Poor attendance by appropriate leadership; 
IT Systems not talking to each other e.g. SAPS, DCS, DOJCD; Implementation of IT 
systems without proper consultation. 
 






Key descriptive words: No proper cluster plan – silo plan; Lack of integrated planning; 
Compliance-driven planning process; Lack of vision; Silo mentality; Departments drive 
own agendas; Project execution plan (Timelines) needed; Policy vs. implementation 
misalignment; Misalignment of planning timelines; Under-targeting 
 





8. SHARING GOALS: 
Key descriptive words: Need Common goals; Shared values and vision; poor 
cooperation; Shared passion; Need to improve knowledge sharing;  
Unclear mandates; Understand impact; No incentive for collaboration; Non-commitment; 
Not understanding or valuing the value chain within JCPS; No single view of the problem; 
Political vs. Administration goals; Social crime prevention not prioritised. 
 







SECTION B: AFFINITY RELATIONSHIPS 
2. Can you describe the relationship between Affinities listed below? 
3. Can you provide examples to illustrate the relationship where necessary? 
 
Affinity Relationships 
1. Silos    2. Red Tape 
 
1. Silos    3. Resources. 
 
1. Silos    4. Culture 
 
1. Silos    5. Leadership 
 
1. Silos    6. Execution 
 
1. Silos    7. Planning 
 
1. Silos    8. Sharing Goals 
 




2. Red Tape    4. Culture 
 
2. Red Tape    5. Leadership 
 
  
2. Red Tape    6. Execution 
 
  
2. Red Tape    7. Planning 
 
  
2. Red Tape    8. Sharing Goals 
  
3. Resources    4. Culture 
 
  
3. Resources    5. Leadership 
 




3. Resources    7. Planning 
 
3. Resources    8. Sharing Goals 
  




4. Culture    6. Execution 
 
4. Culture    7. Planning 
 
4. Culture    8. Sharing Goals 
 
5. Leadership    6. Execution 
 




5. Leadership    8. Sharing Goals 
  
6. Execution    7. Planning 
 
6. Execution    8. Sharing Goals 
 













Annexure E: Interrelationships between affinities and explanations by 
Senior Manager participants 
 
Primary Driver: Leadership (5) 
Leadership (5) was classified as a primary driver by Senior Managers interviewed. As a 




Many of the relationships under leadership are straight forward and did not require any 
explanation from participants. Additional quotations that explain causal relationships 
between leadership and other affinities were the following:  
 
Silos exist because of failure to integrate, which is one. Now, what causes 
as not to integrate? It can be the lack of leadership at the top, to say how do 
we integrate and how do we implement and how do we ensure consistency 
in terms of implementation. [Participant 11; 2513] 
 
 
It is the leadership that enables red tape. In fact, some of the leaders that 
come of the ranks do not know anything else but red tape. They don’t know 
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anything else but bureaucratic systems… Leadership is grown in a red tape 
environment. They cannot unravel the red tape. [Participant 12: 3439] 
 
Good and coordinated leadership equals good execution and planning, as 
well. [Participant: 11 2989] 
 
Good leadership means leads to appropriate sharing of goals. [Participant
 11; 2996] 
 
Unless we get to a point where there is real cluster leadership and the 
planning from the top is integrated, then the rest will fall into place.  3
 566 
 
All of that requires solid management and leadership, geared towards 
execution. [Participant 3: 652] 
 
So, there was capacity to analyse budgets, because that leadership 
understood that we needed to create that culture where we know that our 
budgets impact on each other. They would cut resources or budgets based 
on the analysis. [Participant 6: 1786] 
 
Secondary Driver: Culture 
Culture as a secondary driver was found to be influenced by Leadership and influences all 




Quotations explaining culture as a secondary driver are discussed below: 
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If you have inculcated the right organisational culture, your planning would 
definitely improve, because then you would have brought in the leadership that 
says this is where we are going and people would be as excited about creating 
nice things. [Participant 3: 755] 
 
But does culture land itself to creating red tape. I would say yes. Culture is red 
tape friendly. But this is not the only issues with culture, it is but one of the 
elements. Culture is very tolerant to red tape. [Participant: 12: 3433] 
 
I think leadership is responsible, not necessarily for the culture because the 
leaders may have found it there. But they are unable to change the culture. I 
can’t see them causing the culture, but they are unable to change it. [Participant: 
12; 3514] 
 
In order for the execution process to change, you need some level of culture 
shock in the organisation. You need leadership to ensure that the culture shock 
is there. Then you need to start making sure that you have the right skill to 
inspire people to do the things and you move on. [Participant 3: 657] 
 
Leadership will commit time, resources and intellectual capacity to develop the 
culture. [Participant 6: 1782] 
 
We set goals and reactively go back to others. And that culture makes our 
planning weak. [Participant 6: 1822] 
 
It's culture resulting in silos. Culture causes us to work in silos. People want to 
main it. [Participant 11: 2769] 
 
Secondary Driver: Protocols 
Protocols3 was found to be one of the drivers of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration, 
which is influenced by culture and leadership. 
 




Participants describe relationships as follows: 
I think it is red tape resulting in silos. For instance, if you know that within 
departments it takes 8 months for you to get the actual signature. Now you won’t 
be comfortable to take it to another department for you to do it in another 8 
months. You will be discouraged from engaging other stakeholders. [Participant 
1: 257] 
 
At what levels can you plan? There are certain levels where you should be able 
to plan and execute. But organisational red tape requires you to go through 
hoops in order to execute.  [Participant 6: 1708] 
 
. {Red Tape → Execution} It’s a problem because of the issue of red tape. The 
personnel will do those reports, but they still need to go to their DG’s for sign 
off. Maybe the DG is not even there. Now you look at your timeframes… it is 
problematic [Participant 8: 1957] 
 
{Red Tape → Planning} Why people target less? It’s because of red tapes. 
People do not want to target more because they know that red tapes are going 
to impede them, and they will be punished for not delivering. Yet the main 
challenge is the red tape: To get approval of the system and to get procurement. 
So those are the issues. [Participant 11: 2694] 
 
It’s red tape that pushes us to work in silos. [Participant 8: 2078] 
 
Red tape leads to resource issues. If there was no red tape, we would all be 
one. [Participant 11: 2822] 
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Red Tape would affect your planning. But on the other hand, poor planning will 
lead to more red tape. Red tape will obviously affect your ability to plan, but then 
poor planning would result in more red tape. [Participant 12: 3464] 
 
Secondary Outcome: Silos 
Silos was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences planning, execution and 




Participants expressed the following sentiments regarding silos: 
{Silos → Execution} Now added to that, all the other issues impede the strategy 
execution. The fact that even people within Departments may be working in 
silos, never mind across departments. [Participant 12:  3189] 
 
{Resources → Silos} When you have less resources you are forced to go out 
and collaborate with people. I wouldn’t say silos are encouraged by the 
unavailability of resources. But I would say, when you have the luxury of 
resources, you can work in silos. [Participant 1: 230] 
 
{Silos → Planning} Then people will start doing things on their own and say: But 
that thing is not working, but on my own I can be able to achieve this thing. I will 
continue with my own plans”. [11 2512] 
 
{Silos → Planning} We all still plan. All our plans are, for all intends and 
purposes, silos. But we bring them together into one document. I’ll give an 
example. With sexual offences courts, I have no idea why we are not planning 
together every year. [6  1411] 
 
Secondary Outcome: Resources 
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Resources was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences planning, execution 




Participants shared the following explanations regarding resources: 
{Planning → Resources} It’s not quite joint planning. That’s why we have 
inequitable resources across the cluster.  [Participant 6: 1767] 
 
{Planning → Resources} Poor planning leads to poor use of resources. Poor 
planning is leading to poor application of resources. [Participant 12:
 3501] 
 
{Planning → Resources} Whatever priority that needs to happen in this five-year 
period, these are the kind of resources that are needed. And with these kind of 
resources that are needed, in terms of human, in terms of money, in terms of 
tools of trade, this is how we need to then share the budget across to make sure 
that our priorities at the end of the day are achieved.  [Participant 13:
 3681] 
 
{Sharing Goals →Resources} If we were sharing goals, we would avoid 
duplication, but as it is currently, as long as we have resources, we go with what 
we are comfortable with. It doesn’t necessarily force us to share.
 [Participant 1: 277] 
 
{Planning → Resources} We do integrated planning and then we can do proper 
allocation of resources based on common priorities. [Participant 3: 767] 
 
Minister of Police keeps arresting but is not assisting the other one to say, at an 
integration level, how do arrest, how do we share resources. Sharing of 
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resources can also assist us to move away from silos. [Participant 11:
 2526] 
 
{Culture → Resources} For instance, the current culture within the JCPS, that 
is a bit cohesive, essentialises ICT. You can check within the cluster how ICT 
has received resources compared to Public Education and Communication and 
other goals that we have. [Participant 6: 1741] 
 
Secondary Outcome: Planning 
Planning was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and 




Explanations shared by participants regarding the relationship between planning and other 
affinities were the following: 
{Culture →Planning} Culture results in the planning. Our culture determines 
the sort of planning that takes place [Participant 8: 2046 -7] 
 
{Planning → Resources} I gave an example that people know that whatever 
they put into the MTSF will be resourced, so planning determines the budget.
 [Participant 8: 2040] 
 
{Sharing Goals →Planning} Sharing of goals provide directions to our planning.
  [8: 2059] 
 
{Culture → Planning} Culture affects planning. Culture is your foundation. 
[Participant 11: 2962] 
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{Culture → Planning} I think the culture will contribute to planning issues. 
 [Participant 12: 3520] 
 
{Leadership → Planning} Good and coordinated leadership equals good 
execution and planning, as well. [Participant 11: 2989] 
 
{Planning → Resources} Poor planning leads to poor use of resources.
 [Participant 12: 3501] 
 
Secondary Outcome: Sharing Goals 
Sharing goals was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and 
planning and is influenced by the remaining five affinities: 
 
 
Participants’ descriptions of the relationship between sharing goals and the rest of the 
affinity are the following: 
{Sharing Goals → Planning} But if we can start sharing goals and having a 
common vision, then we can plan better, because we can have integrated 
planning. We can do integrated planning and we can do proper allocation of 
resources based on common priorities. [Participant 3: 767] 
 
{Silos → Sharing Goals} I think it is silos that result in poor sharing of goals. 
[Participant 9: 2437] 
 
Primary Outcome: Execution 




Description of relationships between execution and others are described as 
follows: 
{Red Tape → Execution} Maybe the red tape is creating a problem in terms of 
execution because people don't see the sentiment of a bigger goal in terms of 
the plans, the outcome or the impact that you will have as an individual.  
[Participant 11: 2648] 
 
{Leadership → Execution} Good and coordinated leadership equals good 
execution and planning, as well. [Participant 11: 2989] 
 
{Planning → Execution} Poor planning will lead to poor execution. [Participant 
12: 3545] 
 
{All Affinities → Execution} Now added to that, all the other issues impede the 
strategy execution!  [Participant 12: 3189] 
 
{Red Tape → Execution} Execution is influenced by the amount of red tape. It 
{Red Tape} slows it down.   [Participant 6: 1696] 
 
{Leadership → Execution} For argument's sake if ever leadership doesn't make 
time for me how do I implement what I have just shown you? 
 [Participant 5: 1297] 
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Annexure F: Interrelationships between affinities and explanations by 
Top Manager participants 
 
Primary Driver: Leadership (5) 
Leadership (5) was classified as a primary driver by Top Managers interviewed. As a 




Top Managers described leadership as a primary driver as follows: 
 
It is absolutely critical because that's where the leadership comes from 
the top. And the leadership drives the sharing of goals. And the 
leadership undoes the issues of silos. [Participant 15: 712] 
 
I think a challenge is, I don’t think there’s enough teamwork in terms of 
the activities and that goes hand in hand with the leadership issues. So, 
if you’ve got poor leadership then it cascades down, through lack of 
teamwork and integration of activities, etc. and so on.  [Participant 
17: 1194] 
 
The leadership influences the culture, because your leadership, it sorts 




Secondary Driver: Culture 
Culture as a secondary driver was found to be influenced by leadership and influences six 




Explanations from Top Managers regarding lead Culture as a secondary driver as the 
following: 
 
Yes. The culture is impacting on the planning. The current culture is 
impacting on the bad planning. [Participant 15: 724] 
 
I mean, because culture will flow from the values... But you’ll have to 
change the leadership before we get to any of that. 
[Participant 18: 1453] 
 
 
Secondary Driver: Silos 
Silos was identified as a secondary driver of the JCPS intragovernmental collaboration, 
which is influenced by culture and leadership and influences Protocols, Planning, Sharing 
Goals and Execution. Silos and Resources were considered not to have an influence on 




Explanation for the relationships between silos and other affinities were descried as 
follows: 
Silos lead to poor execution. Because there’s limited knowledge that an 
individual department has. There are a lot of processes that you don’t 
know, especially those areas that are cross-cutting. [Participant 14: 398] 
 
Leadership, because the leadership can put an end to the silos. 
[Participant 15: 772] 
 
If there are the silos, it will be difficult to come up with shared goals. 
[Participant 16: 1075] 
 
Well, no, red tape will influence your resources, it won’t give you people. 
Silos influence that. Silos influence planning. Silos influence executions. 
[Participant 18: 1537] 
 
Pivot: Protocols 
Protocols4 was influenced by three affinities, namely leadership, culture and silos, and 
influences three others, namely sharing goals, execution and planning. Protocols and 
Resources were considered not to have an influence on each other.  
 
 
4 The Affinity Red Tape was renamed Protocols after interviews were conducted 
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Being a pivot means it is neither a driver nor an outcome and is the link between drivers of 




Participants provided the following description for relationships related to Protocols: 
I’m not breaching the red tape because I want to. I want to improve on 
my execution. So, the red tape has got also an impact in the execution.
 [Participant 14: 442] 
 
Yes, yes in both ways, because even if you don’t want to make decision 
as a leader, you use red tape. [Participant 14: 430] 
 
Red tape influences sharing goals. Because if there's a lot of red tape 
you're not going to share goals. [Participant 18 : 1527] 
 
Secondary Outcome: Resources 
Resources was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences Planning, Execution 
and is influenced by Leadership, Culture and Sharing Goals. Two affinities, Protocols and 




Participants provided the following description for relationships related to Resources: 
 
Leadership impacts resources, because if you have got a very strong 
leader that is advocating for resources, you are likely to get ...
 [Participant 14: 477] 
 
Yes, yes. Resources has got much more weight towards planning, 
because now, in my branch, I was discussing with people that there are 
so many things that I would have loved to put, but we can’t do, I don’t 
have personnel. Now we have to prioritize what we can do, because the 
plan is not about warm bodies. You have to look also, these bodies they 
attend meetings, these bodies are starting, are they going to be in the 
office. We have to visit regions. Is that all doable, with all these 
commitments? Resources influence the plan. [Participant 14: 517] 
 
The resources, because you know, you have some departments who just 
have so much. So, it’s definitely resources to silos.  [Participant 
15: 776] 
 
Even when the resources are inadequate, as leaders you must say how 
we do more with the little that we have. It’s a leadership decision. It’s not 
the resources that can tell you how to do more. It’s the leadership. 
[Participant 16: 1051] 
 
Well, it can be that your resources, if you have resources your execution 
can work, so, let’s go like that.  
Leadership to resources, that way. [Participant 18: 1519] 
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Secondary Outcome: Planning 
Planning was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and sharing 




The following were explanations provided by participants on the relationships between 
planning and other affinities: 
 
No, it’s the culture that is stronger than planning. [Participant 14: 541] 
 
Yes. The culture impacts on the planning. The current culture is impacting 
on the bad planning. [Participant 15: 724] 
 
Red Tape has a bearing on poor planning. [Participant 16:1063] 
 
 
Secondary Outcome: Sharing Goals 
Sharing goals was identified as a secondary outcome, which influences execution and 







 I think there is a need to inculcate a culture of working together, right. 
That you must have. The minute you have that it seems to me it becomes 
easier to say, these goals we’re identified them jointly and therefore we 
share them as our common goals. [Participant 16:1027] 
 
Culture is actually not supposed to be, but it can be about sharing goals. 
So, let’s say, let’s just say culture drives sharing goals, okay. Culture can 
also drive planning. [Participant 18: 1505] 
 
Primary Outcome: Execution 





Explanations for Execution as a primary outcome were as follows: 
Leadership monitors executions. [Participant 15: 716] 
 
There’s definitely a link. Planning comes first and then execution. 
[Participant 15: 708] 
 
Because you have the goals now, right. And you now have you execute 
that. So, the execution is informed by the joined determined goals. That 















Annexure H: Individual Systems Influence Diagrams: Top 
Managers 
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